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ABSTRACT 
 
REVAMPING THE UNITED STATES ORGAN DONATION SYSTEM: AN ETHICAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR COMPENSATED LIVE ORGAN DONATION 
 
 
 
By 
Jordan G. Potter, M.A. 
May 2017 
 
Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerard Magill 
With over 100,000 Americans currently on organ waiting lists in the United States, the 
mass shortage of viable organs for transplantation is one of the most pressing healthcare issues 
that we face as a country today. Thousands of these individuals on organ waiting lists will 
ultimately die waiting on an organ transplant that will never come. Many differing proposals 
have been discussed with the aim of increasing organ donation rates and the raw number of 
organs available for transplant, including changing our default consent status for cadaveric organ 
donation and the option of incentivizing organ donation by compensating live donors with 
financial incentives. Iran is the only nation in the world that currently has a legally regulated 
system of compensated live organ donation (CLOD), specifically for kidneys, and it has been 
successful since its implementation, even eradicating its kidney waiting list, which no other 
nation in the world can claim. However, even with this practical success, CLOD has been a very 
v 
controversial concept in the professional bioethics literature, and it has been labeled as unethical 
and illegal in many Western countries, including the United States.  
This dissertation utilizes arguments and principles from applied ethics, political 
philosophy, and behavioral economics to ethically and practically analyze the need for 
revamping the entire United States organ donation system, including both live and cadaveric 
organ donation. The primary focus of this dissertation will be on justifying the ethical basis of 
CLOD in the United States, and a practical model of CLOD will be proposed that also includes 
significant changes to the cadaveric organ donation system. 
 The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter one gives a brief overview of the issues and 
debate surrounding CLOD. Chapter two provides the necessary background context for 
establishing the practical need and feasibility of a system of CLOD in the United States, 
including examining past, present, and future systems of organ donation and situating the 
medical, moral, and political bases of a potential system of CLOD in the United States. Chapters 
three and four examine the major ethical components and arguments for and against CLOD, 
including but not limited to the ethical principles of principlism and the objections from 
exploitation and commodification. Chapter five ethically analyzes the differing types of 
cadaveric organ donation and examines several other potential proposals for procuring organs. 
And finally, chapter six amalgamates the previous arguments and develops them into a complete 
proposal for a practical model to revamp the current United States organ donation system to 
create a more efficient and ethical system of organ donation, procurement, and transplantation. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 In a December 2007 bulletin, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that 66,000 
kidney transplants, 21,000 liver transplants, and 6,000 heart transplants occurred globally in 
2005.1 In the United States less than a decade later, the United States transplant organization, the 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which is ran by the private, non-
profit United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), reports that over 121,000 Americans are 
currently on the United States’ organ transplant waiting list alone, and approximately 100,000 of 
those individuals comprise the kidney waiting list.2 In addition, nearly 15,000 Americans are 
waiting on a liver transplant, and thousands upon thousands more are waiting for heart, pancreas, 
lung, and intestine transplants.3 It’s estimated that the US organ waiting list is growing by 
upwards of several thousand patients per year.4 
 These statistics highlight the growing crisis that is the global organ shortage. In virtually 
every nation around the world, the demand for viable organs for transplantation greatly exceeds 
the available supply. Many differing proposals have been discussed with the aim of increasing 
organ donation rates and the raw number of organs available for transplant, including changing 
our default consent status for cadaveric organ donation and the option of incentivizing organ 
donation by compensating live donors with financial incentives. Iran is the only nation in the 
world that currently has a legally regulated system of compensated live organ donation (CLOD), 
specifically for kidneys, and it has been successful since its implementation, even eradicating its 
kidney waiting list, which no other nation in the world can claim. However, even with this 
practical success, CLOD has been a very controversial concept in the professional literature, and 
it has been labeled an unethical and illegal practice in many Western countries, including the 
United States.  
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Utilizing arguments and principles from applied ethics, political philosophy, and 
behavioral economics, this dissertation aims to completely revamp the United States organ 
transplant system, including both live and cadaveric organ donation, with the main focus on 
providing a political and ethical justification for adopting a legally regulated system of CLOD 
throughout the United States, along with positing a new proposal for cadaveric organ donation 
that connects a mandated choice philosophy with a presumed consent default status. Chapter one 
begins the dissertation by laying the foundation for the thesis. This is accomplished by giving a 
brief introduction and discussion into each step that is required to develop and argue this thesis, 
including an introduction to the practical need and context for CLOD, the ethical principles and 
arguments for and against CLOD, the various differing proposals surrounding cadaveric and 
imminent death organ donation, and the practical model of CLOD that this dissertation proposes. 
1.1) Practical Need for Compensated Live Organ Donation 
 With organs being a scarce valuable resource, various different attempts have been made 
by nations to garner the most viable organs as possible for transplantation. Generally, these 
organizational attempts have centered on systems of cadaveric organ donation, but certain other 
systems have existed that revolved around creating incentives, especially financial incentives, to 
promote live organ donation. Though several of these systems of incentives have definitively 
shown their ability to increase raw organ donation and transplantation numbers, and even 
eliminate waiting lists in one example, they have largely, and in some cases of unregulated 
markets, justifiably, been met by skepticism and disgust due to alleged ethical concerns dealing 
with the use of financial incentives for promoting organ donation.5 However, due to the fact that 
these incentives are highly effective at increasing the raw numbers of viable organs for 
transplantation and the inherent time limit that would be set on these methods due to the ongoing 
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developments in the realm of regenerative medicine that are relevant to organ transplantation, 
perhaps it is time that we give compensated organ donation another look.6 
 The differing systems of organ donation and transplantation of the past and present can 
primarily be divided into two groups: non-compensated systems of organ donation and 
compensated systems of organ donation. These groups are then further broken down into various 
different formats and types, such as opt-in legislation versus opt-out legislation and unregulated, 
open markets versus regulated, closed markets. The most common type of organ donation system 
involves cadaveric donation, and the two main types of cadaveric donation systems are opt-in 
and opt-out systems.7 Opt-in systems, otherwise known as explicit or informed consent systems, 
require potential donors to “opt in” to a donor registry in order to be considered a donor 
candidate upon death. On the other hand, opt-out or presumed consent systems require 
individuals to “opt out” of the presumed donor status if they do not wish to donate their organs 
upon their death. Both systems come in hard and soft formats. Soft formats allow the deceased’s 
family to veto donation, whereas hard formats do not allow the family this option.8 A lesser 
known and used intermediary between these two systems is a system known as mandated choice 
or required response, and this system opts to mandate individuals to explicitly define their 
preference for donation. This system will be discussed in more detail later on in the dissertation.9  
 Intuitively, it would seem that opt-out systems are more efficient than opt-in systems at 
increasing the viable organ supply. In 2002, thirteen out of the top fifteen nations in number of 
people donating organs per million were nations with opt-out systems, including Spain, Austria, 
and Belgium making up three of the top four nations.10 Today the disparity between the two 
systems is even greater with the opt-out systems of Spain (35 people per million), Croatia (34 
people per million), and Belgium (30 people per million) producing many more viable organs 
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than the opt-in systems of the US (25 people per million), UK (18 people per million), and 
Germany (12 people per million).11 However, others have recently challenged this claim on two 
main fronts. First, some argue that the apparent necessity to receive the deceased’s family’s 
permission for donation, even in opt-out countries, is just as much of an obstacle for opt-out 
systems as opt-in systems. Second, others argue that other contextual factors are at play beyond 
the differences in consent. For example, some studies have shown that the difference between 
donation rates in opt-in countries versus opt-out countries is negligible after controlling for the 
differences in each country’s relevant mortality.12 Other contextual factors might be the 
environment of organ donation, including the attention paid towards organ donation and its 
priority within the nation. Many point to the very active and energetic approach that Spain took 
towards organ donation to show that other contextual factors are in play. Whatever the case may 
be, though, it is undeniable that neither system can effectively eliminate or greatly reduce organ 
waiting lists on their own, and both systems ultimately require live donors to meet their quota.13  
But simply allowing live organ donation itself is not sufficient to meet the demand for 
viable organs. This is evidenced by the failures of many new policies to effectively increase the 
raw numbers, i.e. expanding brain death criteria, raising donor age limit, allowing altruistic 
donations from strangers, etc., in addition to the many national waiting lists today in countries 
with live organ donation.14 Rather, live organ donation must be incentivized in order to attract 
enough donors to even come close to meeting the demand for viable organs available for 
transplantation. The effectiveness of incentivizing donation has been well documented in the 
countries of Iran, India, and the Philippines, among others, even if some of these examples have 
largely been considered unethical.15 Before 1994, India had an open market on kidney sales, i.e. 
no legislation governing it, and the use of monetary compensation for kidney donation made 
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India one of the largest transplant centers in the world with low organ prices and almost 
immediate availability.16 The Philippines was also in a similar situation up until 2008, and it 
became one of the world’s hotspots for organ transplants due to an abundance of available 
organs to purchase for transplantation at a low price.17 Unfortunately, human rights abuses and 
other ethical issues stemming from a lack of regulation and the presence of organ brokers began 
to occur in these countries, leading to a ban on unrelated living organ donation in India in 1994.18 
A similar ban on foreign unrelated living organ donation occurred in the Philippines in 2008.19 
Similar situations were also true of Pakistan and Bangladesh until 2010 (the ratification of the 
Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Ordiance) and 1999 (the passing of the Organ 
Transplant Act), respectively, though there are reports of a large, illegal, underground black 
market in Bangladesh still today.20 
Iran is another example of a system of CLOD, specifically in kidneys, that has notably 
increased the amount of viable organs available for transplantation. Similar to India, Iran began 
as an unregulated international market, but sweeping changes in the early 1990’s led to strict 
regulations being imposed on the kidney buying process.21 These changes and incentives have 
been effective, even eliminating Iran’s kidney waiting list since 1999.22 By allotting two separate 
monetary payments to donors in a highly regulated process, with the help of charities, Iran has 
effectively incentivized live kidney donation without falling into the perilous terrain of organ 
brokers and organ trafficking that was seen in India and the Philippines.23 This avoidance of 
brokers and the black market is primarily due to the role played by Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) that regulate and manage the administrative process of matching donors 
and recipients.24 These NGOs, such as the Iranian Patients’ Kidney Foundation and the Dialysis 
and Transplant Patients Association, are known as the Anjomans in Iran, and they’re primarily 
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made up of Iranian volunteers who are organ transplant recipients themselves.25 Of course, this 
doesn’t mean that the Iranian model is perfect, because it suffers from two significant ethical 
flaws that must be addressed in any American model – extreme bodily commodification and a 
lack of consistent interpretation of laws, oversight, and regulations across the provinces of Iran. 
A final example of incentivized and compensated donation is the case of Israel. Unlike 
India, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, though, Israel does not use monetary 
compensation to incentivize organ donation. Rather, Israel uses several non-financial incentives 
to promote both live and cadaveric organ donation, including prioritization in matters of organ 
allocation. This is akin to a strategy known as a “nudge” or libertarian paternalism, though it’s 
technically not a “nudge” itself, which I’ll discuss in more detail later with mandated choice 
cadaveric organ donation.26 If an individual either donates an organ to another or signs up to be a 
cadaveric donor, they are granted priority over non-donors in cases of organ allocation and organ 
waiting lists.27 In addition to this incentive, other financial reimbursements are granted, including 
reimbursements for lost wages, travel and medical expenses, and five years’ worth of life and 
health insurance. The introduction of these incentives greatly increased both the number of 
deceased organ donors and the number of newly signed donor cards, highlighting yet another 
example of the practical need and effectiveness of compensated donation.28 Thus, it’s clear that 
incentivized live organ donation, including both financial and non-financial incentives, is an 
effective way to increase organ donation rates and the total raw numbers of viable organs. 
 Beyond changes in consent policies and providing incentives for live organ donation, 
there is also substantial hope that in the near future scientific advancements can also help 
alleviate the current mass shortage of organs, specifically by harnessing the power of stem cells 
and regenerative medicine, which is defined as: 
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…an emerging interdisciplinary field of research and clinical applications focused on the repair, 
replacement or regeneration of cells, tissues or organs to restore impaired function resulting from 
any cause, including congenital defects, disease, trauma and aging. It uses a combination of 
several technological approaches that moves it beyond traditional transplantation and replacement 
therapies. These approaches may include, but are not limited to, the use of soluble molecules, gene 
therapy, stem cell transplantation, tissue engineering and the reprogramming of cell and tissue 
types.29 
This significant promise is due to the powerful nature of stem cells. Stem cells have the ability to 
differentiate into many differing specialized cell types in the body, which is a characteristic 
known as pluripotency.30 Cell-based therapies utilize this ability by inducing differentiation into 
certain types of cells needed to repair or regenerate damaged tissues or organs.31 In this regard, 
stem cell therapy might work on two different mechanisms. First, this therapy might work as a 
“vehicle that delivers complex signals to a target tissue without actually integrating into the 
tissue itself.” Via this mechanism, stem cells actually function as drug-like entities to deliver 
drug-like effects, such as anti-inflammation, to the damaged tissues. There is even evidence of 
the efficacy of this mechanism in certain recent studies, though this is controversial because it is 
not well understood how this mechanism operates. Second, stem cells could also “restore tissue 
function…as integrated participants in the target tissue,” i.e. by ultimately becoming regenerated 
tissue of the targeted organ.32  
Though there is still much to learn and many practical hurdles that keep this method from 
being a widespread clinical tool today, this second mechanism is the more desired and useful 
method that is hoped to become a practical reality in the near future, though the transplantation 
of hematopoietic stem cells, i.e. ultimately bone marrow transplants, is an actual practical 
example of this mechanism that is in use today. Rather than merely relying on some poorly 
understood beneficial side effects of stem cell-based therapies, actual diseased tissue, such as 
cardiac tissue, could be regenerated and replaced in the heart itself. Further, thanks to the 
promises of induced pluripotent stem cells, which are essentially reprogrammed adult stem cells 
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that are extremely similar to embryonic human stem cells, autologous cell replacements could 
ultimately make these therapies much more effective by eliminating the issues of 
immunosuppression and host rejection.33 Similar types of genetic therapies also have the 
potential to cure genetic diseases by taking advantage of certain viruses’ ability to attach to a 
host’s DNA and supplant certain genes and utilizing these genetically-engineered viruses that are 
equipped with the healthy gene in order to replace the damaged or dysfunctional gene.34 This can 
be completed by direct gene transfer or through living stem cells as vehicles for gene transfer, 
which is even more useful with the versatility of induced pluripotent stem cells.35 These 
therapies ultimately avoid the need for burdensome transplantation procedures, which also come 
with a life-sentence of medication to prevent organ rejection. Thus, both cell-based and genetic 
therapies are extremely valuable methods for regenerative medicine to deal with issues of organ 
and tissue ailments both now and in the future.36 
Another method of regenerative medicine that is also showing promise for future 
application to organ waiting lists is the concept of tissue engineering. Essentially, tissue 
engineering “is an interdisciplinary field that applies the principles of engineering and the life 
sciences toward the development of biological substitutes that restore, maintain, or improve 
tissue function.”37 In fact, tissue engineering can be seen as a middle ground option between the 
more fundamental aspects of regenerative medicine in stem cell-based and genetic therapies, 
where tissues and organs are regenerated, for the most part, in vivo from the application of stem 
cells, and the more practical and current aspects of allogenic transplants of whole tissues and 
organs. By utilizing “natural, synthetic, or semisynthetic tissue and organ mimics that are fully 
functional from the start, or that grow into the required functionality,” tissue engineering 
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provides a middle ground option to grow tissues and organs ex vivo, most likely from autologous 
cells, which can then be transplanted into the individual.38  
The process of tissue engineering is rather complex, and it necessarily involves three 
different components, named the tissue engineering triad – stem cells, scaffolds, and growth-
stimulating signals for the cells to grow. Scaffolds are similar to the extracellular matrix found 
surrounding most cells. In fact, they’re produced to mimic the functions of the extracellular 
matrix itself, because the extracellular matrix is essentially just a complex framework, or a 
skeleton in a sense, that gives tissues shape and acts as a mediator and in-between amongst the 
various cells that reside in its vicinity.39 Scaffolds then work as a complex skeleton from which 
stem cells and the growth stimulating agents and materials are embedded. Ideally, after being 
embedded an optimal microenvironment for cellular growth appears, and the stem cells grow, 
proliferate, and fill out the structure that is given by the scaffold. After a certain amount of 
growth, the newly formed tissue is implanted into the individual, and as the cells begin and 
continue to proliferate, differentiate, and integrate into the surrounding tissue, the degradable 
scaffold itself ultimately dissolves and the tissue starts functioning as it should.40  
These scaffolds can be made from natural or synthetic biomaterials, though one of the 
easiest ways is to use extracellular matrix itself after it has been decellularized, i.e. stripped of its 
cells.41 But 3D printing has opened new doors for tissue engineering, which is why research is 
now moving towards 3D organ printing. Organ printing is defined as a “rapid prototyping 
computer-aided 3D printing technology, based on using layer by layer deposition of cell and/or 
cell aggregates into a 3D gel with sequential maturation of the printed construct into perfused 
and vascularized living tissue or organ.”42 Essentially, 3D bioprinting involves a 3D printer that 
harnesses a modified inkjet technology to develop a 3D tissue or organ from a 2D CT scan 
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blueprint. Upon a biocompatible and degradable scaffold, the 3D bioprinter applies this “ink,” 
which is essentially a medium made up of growth factors and living stem cells that have been 
differentiated to the appropriate type for the tissue, in a layered format to ultimately achieve the 
3D object.43 The success of these methods of 3D bioprinting is substantial. In 2014, 
approximately $537 million was spent on printed body parts throughout the United States, and 
researchers regularly used printed tissues and simple organs to test experimental drugs.44 Though 
issues with vascularity limit the potential applications of 3D bioprinting to smaller tissues at the 
moment, new research is progressing on advancing life-sustaining vascular networks for the 
possibility of printing larger and more complex tissues and organs. Thus, though this technology 
is currently limited to simpler types of tissues, tissue engineering as a whole has immense value 
to regenerative medicine’s application to organ and tissue ailments, and eventually we’ll have the 
knowledge, technology, and resources to make modern day transplants between individuals a 
thing of the past.45 
A final method of regenerative medicine is the concept of xenotransplantation, which is 
the transplantation of tissue from one species into another. This concept actually dates back to 
the 1960’s, with one patient transplanted with a kidney from a chimpanzee actually surviving for 
nine months, though the patient and others ultimately died from the effects of xenorejection from 
the transplant.46 The “Baby Fae” case in 1984 of a newborn infant who died after rejection of a 
xenograft heart transplant is also another infamous case of xenotransplantation gone wrong.47 
These cases highlight the biggest hurdle in xenotransplantation - the issue of xenorejection, i.e. 
the natural incompatibility and ultimate rejection of xenografts transplanted into differing 
species. This is mainly due to the cell surface antigen alpha-Gal that all nonprimates possess, 
because humans have antibodies that cause immediate rejection when they come into contact 
 11 
with alpha-Gal in these animal cells. Two main methods are currently being researched to 
overcome this hurdle. The first involves utilizing genetic engineering to change the genetic 
makeup of tissues in order to avoid xenorejection.48 
 The second method would be to make human/nonhuman chimeras to try and avoid 
xenorejection. Human/nonhuman chimeras are organisms that are composed from two different 
sets of cells from differing species – one human and one not. Generally, chimeras are created by 
integrating two different embryos, and this results in cells from differing origins in many 
different tissues throughout the body. If the process of localizing the chimera’s human cells in 
certain tissues and organs in high enough proportions is perfected, then human/nonhuman 
chimeras could conceivably be viable organ donors for human recipients. Though this is far from 
being a clinical reality, the recent advances in knowledge of induced pluripotent stem cells and 
“the ad hoc creation of solid organs within…chimeras” might make the use of human/nonhuman 
(specifically pig) chimeras a real possibility for organ transplantation in the near future.49 
However, the most promising chimeric and xenotransplantation research involves the new 
CRISPR technology. By utilizing the gene editing capabilities of CRISPR, it may be possible to 
delete a pig embryo’s ability to grow a pancreas (or other organ), implant human induced 
pluripotent cells to replace that ability in the pig embryo’s DNA, and grow a human pancreas 
within the pig fetus. There is actually already a current team at the University of California, 
Davis experimenting with this type of procedure, though they are only allowing the embryo to 
grow for 28 days before ultimately destroying it for analysis.50 
 Thus, there are numerous different potential future applications of regenerative medicine 
that hold the promise to make long organ and tissue scarcities a thing of the past. Though there 
are some ethical issues inherent within some of these potential methods, including issues of 
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justice, allocation, and animal rights, most of these methods, outside of certain elements of 
xenotransplantation, seem to be ethically palatable options that only contain practical ethical 
issues rather than conceptual ethical issues. Further, though the majority of these methods are not 
yet feasible, it is generally believed that our scientific knowledge and capabilities in regenerative 
medicine will ultimately combine with transplant medicine to create viable, efficacious methods 
that ultimately eradicate, or at the very least greatly lessen, the two major current issues in 
transplant medicine – immunosuppression-free transplantation and a renewable, potentially 
inexhaustible source of organs and tissues.51 
 Therefore, since we know both (1) that incentives do improve organ donation and 
transplantation rates and (2) that it is essentially just a matter of time until progress in 
regenerative medicine ultimately lessens or eradicates the need for incentivized donation, we 
have a moral responsibility to do everything that we can to save the lives of those suffering from 
organ failure and tissue ailments today. By not allowing these individuals to help themselves, 
we’re essentially damning them to a life of misery and ill health, or even worse, death, due to 
living in a time without the luxury of regenerative medicine, which is discrimination based upon 
a non-moral property that these individuals had no choice in bringing about. Furthermore, there’s 
an argument to be made that the moral distinction between purchasing an organ from another 
individual and ultimately purchasing an organ that was engineered in the lab or created in a farm 
animal is blurry at best. So there seems to be sufficient justification to at least attempt to find an 
ethically palatable system of CLOD that minimizes any harms while maximizing potential 
benefits, both practically and ethically, and we have the moral responsibility and obligation to 
enact and allow any such system in a pluralistic, moral society.  
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Now that it has been shown how we have a moral obligation to not prohibit an ethically 
palatable system of CLOD (should there be one), it is prudent to situate CLOD in its proper 
medical, political, and moral context. For example, it is widely accepted that the benefits of live 
kidney donation greatly outweigh the harms associated with it, as evidenced by the widespread 
acceptance of altruistic live kidney donation.52 Studies suggest that there is minimal short-term 
and long-term medical risk involved in kidney donation, with one study even finding an 85 
percent survival rate 20 years after kidney donation.53 There is also fairly conclusive evidence 
that the rate of renal failure is no higher after donating a kidney compared to the normal 
population, with short-term risks only constituting a .03 percent chance of mortality and a 20 
percent chance of morbidity shortly after the donation procedure.54 These results of the safety of 
live kidney donation have also been corroborated in a more recent 2010 study of over 80,000 live 
donors, and the results once again provide evidence that “live kidney donation is safe and free 
from significant long-term excess mortality.”55 And even those very few studies that do find 
increased rates of these issues, albeit very minimal increases, argue that their “findings will not 
change our opinion in promoting live-kidney donation.”56 And though rarer and a slightly more 
serious operation, recent studies suggest that living liver donation is comparable to living kidney 
donation, and mortality for donors does not significantly differ from healthy non-donors.57 
Regarding the political and moral context, being one of the Enlightenment’s most 
successful achievements, the political philosophy of classical liberalism emphasizes the equality 
and freedom of all peoples and the primacy of the individual.58 Compared to other political 
philosophies, liberalism is then mainly focused on individual freedoms and rights and the 
protection of these freedoms and rights from government intrusion.59 Namely, this political 
philosophy perceives these freedoms and rights to be personal autonomy, i.e. the capacity for 
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rational self-governance, self-determination, and personal freedom, which specifically includes 
the ability to develop one’s own conception of the good, or view of how to live one’s life based 
on one’s values, desires, and beliefs. Thus, two things must necessarily be absent in this political 
philosophy in order for individuals to consistently exercise their autonomy: State perfectionism 
and paternalism. First, State perfectionism is the view that there are some conceptions of the 
good that are better than others, and it is the prerogative of the State to promote these particular 
conceptions.60 Second, paternalism can be defined as “when those in positions of authority refuse 
to act according to people’s wishes, or they restrict people’s freedom, or in other ways attempt to 
influence their behavior, allegedly in the recipients’ own best interests [as judged by those in 
authority].”61 
 For liberalism, both State perfectionism and paternalism unjustifiably violate individuals’ 
rights to autonomy and the freedom to develop and practice one’s own conception of the good. 
However, these are the exact types of actions, i.e. paternalism and limiting behaviors that are 
considered bad or evil for society, that characterize government interventions and laws, because, 
otherwise, we would ultimately live in an anarchic state. Clearly, then, liberalism’s focus on the 
individual runs counter to the utilitarian outlook of many governmental interventions into the 
lives of the population, even if that comes at the expense of certain individual liberties. Therein 
lies the liberal answer to the vast majority of governmental interventions – the liberal objection, 
which states that governmental interventions are objectionable, unjustifiable, and illegitimate due 
to them ultimately amounting to State interference into individual autonomy, rights, and 
freedoms. However, personal autonomy within liberalism, and ultimately ethics, is not absolute, 
which is where the harm principle comes into the picture.62 
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 Though being known primarily for his advancement and fuller development of the 
normative ethical theory of utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill was also substantially interested in 
political philosophy, specifically the relationship between individuals and the State. Since certain 
limits must necessarily be placed on individual autonomy, or risk slipping into anarchy, he 
developed the harm principle to determine when and how it was appropriate for the State to 
legitimately interfere with individual liberties and freedoms. It states: 
…the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.63  
Whether explicitly or implicitly, this principle has long been a guiding measure to determine the 
justifiability of State intervention upon individual liberties within liberal societies, even in the 
United States. Per the harm principle, State intervention is only justifiable to prevent harm to 
others, and though the promotion of benefitting oneself and others and the prevention of harm to 
oneself are noble pursuits, they are not legitimate State interventions into individual freedoms. 
 Regarding the moral and political context of CLOD in the United States, this sets the 
limit for what the State can and cannot justifiably prohibit for its citizens. Since our liberal 
society is dedicated to a pluralistic understanding of conceptions of the good, i.e. a denial of 
State perfectionism, and avoiding paternalism is necessary to implement this dedication to 
pluralism, the State cannot justifiably, either morally or politically, prohibit any action or 
behavior that does not protect others and prevent them from harm from others, and this is a 
necessary requirement since protection from self-regarding harm is not justified by the harm 
principle, which is discussed in more detail later. Thus, as long as an ethically palatable system 
of CLOD can be developed that does not explicitly harm others, then the State has no moral or 
political justification for its prohibition by law. The rest of this dissertation will now focus on 
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justifying the ethically palatable nature of CLOD and developing a practical national system for 
implementation that revamps our system of both live and cadaveric organ donation. 
1.2) Autonomy, Justice, and Exploitation 
The strongest arguments in the debate surrounding CLOD revolve around the concept of 
principlism, which contains the four main ethical principles guiding modern bioethics: 
autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence.64 In particular, the principles of autonomy 
and justice are especially useful in this debate, and they are used in both the positive arguments 
of autonomous freedom and social justice and the negative argument from exploitation.65 And 
not only do the principles of autonomy and justice figure prominently in the debate regarding 
CLOD, they also are two of the most discussed and debated ethical principles within applied 
ethics, which is primarily due to their importance and relevance in applied ethical issues. An 
examination of these ethical principles highlights how these principles are consistent with a 
regulated form of CLOD and how a prohibition ultimately violates each principle. 
Though not a universally shared sentiment, many feel that the principle of autonomy is 
the primus inter pares, or first among equals, of the four principles approach, because it is the 
reason for the existence of morality and plays a major role in the other three principles.66 
Autonomy is defined as a concept of self-governance that is free from controlling interferences 
from others and impediments on meaningful choice. The autonomous person acts according to a 
self-chosen plan without unduly interference or limitations upon that plan from other individuals. 
When one does not act autonomously, it is due to the incapability of realizing the plans and 
desires of the individual, and this incapability arises from some sort of excessive hindrance upon 
the freedom of the agent.67 Three conditions are necessary for autonomous action: intentionality, 
understanding, and noncontrol.68 For the act to be autonomous, the action must be intentionally 
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willed, and the agent must adequately understand the action and its consequences. The agent 
must also not be under the controlling influence of another, because an agent can only act 
autonomously when the act is not directly affected by an impressionable factor or influence that 
affects the agent’s plans.69  
 The principle of autonomy does have its limits, though, and restrictions upon autonomy 
are usually justified in protection of the autonomy of others.70 This is in accordance with the 
negative obligation imposed by autonomy, which states that autonomous agents should not 
interfere in the autonomous actions of other agents. There is also a positive obligation imposed 
by autonomy, and it states that agents should foster autonomous agency for fellow agents, which 
includes the dissemination of information that is potentially relevant to an action they are 
deliberating on.71  
In support of CLOD, Gerald Dworkin labels this type of autonomy as bodily autonomy, 
and he defines it as the “capacity to make choices about how [one’s] body is to be treated by 
others… [and] the primary good achieved by such a right is the recognition of the individual as 
sovereign over his own body.”72 Thus, the principle of autonomy takes a very libertarian stance 
and argues that agents have the right to exercise their autonomy, and as long as it passes the 
obligations imposed by autonomy, then this right to autonomous decision-making over one’s 
body should not be infringed.73 CLOD passes the negative obligation of autonomy, because no 
other agent’s autonomy is restricted in individual organ sale. Furthermore, a strictly regulated 
system of CLOD would have safeguards to foster autonomous decision-making and informed 
consent, which reflects the positive obligation of autonomy.74 This argument then posits that the 
prohibition on CLOD is paternalistic and in violation of the moral obligation to respect 
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individual autonomy, and unless other moral obligations are overriding, respecting the principle 
of individual autonomy can partially justify regulated systems of CLOD.75 
Another concept of principlism is the principle of justice, and it is also used by some to 
support CLOD. As a concept, justice cannot be restricted to a singular definition, but in the 
context of organ donation, it usually refers to matters of distribution of scarce resources.76 
Traditionally, the principle of justice is regarded as an other-regarding virtue that can be bound 
to a character or an act.77 It also provides a guide to areas of concern for specific normative 
theories to address.78 Though there are three main differing conceptions of justice, i.e. utilitarian, 
libertarian, and egalitarian, I will primarily focus on egalitarian conceptions of justice, because it 
seems fairly uncontroversial that both utilitarian and libertarian conceptions of justice would be 
heavily opposed to any sort of prohibition that both (1) limited overall utility and (2) limited 
individual freedoms by an act of the State.79  
One of the most influential egalitarian theories of justice is Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities theory, and it provides the principle with normative content tailored to a global and 
international context.80 In the context of CLOD, it has been argued by proponents that 
prohibiting CLOD has denied many in need of organ transplants the essential capabilities of life, 
good bodily health, and the right not to die prematurely, which are all essential conditions of her 
capabilities theory of justice.81 Furthermore, it can also be argued that the prohibition of CLOD 
also violates the normative egalitarian principle of the fair-opportunity rule, which claims that 
individuals “should not be denied social benefits on the basis of undeserved disadvantageous 
properties, because they are not responsible for these properties.”82 This is because individuals 
with this particular disadvantageous property, i.e. a faulty organ, are being unduly penalized for 
this property that they had no responsibility in creating. 
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Where these theories of justice are oriented towards the recipient, other arguments from 
justice are oriented towards the donors. For example, Robert Veatch argues that since the goods 
of life have been systematically denied to the poorest and most vulnerable of our society, it is 
unethical and unjust to prohibit one of the last financial benefits these families might have, 
namely compensated organ donation.83 After the Eliot Spitzer prostitution scandal, Martha 
Nussbaum came out with a very similar argument to Veatch’s in favor of prostitution, arguing 
that “the idea that we ought to penalize women with few choices by removing one of the ones 
they do have is grotesque...”84 In an earlier article, she argues that it is short-sighted to “rule off-
limits an option that may be the only livelihood for many poor women…”, and though this is 
aimed at prostitution rather than compensated organ donation, it is similarly short-sighted and 
unjust to remove the option of donating one’s organs for a profit and reducing one’s ability to 
better oneself even further.85 Thus, the principle of justice is consistent with a regulated system 
of CLOD that treats every person, whether poor or rich or healthy or unhealthy, as equals, and a 
prohibition of CLOD would ultimately violate the obligations of this moral principle by treating 
equals unequally and punishing individuals for conditions that they may not necessarily be 
morally responsible for. These arguments are related to the paradox problem of the exploitation 
objection and the Non-Worseness Claim (NWC) of the exploitation debate, which will both be 
detailed shortly. 
 But though these two principles are regularly used by proponents to argue for the 
justification of CLOD, they’re also relevant to one of the primary objections to CLOD known as 
the exploitation objection. And while being a fairly common notion in applied ethics, many 
misunderstand the definition and implications of exploitation, which has led to many differing 
claims and concepts of exploitation in the literature.86 However, though there are numerous 
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differing conceptions of exploitation ranging from Marxist interpretations to conceptions based 
on Kantian notions of treating others instrumentally, there are certain necessary components that 
are required for the act of exploitation to take place, which makes establishing a basic working 
definition that encompasses the vast majority of these conceptions of exploitation possible.87 
Essentially, three things must be present in every case of exploitation – the exploiter extracting 
some benefit from the use/involvement of the exploitee, the exploiter benefitting at the expense 
of the exploitee, and unfairness.88 Thus, one basic working definition for the concept of 
exploitation that both fits the majority of the various differing conceptions of exploitation and 
takes into account these three necessary components is “taking unfair advantage of another,” or 
more precisely - “A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B.”89 
To highlight the function of these three necessary components and how exploitation 
necessarily takes unfair advantage of another, it is necessary to view them in action in a 
paradigmatic case of immoral exploitation. Coincidentally, these three components can best be 
examined in the examples of open, unregulated markets for organs in developing nations of the 
past, which is an entirely different concept than this dissertation’s proposal for CLOD. For 
example when India was a burgeoning open kidney market before it was illegalized and pushed 
the trade underground, organ brokers would regularly bring the poorest individuals together with 
wealthier individuals needing a transplant, and they would generally pay around $2,500 to 
$4,000 for a kidney. However, the donors usually received less than $1,000 of that sum due to 
the organ broker’s fees and price of administration, and many times donors even received less, or 
nothing at all, due to corrupt organ brokers, which highlights one of the main problems in open, 
unregulated markets as the presence of exploitative organ brokers.90 
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Thus, it’s easy to see how the donor is being unfairly taken advantage of due to the three 
required components of exploitation being met in this example - both the organ broker and buyer 
derived benefit from the donor (profit and an organ for transplantation), this benefit came at the 
expense of the donor (unfair price for an organ, not receiving the entire payment for the organ 
due to the broker, and/or being cheated out of the agreed upon price), which ultimately makes 
this situation seriously unfair due to the presence of fraud and an unfair price. Of course, it could 
be argued that this benefit does not come at the expense of the donor, because the donor was paid 
and is now better off due to the situation. However, exploitation deals with the normative rather 
than the descriptive, so coming at the expense of the donor is in relation to a fair transaction 
rather than whatever transaction actually obtained. This is termed the difference between the no-
transaction baseline and the fairness baseline, where the former corresponds to the descriptive 
and the latter corresponds to the normative. Relative to no transaction whatsoever, exploitation 
often betters the exploitee. But the requirement of the benefit coming at the expense of the donor 
isn’t necessarily related to what did happen in this transaction versus no transaction whatsoever, 
i.e. the no-transaction baseline, but rather what should have happened under a fair transaction, 
i.e. the fairness baseline. So while the donor might actually be better off in this situation due to 
the sale of an organ, the donor would have been even better-off after the sale of an organ in a fair 
transaction, which realistically would be more than approximately the $1,000 that is usually 
received, meaning this truly does come at the expense of the donor.91 
This brings up another important fact about exploitation – as shown above, and in other 
cases such as clandestine sweat shops, immoral exploitation can still occur when the exploitee 
benefits from the exploitation itself.92 Thus, a distinction should be made between two differing 
sets of types of exploitation, specifically between nonconsensual exploitation and consensual 
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exploitation and between harmful exploitation and mutually advantageous exploitation. The 
difference between nonconsensual and consensual exploitation is the presence of valid, informed 
consent to the exploitative transaction. The other distinction is between harmful exploitation, 
where only the exploiter benefits from the transaction purely at the expense of the exploitee, and 
mutually advantageous exploitation, where both the exploiter and exploitee benefit in some way 
from the transaction. In cases involving nonconsensual transactions or one-sided harmful 
exploitation, it’s pretty clear that exploitation has taken place. On the other hand, certainly there 
are cases of consensual, mutually advantageous exploitation (CMAE) transactions where it’s not 
always clear that immoral exploitation has occurred, because both sides seem to agree upon a 
transaction that benefits both of them without seemingly, at least on the surface, coming at the 
expense of the exploited.93 For the purposes of the exploitation objection to CLOD, then, this is 
of utmost importance, because any argument against the immorality, and potential prohibition, of 
CLOD will necessarily rely on both proper consent and mutual advantages to both parties. 
This is actually an area of the professional literature on exploitation that there is not a 
consensus view on. In virtually every major conception of exploitation in the literature, there are 
moral undertones to the presence and act of exploitation, as seen with “unfairness” being a 
necessary component of exploitation. Thus, the accusation of exploitation is almost always 
considered a moral judgement, i.e. acts of exploitation are considered immoral and wrong. 
However, the moral component of “unfairness” isn’t necessarily the most clear and direct 
concept, and it’s certainly not an inherently and/or absolutely immoral concept, i.e. every single 
unfair scenario is not necessarily immoral. There are varying levels of unfairness, and there are 
quite a few things in the world that aren’t really fair, yet we fail to consider them immoral. This 
falls right in line with the intuition that certain CMAE transactions aren’t necessarily immoral, 
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even if there is a level of unfairness to them. So in cases of CMAE transactions, there actually 
might be arrangements that aren’t technically immoral due to not being “unfair” enough.94 
This sentiment is best justified by what is referred to as the Non-Worseness Claim 
(NWC). The NWC claims that, “in cases where A has a right not to transact with B, and where 
transacting with B is not worse for B than not transacting with B at all, then it cannot be seriously 
wrong for A to engage in this transaction, even if its terms are judged to be unfair by some 
external standard.”95 So even if there is some inherent unfairness in a certain CMAE transaction, 
the NWC argues that if there’s no moral obligation to get involved and involvement is no worse 
than non-involvement, then there is nothing seriously wrong or immoral with an exploitative 
transaction that is consensual and mutually advantageous. In the language used earlier, as long as 
the unfairness ultimately is in relation to the fairness baseline and not the no-transaction baseline, 
i.e. involvement doesn’t make the exploited’s situation worse, and there is sufficient benefit for 
both sides, then the levels of unfairness in CMAE transactions are not sufficient enough to qualify 
this act as unethical. Of course, some might question the moral character and motivations of the 
exploiter in this type of exploitation, but moral character and motivations aren’t necessarily 
relevant or defeating for the NWC. Discussing the issue of price gouging, another example of a 
CMAE transaction, Zwolinski offers the following regarding character and the NWC: 
But NWC is not a thesis about moral character, it is a thesis about the wrongness of moral acts. 
And this is importantly different. Vicious people can perform morally permissible [emphasis 
added] actions. Think, for instance, of Kant's shopkeeper who returns the correct change to a naive 
customer only out of a selfish concern for his own reputation and long-term profit. If he could be 
sure he could steal a penny from a child's change and get away with it, he would, but prudence 
dictates restraint. Such a person has a bad moral character. But the act he is performing—giving 
the child back her correct change—is perfectly innocent… Thus, Snyder's concems about NWC 
do not give us reason to prohibit price gouging, or even condemn it. For all his arguments show 
(correctly, I think) is that price gouging can sometimes be done by morally vicious people. They 
do not show that the act of price gouging itself is morally impermissible [emphasis added].96  
Thus, we can now distinguish among three different types of mutually advantageous 
transactions: nonconsensual, mutually advantageous exploitation (NCMAE), consensual, 
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mutually advantageous exploitation (CMAE), and non-exploitative mutually advantageous 
transactions (NEMA), which we have no reason to suspect are unethical in the first place. As 
stated above, since CLOD is necessarily a mutually advantageous transaction and the latter two 
mentioned types of mutually advantageous transactions are ethically permissible types of 
transactions, for the exploitation objection to CLOD to be sufficient in its aims for prohibition, it 
must be determined that CLOD is (1) an example of a NCMAE transaction, (2) ethically 
distinguishable from other similar types of NCMAE transactions that are currently not prohibited 
by law, and (3) “harmful” enough, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to justify prohibition by 
law. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the claims made by the exploitation objection are aimed 
directly at the process of consent in CLOD, so the objection is still capable of meeting these 
demands and constituting a legitimate objection to CLOD. 
To ethically analyze the issue of CLOD to determine its status as an exploitative practice, 
it must be compared with the necessary components of exploitation that were discussed above, 
namely - the exploiter extracting some benefit from the use/involvement of the exploitee, the 
exploiter benefitting at the expense of the exploitee, and unfairness.97 The first component is 
obviously present, because it’s clear that both sides are significantly advantaged and benefitted 
by the transaction. Unfairness is also obviously present, because it’s the lack of complete equity 
between individuals that allows the transaction to take place in the first place, albeit in differing 
areas, i.e. the donor lacking in money and the recipient lacking in organ health. This unfairness is 
empirically verified, too. For example, though there are significant other motivations to donate a 
kidney in Iran, such as the moral value of charity, financial reasons were also a major donor 
motivation, as evidenced by the pool of commercial donors consisting primarily of the poor.98 
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Thus, unfairness is present in the unequal starting positions of each party rather than within the 
transaction itself. 
 But can one really make the argument that the recipient (exploiter) benefits at the expense 
of the donor (exploitee)? In a regulated system of CLOD, no, because the donor is receiving a 
fair price for the organ, or at least what we can reasonably conclude as a fair price given the 
economic studies on the matter (over $15,000 for kidney/$37,600 for liver according to a recent 
study).99 Remember, for the benefit to come at the expense of the donor, the transaction must 
make the donor worse off relative to the fairness baseline, even if it makes the donor better off 
relative to the no-transaction baseline. But in this case, the donor is actually better off relative to 
both baselines, because (1) the transaction is better than no transaction for the donor and (2) the 
transaction is based on a fair price for the organ. Of course, it could be argued that there is no 
proper standard to convert the worth of an organ to monetary value, meaning organs are 
incommensurable with monetary value. However, this is a problematic claim for two reasons: (1) 
it’s not clear at all that goods can ultimately be incommensurable and (2) incommensurability 
doesn’t necessarily make a transaction of goods unfair, meaning it isn’t sufficient as an 
objection. Thus, it seems clear that a regulated system of CLOD ultimately does not meet the 
required components to label it as an example of immoral exploitation. Alan Wertheimer, a 
world-renowned expert on the concept of exploitation, seems to agree with this overall analysis: 
A mutually advantageous transaction is arguably (wrongly) exploitative only if the outcome is (in 
some way) unfair to B. This is not merely definitional. After all, it may be thought that a 
transaction is exploitative whenever [it] takes advantage of B's vulnerabilities or desperate 
situation to strike a deal. That is false. For if A makes a reasonable proposal that B has no 
alternative but to accept given B's desperate situation, A does not exploit B. If a doctor 
proposes to perform life-saving surgery for a reasonable fee, the patient is hardly exploited, 
even though the patient would not have agreed but for the fact that her life was in danger 
[emphasis added].100 
 To understand why this practice ultimately represents a NEMA transaction rather than an 
exploitative transaction, a distinction must be made between taking unfair advantage of an 
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individual (exploitation) and taking advantage of an unfair situation (not exploitation), which are 
two vastly different concepts with differing moral motivations. This distinction is very important 
to make, because as shown above, it would otherwise label professionals such as physicians and 
auto-mechanics as professional exploiters, since they rely upon a certain disadvantaged situation 
of an individual, e.g. health problems, car trouble, etc., to make a living.101 Mark Cherry labels 
this distinction as “the line between the unfortunate and the unfair,” and he further states: 
That someone is poor or otherwise disadvantaged due to unfortunate circumstances does not imply 
either that he is unable to make rational choices given his limited choice set or that one acts 
improperly when one seeks to trade with or otherwise engage such a person in a market 
transaction [emphasis added] — for example, by offering the disadvantaged person a job or the 
real possibility of securing valuable rewards. More must be said to demonstrate that one acts in 
a morally blameworthy fashion when one extends an offer to a poor individual, which seeks 
to improve his prospects and to which he had no prior entitlement, such as when one offers 
valuable compensation for organ donation [emphasis added].102 
 To justify this distinction, one needs only to look at Kant’s second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative, which isn’t surprising since many individual conceptions of exploitation 
rely on this Kantian notion. This formulation claims that we should always treat individuals as 
ends in themselves and never merely as a means to an end, which essentially means that we 
should never treat others instrumentally.103 Taking unfair advantage would then equate to 
treating individuals as an instrument and merely as a means to an end. Specifically, this would 
take the form of recipients not respecting donors as ends in themselves and offering them an 
unfair price for donation, which would ultimately just treat the donor as a means to an end, i.e. a 
host of an organ for transplantation. On the other hand, taking advantage of an unfair situation 
does not necessarily equate to treating individuals instrumentally, and at least in the case of 
CLOD, both sides are ultimately taking advantage of an unfair situation that the other party is in, 
i.e. vulnerability with the donor’s finances and recipient’s health, to benefit from a mutually 
advantageous transaction, while still treating the other party as an end in themselves.104  
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Since neither party benefits at the expense of the other party, the regulated systems of 
CLOD clearly do not meet the required conditions for exploitation, and CLOD is simply a 
system of NEMA transactions. But even if we did allow the Iranian model of CLOD to be 
considered a system of CMAE transactions, the NWC argument above highlighted why we 
should think that there’s nothing seriously wrong or immoral with CMAE transactions, 
ultimately making them ethically permissible. But going even further down the rabbit hole, even 
if we granted the contentious claim that exploitation is always harmful and morally wrong, it still 
would not justify its prohibition by law. This is because in classically liberal societies like the 
United States, which this dissertation is ultimately focusing on, the harm principle, i.e. the 
guiding normative principle regarding State interference into individuals’ lives, ultimately allows 
for self-regarding harm. As long as the harm that someone consensually brings on oneself is self-
regarding, doesn’t violate any specific duty, such as becoming intoxicated while on police duty, 
and doesn’t cause perceptible harm to any particular person, then individuals have the freedom to 
partake in it, according to the harm principle.105 Therefore, it seems painfully obvious that (1) 
regulated systems of CLOD are not examples of exploitation and (2) even at its worst, there is no 
justification for prohibiting consensual cases of CLOD, which brings us to the two other main 
claims utilized within the exploitation objection. 
These claims generally deal with the issues of consent and autonomy regarding 
exploitation. For example, Paul Hughes argues that rather than being an autonomy-enhancing 
option, allowing poorer populations to donate their organs for compensation might just be 
autonomy-undermining and constraining their liberty even more, because the option of CLOD is 
coercive and autonomy-limiting.106 Thus, this claim of the argument from exploitation argues 
both that the opportunity to be compensated for donation is autonomy-limiting and that the 
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decision to actually donate for compensation is a forced response due to coercive financial 
influences, making it an unethical practice.107 
 If this sounds fairly paternalistic, then it shouldn’t be surprising that this argument is 
ultimately based on a neo-Marxian conception of exploitation, especially the autonomy-limiting 
component. Marx’s original conception of the exploitation of the worker revolves around the 
criticism that the “capitalist” unfairly takes advantage of the worker by converting the “surplus 
value” of the workers’ labor into profit, which he argues belongs to the workers’ themselves, but 
given the constraint of options for the workers, i.e. they must work and produce this labor for the 
wages that support their families, they must necessarily continue to labor for their exploiter.108 In 
CLOD, an autonomy-constraining option, rather than an autonomy-enhancing option, is defined 
as one that “presupposes and/or reinforces” a system of constrained options in the first place. For 
example, these opponents argue that CLOD only works in a society that presupposes large 
populations of poor people with limited, constrained options, which unduly influences them to 
donate their organ for compensation.109 Additionally, these opponents also claim that CLOD 
reinforces these constrained choice-sets by keeping these poor donors’ options constrained.110  
However, this isn’t necessarily empirically true in regulated markets. And this is a fallacy 
that many objections to CLOD, such as Jha and Chugh, ultimately make – they compare data 
from unregulated markets and extrapolate that information to argue that regulated markets would 
fare the same.111 But, again, this isn’t necessarily true. For example, in a study of Iranian donors 
and recipients it was found that though most donors were poor, 16% were from the middle class. 
Further, over 86% of the Iranian recipients were either poor (50%) or from the middle-class 
(36%), meaning only a little over 13% of kidneys went to the rich.112 This also contradicts other 
objections to CLOD that ultimately assume that regulated systems of CLOD would ultimately 
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only serve the rich at the expense of the poor.113 Further, this also shows that a system of CLOD 
does not then necessarily presuppose large poor populations with limited, constrained options, 
though they certainly would make for a more robust market.114 
Similarly, there’s no evidence that CLOD in regulated markets reinforces constrained 
choice-sets like has been observed in the open, unregulated markets and black markets in organs. 
Like many other articles and opponents, Hughes makes this argument by using evidence and 
articles from unregulated open and black markets, like India, which was a wildly unregulated 
market full of organ trafficking, coercion, and outright exploitation. He even openly admits that 
it could be different in regulated markets, but he essentially states that this is an empirical claim 
that we cannot know about before actually studying the consequences of an actual regulated 
market, conveniently ignoring the example of Iran.115 
Though this doesn’t necessarily measure choice-sets, there are several recent studies that 
show positive impacts and a very high satisfaction rate in Iranian donors after they have donated 
a kidney for compensation, which could very well indicate progress in their lives and thus 
additional options.116 Other studies show similar findings of paid donors reporting the 
improvement of either, or both, their immediate and/or long-term financial situations. One study 
showed that 86.5% of donors felt complete satisfaction after donation, with 11.5% feeling 
relatively satisfied. Further, one study involving six different transplant regions and 44 different 
individuals reported that 73% of the donors reported that their financial problems were solved, 
with a good mix of immediate and longer-term follow-ups within that group. Unsurprisingly, it 
was also found that nearly 90% of the donors interviewed were glad that they had the 
opportunity to donate their kidney for compensation in order to improve their financial 
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situations, so it seems fairly uncontroversial that the option of CLOD does in fact enhance 
autonomy rather than constrain it even further.117 
The other main claim regularly utilized with the exploitation objection states that the 
decision to donate one’s organ for compensation is forced due to coercive influences, i.e. 
poverty, and a constrained choice set, and informed consent can never be achieved in this context 
due to the voluntariness of the decision, i.e. the third step in the process of informed consent, 
never being real.118 Sandel labels this component of the argument the “fairness objection,” and 
he also points to the injustice of inequality being the basis of the market. He states, “…market 
exchanges are not always as voluntary as market enthusiasts suggest. A peasant may agree to sell 
his kidney or cornea to feed his starving family, but his agreement may not really be voluntary. 
He may be unfairly coerced, in effect, by the necessities of his situation.”119 Essentially, where 
Hughes’ argument posited that adding the option of CLOD actually limited autonomy and the 
range of choices for individuals, this claim of the exploitation objection merely states that the 
range of choices for these individuals is too small in the first place, which makes the choice of 
CLOD unfree, coerced, and not appropriate to be an option for these individuals.120 There are 
two main related problems with this claim of this component of the exploitation objection – the 
arbitrariness problem of the exploitation objection and the paradox problem of the 
exploitation objection. 
 The main problem with this argument itself is that it is only applied conditionally and 
pointedly against CLOD, even though it is just as relevant and applicable to other market 
exchanges in this population. Essentially, then, this is what I call the arbitrariness problem of 
the exploitation objection – if the presence of coercive, unduly influences from a small range of 
options makes CLOD exploitative and unethical for poor individuals, leading to prohibition, then 
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virtually every market or economical exchange by poor individuals should be considered 
exploitative, unethical, and prohibition-worthy. Singling out CLOD for this argument is then 
arbitrary and inconsistent. This is actually a common type of argument used by advocates for 
CLOD, because it’s an obvious, pervasive, and simple objection that shows a contradiction and 
inconsistency in the treatment of CLOD compared to various other similar actions. For example, 
James Stacey Taylor discusses Gerald Dworkin making the argument that: 
...if the poor should be prohibited from selling their organs for this reason then they should also be 
prohibited from joining the army, engaging in hazardous occupations such as high-steel 
construction, or being paid subjects in medical experiments, since these decisions are also often 
made out of economic necessity, and thus should also be considered to exhibit diminished 
autonomy.121 
Similarly, speaking about CLOD, Mark Cherry argues: 
Analogously, on the labor market, those who must settle for any unpleasant or more risky 
occupation, such as ditch digger, oil platform construction, or assembly line worker, must make 
the same type of choice; this does not necessarily mean that they are being coerced.122 
Radcliffe-Richards et al. offers a similar argument comparing the inconsistent treatment between 
the rich and the poor when it comes to dangerous undertakings for pleasure or high pay: 
If the rich are free to engage in dangerous sports for pleasure, or dangerous jobs for high pay, it is 
difficult to see why the poor who take the lesser risk of kidney selling for greater rewards—
perhaps saving relatives’ lives, or extricating themselves from poverty and debt—should be 
thought so misguided as to need saving from themselves.123 
 Thus, the arbitrariness problem suggests that this objection is inconsistently and 
prejudicially used only against CLOD when it actually applies to a plethora of other market 
transactions and decisions where poor individuals may be “disadvantaged” and “coerced” due to 
a limited range of options, such as health-risking jobs, like coal mining, or being paid for 
medical experiments. However, this is obviously immoral due to the extreme amount of 
paternalism it would lead to. So just like in other dangerous occupations or activities that we 
allow poorer individuals to partake in, it isn’t necessary to outright prohibit these activities, but 
rather we must simply regulate them enough to ensure a baseline threshold of safety and 
protection for the participants or workers. In fact, there’s sound evidence that live kidney 
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donation is actually much safer and less risky than many occupations. For example, the logging 
industry in the United States has around 110.9 fatal injuries per 100,000 people.124 But when it 
comes to live kidney donation, recent studies have found that surgical mortality from live kidney 
donations is 3.1 per 10,000, which essentially expands to 31 deaths per 100,000, and there is no 
significant higher long-term risk of death in live kidney donors than similar, non-donor 
individuals in the general population.125 Therefore, it stands to reason that it isn’t necessary or 
justifiable to outright prohibit CLOD, but rather we just must ensure a baseline threshold of 
safety and protection, via regulation, for both the donor and the recipient.126 
 If one still thinks that there is something substantially different about allowing a person to 
donate their kidney for compensation compared to allowing them to substantially risk their 
health by working somewhere like a coal mine or logging company, then it is due to them seeing 
something inherent to CLOD itself that makes it fundamentally different than coal mining and 
inherently immoral. But by admitting this fact, one is also admitting that the exploitation 
objection in itself is not sufficient as an argument to prohibit CLOD, because, otherwise, it would 
require massive paternalistic efforts levied against poor individuals in all kinds of similar market 
transactions and decisions, which is obviously immoral and unjustifiable. Therefore, the 
exploitation objection is not sufficient in itself and must rely on further arguments, specifically 
from commodification, to justifiably prohibit CLOD by law and deem it necessarily immoral.127 
 Relatedly, the paradox problem of the exploitation objection is a similar argument 
against the exploitation objection as the arbitrariness problem, and it also highlights why the 
objection of exploitation is not sufficient as an argument against CLOD due to its tendency 
towards inconsistency and contradiction. Remember, this claim of the exploitation objection 
states that the range of choices for these individuals is too small in the first place, so the choice 
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of CLOD is unfree, coerced, and not appropriate to be an option for these individuals. However, 
this is prima facie contradictory, because it is essentially exacerbating a problem that it is 
arguing against, i.e. a constricted or limited choice set. So it is essentially limiting an already 
limited choice set, which it is arguing against in the first place. Radcliffe-Richards et al. argues 
that “we cannot improve matters by removing the best option that poverty has left, and making 
the range smaller still,” because doing so would “make subsequent choices, by this criterion, 
even less autonomous.”128 In fact, just as the arbitrariness problem also shows, the exploitation 
objection relies on something being inherently immoral about CLOD in order for the objection to 
make any sense, because, otherwise, the additional choice of CLOD would be regarded as a good 
thing for an otherwise limited or constricted choice set. Therefore, both the arbitrariness problem 
and the paradox problem show that the exploitation objection is not sufficient in itself and relies 
on further controversial assumptions about the inherent immoral nature of CLOD to succeed. 
Cherry stated this problem the best when he wrote: 
In general, it is difficult to count a policy as exploitative if, as in the case of legitimizing organ 
sales, it increases the number of options open to individuals. In order to see such circumstances as 
exploitative, one must hold that there is something intrinsically wrong or debasing in selling one's 
organs, so that even if one does this freely, one has been brought to do something morally 
injurious to oneself.129 
1.3) Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, and Commodification 
In addition to the arguments made from autonomy, justice, and exploitation, other strong 
arguments from beneficence, non-maleficence, and commodification are made from both sides in 
the compensated donation debate.130 These include both conceptual arguments from ethical 
principles, i.e. beneficence, non-maleficence, and human dignity, and practical arguments from 
the context of our current situation, i.e. eliminating organ trafficking, transplant tourism, etc.131  
The ethical principle of beneficence basically states that one must benefit and do good 
towards others.132 It imposes an obligation upon individuals to act in ways that benefit other 
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people, and it also includes an element of the overall welfare and utility of maximizing good for 
the greatest number of people.133 Depending upon the context, there are differing types of 
beneficence, such as general, specific, obligatory, and ideal.134 General beneficence is 
beneficence towards strangers and those who we do not have emotional relationships with, and 
specific beneficence is the act of good towards those we do have emotional relationships with.135 
The difference between obligatory beneficence and ideal beneficence is a little more 
practically obscure, but theoretically the difference involves the act’s obligation. In obligatory 
beneficence, acts of beneficence are morally imposed and required; whereas, ideal beneficence 
only includes non-obligatory acts of beneficence that are nonetheless virtuous, heroic, and 
noble.136 These acts are generally known as “supererogatory” acts or acts of exceptional 
beneficence.137 From the perspective of CLOD, acts of beneficence will either be ideal/general or 
ideal/specific, depending upon whether or not the donor had an emotional relationship with the 
donee, though it stands to reason that in this case it would mostly be ideal/general beneficence. 
Compensated, and thus incentivized, donation is then consistent with the principle of 
beneficence by creating many more acts of beneficence via the avenue of organ donation and 
helping others in need, either financially or in the manner of health.138 Though financial 
incentives for donation preclude these types of organ donation from being completely altruistic, 
these are still considered good acts that now benefit both parties, i.e. the donor via compensation 
and the recipient via a life-saving organ. In addition to the empirical evidence of the observable 
increased rates of organ donation in past organ markets, including Iran, recent studies also give 
further credit to this common sense notion that providing incentives for live kidney donation 
would ultimately increase the number of kidneys donated from live donors. One recent study by 
professional economists suggests that payments of roughly $15,200 would increase kidney 
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transplants by 44% and payments of $37,600 would increase liver transplants by 67%.139 Other 
studies have come up with a less optimistic projection, though they still corroborate the common 
sense notion that incentives for live donation will ultimately increase donation rates.140  
Additionally, there are several practical ways that CLOD promotes and enhances 
beneficence via increased rates of live organ donation, including the reduction of harmful organ 
trafficking and abuse and the much greater long-term survival advantages that transplant 
recipients have over wait-listed dialysis recipients.141 There are even studies that suggest that 
CLOD would actually save the healthcare system a substantial amount of money by getting more 
individuals off of government-funded dialysis at a much faster rate, and these potential savings 
range from $90,000 per transplant patient with 3.5 gained quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) 
all the way up to $270,000 when the monetary value of the QALYs is added, depending upon 
how value one puts on the added life years to these transplant recipients.142 So though a 
prohibition on CLOD would not necessarily violate the obligations of the principle of 
beneficence, it would drastically decrease beneficence acts that would otherwise be frequent.  
The final principle of principlism is non-maleficence, and it essentially states to “do no 
harm” towards others. Though related to beneficence, non-maleficence is considered a separate 
ethical principle due to the differences in obligation between the two: where there is not always 
an obligation of beneficence towards others, there is always an obligation of non-maleficence 
towards others, though it’s not absolute.143 That being said, in the field of healthcare non-
maleficence and beneficence share an almost intertwined existence due to the nature of 
healthcare usually employing cost-benefit ratios to decide whether or not the cost or harms, i.e. 
non-maleficence, of an intervention are worth the benefits or good results, i.e. beneficence. This 
highlights the fact that some harms can be justified for good results, and this challenges the 
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conventional notion of non-maleficence’s priority over beneficence in healthcare.144 This is 
especially relevant for CLOD, because at its core there is a rather distinct cost-benefit analysis 
that weighs the benefits of the act with its likely costs or harms.145Generally, in the context of 
organ donation the principle of non-maleficence is associated with the harms inflicted upon the 
donor during the process of donating the organ.146 However, as highlighted in the section above, 
it is widely accepted that the benefits of organ donation greatly outweigh the harms associated 
with it, and this includes cases of CLOD, too.147  
On the other hand, it can be argued that prohibiting the legal regulation of a system of 
CLOD is actually harmful in several ways, including the promotion and overall acceptance of 
underground black markets in organs, organ trafficking, and transplant tourism.148 Prohibition of 
CLOD ultimately creates an environment where black markets can emerge and thrive, especially 
due to a much higher demand for organs; thus, there are good reasons from the obligations of 
non-maleficence to not prohibit such an act, of course being contingent on the fact that there are 
no other overriding ethical obligations, which we have yet to come across. This argument is 
ultimately justified by the empirical proof provided by the only regulated, legal system of CLOD 
in the world, i.e. Iran, which ultimately eliminated their organ black market, organ trafficking, 
and transplant tourism through heavy regulation of a legal system of CLOD and taking away the 
need and motivation for these practices.149  
Though it’s debatable whether this obligation to prevent harm falls under obligations of 
beneficence or non-maleficence, it is without a doubt an ethical obligation that we are mandated 
to follow, no matter which principle it belongs to.150 Both Nussbaum’s type of argument for 
prostitution, and analogously CLOD, and Veatch’s argument for CLOD via justice for the poor 
that were mentioned earlier are also arguments from non-maleficence, because they state that 
 37 
taking one more option away from poor populations is harming them by keeping them pinned 
down in poverty and unable to help themselves out of it. The same can be said about donors 
themselves, too – prohibition of CLOD leads to fewer viable organs for transplantation, which is 
a significant, if indirect, harm caused by prohibition. Thus, the obligations imposed by the 
principle of non-maleficence are compatible with a regulated system of CLOD, and prohibition 
is ultimately a violation of the obligations of non-maleficence due to harming potential poor 
donors and unhealthy recipients and creating the necessary conditions and environment for the 
presence of organ black markets, organ trafficking, and transplant tourism. 
But even though these arguments from beneficence and nonmaleficence can easily be 
used in favor of CLOD, they are also used in the second major objection to CLOD, the 
commodification objection. For example, though it has been highlighted how practical and 
effective the Iranian model for compensated kidney donation has been and how it has dealt with 
the ethical issue of the exploitation of the poor via the tremendous work of charities in Iran, one 
ethical issue that is still readily apparent is the utilization of the commodification of the human 
body that ultimately underlies the entire system, which some find to be harmful and immoral.151 
In fact, this system ultimately takes an extreme form of commodifying the human body, because 
it essentially operates off of dual quid pro quo agreements that directly exchange cash for organs. 
The argument from commodification is essentially based on the very first principle of the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, human dignity, which states: Human 
dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected.152 Though being a 
widely utilized concept in ethics and human rights language, it is notoriously ambiguous, and it 
is difficult to find any unanimous agreement on its true definition. As a concept and principle, 
though, human dignity generally refers to the intrinsic value every single human being contains, 
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and this value is an inherent dignity that must be respected unconditionally.153 The Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Elaboration of the Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on 
Bioethics actually defines the concept of respect for human dignity as “[flowing] from the 
recognition that all persons have unconditional worth, each having the capacity to determine his 
or her own moral destiny. Showing disrespect to human dignity could lead to the 
instrumentalization of the human person.”154 
This is an ideal that is very prominent in Kantian moral philosophy, because Kant posited 
that humans contain an inherent value that makes us intrinsically valuable. Thus, as previously 
discussed, the second formulation of his Categorical Imperative for ethical action is to always 
treat people as ends in themselves and never merely as a means.155 This means that people 
should always be treated as valuable individuals and never merely as a means towards some 
other end. As argued above in the context of exploitation, willful two-way contracts do not treat 
the organ donor as a mere means in CLOD, because the donor’s intrinsic worth is being 
respected by honoring the terms of the contract, i.e. being compensated, which is the very basis 
of contractual obligations. In terms of exploitation, it’s only treating the donor as a mere means if 
one utilizes coercion or theft in the process. However, opponents of CLOD argue that the very 
nature of providing monetary compensation for a person to donate their organ treats that 
individual merely as a means, i.e. a collection of useful parts, rather than a valuable individual 
that is to be respected wholly, and it ultimately changes that individual from a “person” to a 
“thing.” This process treats individuals merely as a means rather than an end in themselves, thus 
making it an unethical action.156 
This process of turning “persons” into “things” is labeled objectification, and it alters 
bodily parts into commodities.157 A commodity is essentially “anything intended for 
 39 
exchange.”158 It can further be described as any object of economic value.159 Thus, the process of 
bodily commodification is to take something with intrinsic value and objectify it, and once it is 
objectified it must be commercialized to give it an exchange value, which allows it to be sold for 
a price. This completes the transition from a “person,” or thing with intrinsic value, to a “thing” 
that is subject to market relations.160 Michael Sandel describes this process as corruption of the 
human person, and he believes it promotes an objectifying and degrading view of the human 
person. He argues that this corruption is caused by adding market relations to a non-market 
product, so to place the human body in this market situation is to corrupt the very integrity of the 
human person.161 There are then two argument formulations for the commodification objection. 
Firstly, it can be argued that compensated organ donation encourages a commodification of the 
human body, which is an evil bad enough in itself to justify prohibition. Secondly, it can be 
argued that compensated organ donation encourages a commodification of the human body, and 
commodifying the human body can ultimately lead to and cause a commodification of the human 
person, which is intrinsically wrong and should be prohibited.162 
By essentially arguing that commodifying the human body and/or person is a moral harm 
that has no place in our society, the commodification objection provides a seemingly serious 
hurdle to the goal of an ethically palatable system of compensated live organ donation that 
should be legally available. However, there are serious inconsistencies within the objection that 
raise serious questions about its justification for prohibition. These areas of weakness can be 
dismantled by three distinct modes of argument: arguments from liberal political philosophy, 
descriptive arguments of arbitrariness and a lack of consistency, and normative arguments of 
missing distinctions and false comparisons. When these three modes of arguments are combined, 
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it’s readily apparent that objections based on commodifying the human body and/or person are 
inconsistent and not sufficient to support a total prohibition on compensated organ donation. 
The first argument comes from John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy, and it basically 
utilizes his harm principle to argue that even if commodification is a moral harm, the State has 
no authority to prohibit such a trade. Remember, the harm principle states that, “the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant.”163 Thus, if we take the harm principle seriously as a normative guideline for individual 
freedoms in a liberal society, which most liberal societies do, though they sometimes break it, 
e.g. helmet mandates for motorcycle riders, then the State has no moral authority to prohibit 
freely chosen CLOD. In fact, the last sentence of the fuller passage detailing the harm principle 
explicitly states that “over his own body…the individual is sovereign.”164 This is due to the harm 
principle’s allowance of self-regarding harm. As long as the harm that someone potentially 
brings on oneself is self-regarding, doesn’t violate any specific duty, such as getting drunk while 
on police duty, and doesn’t cause perceptible harm to any particular person, then individuals 
ought to have the freedom to partake in it. Even potentially harmful actions that may affect other 
people can be justified under the harm principle, as long as the harm is “through” the individual 
“in the first instance.” For example, while mountain climbing, a climber could fall and become 
injured, which would risk others’ lives and safety in an attempt to save him; however, since this 
harm occurs “through” the individual himself and wasn’t directed at anybody in particular, this is 
a chance and cost that society is willing to pay in order to maximize individual freedoms.165 
Though the harm principle provides sufficient justification for denying the legitimacy of 
any State prohibition on CLOD, there are further arguments that are even more damning to the 
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commodification objection. First, descriptive arguments and analogies can both counter the first 
formulation of the commodification objection and demonstrate how bodily commodification in 
this form is already rampant in our society. For example, the first formulation of the 
commodification objection states that compensated organ donation encourages the 
commodification of human bodies, which is evil enough in itself to justify prohibition. But what 
exactly differentiates the human body, specifically an organ such as the kidney, from other types 
of commodities? There are several different accounts of the process of commodification and 
what distinguishes commodities from non-commodities, but they all generally agree upon certain 
basic components, such as a denial of subjectivity (lacks consciousness; no concern for feelings), 
instrumentality (primarily has instrumental value), and fungibility (replaceable/interchangeable 
with other things, such as money).166 Another expanded account of commodities essentially posts 
these same basic components in differing language: objectification (denial of subjectivity), 
fungibility (interchangeable), commensurability (measurable by a common standard, such as 
money), and money equivalence (ability to be ranked according to dollar/money value).167 Thus, 
a commodity is then something that is (1) objectified, (2) containing no intrinsic value or 
importance, and (3) interchangeable/exchangeable with other things, such as money. When one 
receives compensation for donating an organ, then, it’s fairly obvious that all three of these 
factors are present, meaning CLOD is most definitely an example of commodification of the 
human body.  
Though the question still remains whether or not this type of bodily commodification is 
necessarily bad enough in itself to justify prohibition. One argument against this notion is that 
according to these three basic components of commodification, CLOD fares no worse than 
altruistic live organ donation in this regard. That is, altruism does nothing to change the fact that 
 42 
the transplanted organ was (1) objectified, (2) containing no intrinsic value or importance, and 
(3) interchangeable/exchangeable with other things, i.e. the original organ, money due to 
healthcare costs, etc. In fact, these three components are pre-requisites for the very possibility of 
organ transplantation in the first place, meaning altruistic live organ donation commodifies the 
body in a similar way as CLOD. Of course, it can be argued that in altruistic donation money 
isn’t exchanged for the organ, which suggests that it’s categorically different from the 
commodifying act of CLOD due to the close link between commodification and money. 
However, something can still be treated or regarded as a commodity without the actual exchange 
of money, which is justified by the fact that things can be commodified whether they’ve been 
given, bought, or even stolen.168 Further, though it’s true that money wasn’t exchanged with the 
donor herself in altruistic live organ donation, money was still certainly exchanged in the process 
in the form of healthcare and transplantation costs. So essentially rather than the donor 
benefitting financially, wealthy physicians, nurses, hospitals, and Organ Procurement 
Organizations (OPOs) reap the financial benefits from the transaction. Forcing altruistic donation 
then doesn’t mean that money doesn’t exchange hands. Rather, it just means that money is 
exchanged away from the donor herself.169 Ultimately, then, altruistic organ donation merely 
compels a great self-sacrifice on the part of the donor in a situation where all other parties benefit 
in a commercial setting that commodifies the human body every bit as much as CLOD.170 
To further defeat this formulation of the commodification objection, it should be noted 
that this type of bodily commodification is also rampant elsewhere in our society, which bring us 
to the arbitrariness problem of the commodification objection. Similar to the same-named 
problem with the exploitation objection, this problem highlights the arbitrary and inconsistent 
nature with how the commodification objection is applied in this case. There are numerous other 
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types of bodily commodification in our society that are not prohibited, so it’s arbitrary and 
inconsistent to only apply this objection to compensated organ donation. For example, one of the 
more well-known cases of bodily commodification is the ability to sign up for clinical drug trials 
for compensation where researchers can test the effects of certain drugs on the human body, and 
they even have dedicated websites for finding these types of research studies, even a .gov site.171 
Further, women regularly sell their eggs for thousands of dollars for fertility reasons or 
embryonic stem cell research.172 In fact, in New York women can sell their eggs for research for 
upwards of $10,000, which is even funded by public money, similar to my proposal below.173 
Finally, the military and Veteran’s Association even take this bodily commodification a 
step further by assigning individual “prices” for compensation for injuries or amputations that 
soldiers might have suffered in service of their country. For example, in a piece by The 
Washington Post that discusses a particular soldier’s journey to receive his compensation 
package for his injuries sustained in war, it is stated: 
He would almost certainly be judged 100 percent disabled, entitling him to a minimum monthly 
payment of $2,858. He’d also receive special monthly compensation. “That’s something we pay 
above the basic monthly rates because of your amputations,” Washburn [the benefits counselor] 
said. Special monthly compensation payments vary widely and can be tough to estimate. The loss 
of a single foot, hand or eye is worth $101.50 a month. Two missing legs can generate an 
additional payment of about $1,000-$1,300 a month. Missing arms are worth an extra 
$1,600-$1,800 [emphasis added]. Washburn passed Shockley a spreadsheet with the categories 
and rates.174 
And there are many, many more examples just like these ones above, which proves that it’s 
completely inconsistent and arbitrary to single out CLOD as an unethical commodification of 
the human body that should be prohibited when we live in a society that has numerous other 
examples of this very same concept that aren’t prohibited. Thus, as with the arbitrariness 
problem of the exploitation objection, this problem shows that this objection is not sufficient to 
justify prohibition of CLOD, because it doesn’t differentiate this act of bodily commodification 
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from other non-prohibited acts of bodily commodification, which leads us to the second 
formulation of the commodification objection. 
The second formulation of the commodification objection argues that CLOD encourages 
a commodification of the human body, and commodifying the human body can ultimately lead to 
and cause a commodification of the human person, which is intrinsically wrong and should be 
prohibited. In a sense, though this claim seems stronger than the first formulation, it is also much 
harder to prove. In fact, it necessarily goes beyond merely proving bodily commodification, 
because the presence of bodily commodification does not necessarily entail commodification of 
the human person. The human person is a concept intimately related to, but ultimately distinct 
from, the human body, so there is no necessary connection between the two where 
commodification of the body necessarily entails commodification of the person.175 And 
ultimately, this distinction is why this formulation of the objection can be so easily defeated. 
Recall from earlier the definition given for the concept of respect for human dignity as 
“[flowing] from the recognition that all persons have unconditional worth, each having the 
capacity to determine his or her own moral destiny. Showing disrespect to human dignity could 
lead to the instrumentalization of the human person.”176 Essentially, this bases the concept of 
respect for human dignity on human personhood, which gives humans intrinsic, unconditional 
worth with the ability to determine our own moral destiny, meaning respecting personhood is the 
requirement for respecting human dignity. 
 Like human dignity itself, the concept of “personhood” is a controversial moral and legal 
concept that has been long debated. However, it has long been utilized in the Western 
philosophical tradition, not legal tradition, to mean any moral agent (human or non-human) that 
possesses both (1) a consistent consciousness and rationality throughout time and (2) the ability 
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to formulate ideas and plans with the ability to act out those plans.177 So this raises a twofold 
question. First, as already answered in a positive manner, does CLOD commodify the human 
body? Yes. Second, does that commodification of the human body lead to and cause a 
commodification of the human person? It’s not obvious why this would be true. As mentioned 
above, though they’re intimately connected in many ways, the human person/self and the human 
body are two distinct concepts/entities. For example, if an individual’s hand is removed, then the 
human body loses an important part of itself; however, the human person is still intact and not 
significantly impacted. On the other hand, no pun intended, if an individual’s heart or brain is 
removed, then both the human body and the human person lose an integral part of themselves, 
since both the heart and the brain are needed for the human body to function and for the 
consciousness requirement of human personhood. Of course, it might be objected that even if 
personhood as a whole is not lost, it could be that a significant “piece” of the person is lost by 
losing something as integral to human flourishing as a hand, limb, eye, etc. This is very true, but 
by that very logic the organs of discussion here, i.e. a spare kidney and a part of a liver, would 
not constitute such a loss since they’re not nearly as integral to human flourishing and 
functioning as a hand, limb, or eye, since the body can function effectively without these donated 
bodily parts. Analogously, it’s like comparing the loss of a parent, sibling, or significant other to 
the loss of a long-lost cousin that you never met – there’s simply no comparison. Thus, this 
shows that at least in the secular sense of human personhood, the human body is a collection of 
parts that are qualitatively different and have differing associations with the concept of human 
personhood.178 
 These bodily parts’ differing qualitative associations with human personhood are due to 
the “conceptual distances” between the concept of personhood and the necessity of that 
 46 
particular body part for the existence of personhood. For example, as stated above, the hand is 
much more “conceptually distant” from personhood than the heart or the brain, which are both 
necessary for personhood. When discussing the kidney in particular, it is clear that it is extremely 
“conceptually distant” from the notion of human personhood, because humans were granted two 
kidneys when we really only need one for effective survival. This has long been known and 
confirmed with consistent academic study findings of the relative safety of live kidney donation, 
which has virtually no short or long-term side effects on the functionality of the remaining 
kidney or “excess mortality.”179 Mark Cherry puts this notion best when he writes: 
Even if sales that would necessarily involve a loss of life are ruled out, if the self is different from 
the organs that are separable and distinguishable from the self, though the self may not sell some 
organs, it may sell others [emphasis added]. Just as one only requires sufficient food and 
medicine to sustain life, rather than any particular serving of food or dose of medicine, of those 
body parts that are both distinguishable and separable from the self, one only requires a 
sufficient set of body parts, rather than any particular parts or replacements, to sustain the 
biological life that in turn sustains personal life and consciousness [emphasis added].180 
 Thus, given the facts that (1) altruistic live kidney donation has been argued to be just as 
commodifying of the human body as CLOD and (2) CLOD does not even significantly affect the 
functioning of the human body, let alone personhood, then it is clear that CLOD is not 
significantly different than altruistic live kidney donation with regard to the commodification of 
the human body and person. Of course, this doesn’t mean that we should outright follow the 
Iranian model of extreme bodily commodification, because perception matters in developing an 
ethically palatable system of CLOD in a multicultural, liberal society such as our own. As I’ll 
discuss shortly, using an alternative route of compensation and couching it in the language of tax 
benefits is much more palatable than a market with quid pro quo exchanges of cash for organs.  
But this isn’t to say that within our liberal society with autonomy-based ownership rights 
over our bodies that we don’t have the fundamental individual rights to subject ourselves and our 
bodies to that type of commodification. It is fairly clear that even if CLOD did represent some 
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sort of bodily commodification that led to commodification of the human person, the harm 
principle grants sovereignty over individuals’ bodies to the individuals themselves, meaning 
combined with the plethora of other similar types of bodily commodifying actions in our society, 
there would be no political justification for prohibition. The same can be said with other, lesser 
arguments against CLOD, such as possible stigmatization of donors and suppression of altruistic 
donation, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.181 However, with the addition of 
the ethical justification that strikes down the second formulation of the commodification 
objection, it is more than clear that there is absolutely no justification for prohibition on CLOD 
within the United States, and we should strive to minimize and regulate commodification rather 
than prohibit it. Once again, Cherry sums this issue up the best by stating: 
Commodification of human organs is not an obvious violation of the Kantian maxim to treat 
persons as ends in themselves absent additional arguments showing that even consensual selling of 
organs is morally injurious. The organ market respects vendors as persons and moral agents. 
Prohibition, in contrast, may demean the poor by considering them unable to make moral 
decisions about their own fates [emphasis added].182 
1.4) Cadaveric, Imminent Death, and Other Organ Donation Proposals 
 Now that it’s been shown how CLOD is ethically and politically justifiable in a liberal 
society, it’s time to look at the ethics of cadaveric organ donation before ultimately developing a 
complete system of organ donation for the United States. This section analyzes the ethicality of 
the differing types of cadaveric organ donation systems, along with ethically analyzing several 
other newer proposals of organ procurement and donation. 
Though opt-in, explicit consent systems are rather inefficient at procuring organs and 
consent from potential donors, traditionally these explicit consent systems have been considered 
the ethical “gold standard” of consent systems. This is because these types of systems are 
essentially donation models that provide the most amount of respect for the principle of 
individual autonomy, which is extremely important in individualistic societies like the United 
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States. The notion of freedom and autonomous decision-making with what happens to one’s 
body after death is of utmost importance to many Americans, and this consent system has 
generally been considered the most accurate at respecting individual autonomy, even if 
sometimes it doesn’t “catch” individuals that would’ve been donors.183 However, though opt-in, 
explicit consent systems are considered the ethical “gold standard” option for national systems of 
cadaveric organ donation, there is a potential ethical issue that pervades both opt-in and opt-out 
systems, which is family consent. In both types of systems, it is unethical to limit the family’s 
decision-making ability when they have clear and objective evidence of what the deceased would 
have wanted, both to donate and not to donate. Generally, this is only seen in legislation within 
Austria’s hard opt-out format, even though it practically hasn’t been enforced.184 Whatever the 
case, if the family truly knows what the deceased’s preferences and has clear evidence to support 
their claims, then legislation shouldn’t be able to hinder their involvement.  
But mainly, the ethical issues generally revolve around the notion of “presumed consent” 
within opt-out systems. It has been vehemently argued that an opt-out system, and the overall 
notion of “presumed consent,” violates the principles of autonomy and informed consent, 
because there is no express, written consent given for organ donation. Further, most systems of 
“presumed consent” end up being nothing more than paternalistic systems of routine organ 
salvaging, as argued by Veatch and Ross.185 Where opt-in systems more closely align with the 
ethical principles of personal autonomy and expressly informed consent, due to involving an 
active informed decision about whether or not one wants to donate their organs upon death, opt-
out systems align more with the principles of justice and beneficence.186  
Technically, this ethical issue is only practical in nature, though, because if a nation was 
able to provide massive public health education campaigns and reach full awareness of its 
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citizens about the opt-out organ donation process, then a lack of opting out could legitimately be 
viewed as consent to donate one’s organs upon death. Theory isn’t always practical, though, and 
having a nation’s total population reach full awareness on an issue would be a Herculean task 
and virtually practically impossible.187 Essentially, this was the UK’s Organ Donation 
Taskforce’s viewpoint on the matter. While theoretically they had no fundamental moral 
objection to an opt-out system, they argued that practically it would be extremely difficult to 
implement without ensuring violations of informed consent and a lack of awareness in at least 
some of the population, so they recommended that the UK exhaust all of their options at 
improving their opt-in system before switching to an opt-out system.188 It should be noted that 
Wales officially converted to an opt-out system in December of 2015.189 Thus, in opt-out, 
presumed consent systems a certain level of autonomy violations is ultimately accepted as a 
foreseen but undesirable and unavoidable consequence of increased organ donation rates. 
Fortunately, there is a way to combine the efficacy of opt-out systems with the ethicality 
of opt-in systems: mandated choice. Essentially, this system requires individuals to register their 
preference for cadaveric organ donation by asking the individual directly and requiring an 
answer for the completion of some sort of form or document, such as a driver’s license 
application. This type of system is perfectly suited for organ donation, because mandated choice 
systems work best in bifurcated systems with simple answers, e.g. yes or no, opt-in or opt-out, 
etc.190 This system has other advantages, as well. First, mandated choice systems allow 
individual preferences to be more accurately recorded via active, explicit choice. This is a very 
important advantage over presumed consent and even explicit consent systems, because many 
times the family of the individual will unfortunately deny organ donation due to not knowing the 
exact preferences of the deceasing individual. Further, many mandated choice systems then 
 50 
allow the individual’s explicit consent to trump any family objections. For example, Illinois’ 
mandated choice system makes explicit consent from the individual sufficient for organ 
donation, meaning the individual’s family’s consent is not required. More will be said later on 
the importance of getting consent from individuals themselves rather than their families, but it is 
clear that mandated choice systems offer the advantage of more accurately recording individual 
preferences by requiring individuals to reveal their preferences for organ donation.191 
Similarly, another related advantage is the vast increase of the base number of individuals 
that are explicitly asked about becoming an organ donor. In both opt-in and opt-out systems, 
there really is no widespread mechanism to garner preferences from individuals. In mandated 
choice, though, by requiring individuals to answer the question, usually via driver’s license 
applications or state identification cards, or, even better, on federal tax documents, the number of 
potential organ donors can more accurately reflect the public opinion and attitude toward organ 
donation, which is generally very high and supportive.192 Of course, some may argue that it’s 
paternalistic to require an answer and force individuals to register their preferences in this way, 
but with something as simple and trivial as registering a preference, ultimately this argument is 
hardly compelling. 
Recently, several states have switched to a mandated choice system, and drastic benefits 
were seen almost instantly. For example, in Texas in 2010 a new law came into effect that 
required individuals applying for a new driver’s license to answer the question of whether or not 
they’d like to register as an organ donor. Before that law passed in January 2010, only two 
percent of adult Texans were registered as organ donors, and by July 2010 approximately five 
percent of adult Texans were registered as organ donors.193 The Texas Department of Public 
Safety workers, who were responsible for asking the question about registering as an organ 
 51 
donor, went through extensive training in organ donation and the donor registry in 2012 to better 
answer questions that potential donors might ask before signing up, and between this training 
and the longer usage of the mandated choice system, by January 2013 seventeen percent of 
eligible Texans were registered as organ donors.194 Similar effects have been observed in many 
other states that have recently switched to systems of mandated choice, too, such as Illinois and 
California to name a few, including a nine percent raise in registered organ donors in the first six 
months of Illinois’ adoption of a system of mandated choice on driver’s license applications.195 
Thus, there are substantial ethical and practical advantages to adopting a mandated choice system 
of cadaveric organ donation over a system of presumed consent or explicit consent, and it 
ultimately is the most ethical system of cadaveric organ donation. 
But beyond the traditional models of cadaveric and live organ donation, there are some 
intermediary types of organ donation that don’t clearly fit into either of the two aforementioned 
types of organ donation. For example, with brain dead donors being a rare commodity and the 
multiple practical problems that are associated with donation after cardiac death (DCD), e.g. 
longer warm ischemic times, variable death times after withdraw of life-sustaining treatment, 
barring the family from being with the patient at the time of passing, etc., some are looking to 
expand upon the opportunities to harvest organs from those near the end of life.196 In addition to 
live and cadaveric organ donation, some have argued for the utilization of an intermediate type 
of donation known as imminent death organ donation (IDOD). This type of live organ donation 
comes at the end of life from terminally ill patients that have decided to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment; however, these patients are neither brain dead nor ideal candidates for DCD, which 
makes cadaveric organ donation virtually impossible for these patients. Thus, in this type of 
donation before life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn, organ donation, i.e. excising the organ 
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from the still living donor, occurs, and life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn soon after the 
operation is over.197 At the present time, IDOD has been limited to one kidney at a time, though 
it is believed that more organs could be donated from these patients in the future.198 
The reason that some find this method to be controversial is due to the notion of the dead-
donor rule, which has seemingly been the guiding ethical norm for the practice of organ donation 
throughout its existence.199 The dead-donor rule has two main obligations. The first obligation 
corresponds to cadaveric organ donation - organ donors must be dead before the procurement of 
organs begins - and the second obligation corresponds to live organ donation - organ 
procurement itself may not cause the death of the donor.200 Since this type of organ donation is 
completed before life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn while the patient is alive, it is considered 
a live organ donation, and this means the second obligation of the dead-donor rule is applicable 
to IDOD, which is the exact reason why it is currently limited to a single kidney, i.e. it’s believed 
that it’s extremely unlikely that excising one organ would cause or even hasten the death of the 
patient.201 However, even in rare cases where complications do occur during surgery where the 
death of the patient is hastened, just as in palliative sedation, as long as the true motive is 
excising the organ rather than hastening the death of the patient, then this act can be ethically 
justified by the widely accepted ethical norm of the principle of double effect.202 
This type of organ donation actually comes in two forms, too, with each having distinct 
ethical components. First, it may occur in patients who are awake, alert, and have decisional 
capacity, and these patients can make the autonomous, informed decision to donate an organ 
before they start withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. For many, this seems to be a fairly 
straightforward and ethically justifiable scenario. Not only does it respect and promote patient 
autonomy, it also promotes significant acts of beneficence and engenders much good for the 
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dying patient, and this beneficence is even more apparent for the patient’s family, too. For 
example, though not specifically discussing cases of IDOD, James Childress has noted the 
positive effects and good for the family that usually comes from the choice for and successful 
completion of organ donation in a recently deceased loved one. In the family’s own words, “This 
was the best thing we could have ever done. Whoever the people are that got the organs, we’re 
just grateful to them to keep part of him alive in this way. We’re grateful they are living.”203 Said 
another way, this method, “could provide patients and families a middle ground—a way of 
avoiding futile medical care, while also honoring life by preventing the deaths of other critically 
ill people.”204  
A second and more controversial option is in permanently unconscious patients - those in 
a permanent vegetative state or those with a devastating neurologic injury that is considered 
irreversible, though not considered brain dead - where surrogate decision-makers would make 
this decision to donate the organ after making the decision to ultimately withdraw all life-
sustaining treatment. The main issue with this option of imminent death donation involves the 
use of surrogate decision-making. There are two main and relevant standards of surrogate 
decision-making when it comes to this option of organ donation: the best interests standard and 
the substituted judgment standard. The best interests standard essentially states that surrogates 
should make the decision according to the patient’s “best interests” when no prior preferences 
from the patient are known. Immediately, then, we can toss out the decision of IDOD for 
incapacitated patients using this standard, because since this type of procedure would provide no 
benefit whatsoever to the patient, but only additional harm and burden, there is no objective 
interest in performing this donation from the perspective of the incompetent patient.205 
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However, the substituted judgment standard is the preferred standard for surrogate 
decision-making, and it is based upon the subjective and known preferences of the incapacitated 
patient. Essentially, this standard requires the surrogate to use the known preferences and values 
of the incapacitated patient to make the most proper medical decision according to what the 
patient would ultimately want if they were making the decision themselves.206 Of course, the 
substituted judgment standard has its own problems, as well. Several recent studies have found 
that the substituted judgement standard is not nearly as accurate and reliable as it was once 
thought to be. For example, there is a significant discrepancy in the actual preferences of the 
patient versus the judged preferences of the patient by the surrogate, meaning surrogates are 
sometimes judging the patient’s preferences wrong and thus making decisions that are counter to 
what the patient really would’ve wanted. One study even found that surrogates are only correct 
in their judgments about 68% of the time, which is still a majority of the time but far from the 
overwhelming accuracy that this standard was once thought to possess.207 
Complicating things even further, along with the recent research suggesting the increased 
fallibility of the substituted judgment standard, there is also substantial evidence that patients’ 
preferences evolve and significantly change over time, especially with regard to end-of-life 
issues, meaning surrogates’ memories regarding past preferences of the patient might not be up 
to date. Furthermore, research also suggests that prior preferences aren’t necessarily even of 
primary importance to patients in end-of-life scenarios, because they value the opinions of family 
and their doctors, who they also want involved in the decision.208 A further problem is that IDOD 
is an extremely specific situation that is not well-known in the general public, so the chances of 
patients previously and explicitly discussing their preferences for this procedure are minimal at 
best. Further, cadaveric organ donation is not morally equivalent to live organ donation, so since 
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IDOD is a form of live organ donation, showing preferences toward or being a registered 
(cadaveric) organ donor is not necessarily sufficient for the substituted judgment standard. Thus, 
there are substantial questions regarding the required threshold that surrogate decision-makers 
would need to meet in order for them to justifiably conclude through the substituted judgement 
standard that the incapacitated patient would truly want IDOD in this situation. 
On top of this issue with surrogate decision-making, there is also the issue of public 
perception and trust in organ donation to consider, especially with minority populations. There is 
already a well-known, documented distrust of the white-dominated healthcare by African-
Americans, and this distrust and suspicion is present in the realm of organ donation, too.209 In 
fact, there is substantial substance to some of these concerns based on racial discrimination, with 
several studies suggesting that black Americans are routinely much less likely to be referred to 
transplant services, considered good candidates for transplantation, and placed on organ waiting 
lists than white Americans, even with all other factors in consideration and accounted for.210 The 
combination of this distrust with actual discrimination has led to major disparities in organ 
donation and allocation within this population.211 Further, a continued reluctance towards organ 
donation in this population has largely maintained this disparity due to a lack of histocompatible 
viable organs for transplants in African-Americans.212 So with the effectiveness and success of 
organ donation programs relying so heavily on public perception and trust in organ donation, this 
is a serious concern that must be taken into account, especially with regard to minority 
populations that are already dealing with significant disparities in this area of healthcare. 
So we must truly take into consideration what widespread promotion and utilization of 
IDOD in incapacitated patients would do to (1) surrogate decision-makers in their attempt to 
interpret the patient’s obscure preferences and (2) the public perception and trust in organ 
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donation. This is basically the position of the chairman of the UNOS ethics committee, Dr. Peter 
Reese, when he says that IDOD “could erode public trust in donation in general.”213 This is 
especially true in minority populations, who are already suspicious of and distrust white-
dominated healthcare, including the organ donation sector. This primary concern in the public 
perception of IDOD, among other issues - such as practical issues like a possible lack of support 
from the medical staff, better guidance for when to offer IDOD over DCD, and better models to 
predict how allowing IDOD would impact the number of viable organs available for transplant, 
led the joint OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee to conclude in March of 2016 that IDOD in 
incapacitated patients was not something to pursue further at this time.214 As a rule of thumb, I 
believe this is the correct public position to take in IDOD in incapacitated patients, though not in 
capacitated patients as argued above. This does not necessarily require a total prohibition, 
though, because certainly there can be times when surrogate decision-makers have indisputable 
evidence that IDOD is what the patient would prefer. However, with the potential to severely 
harm public perception and trust in organ donation and the very precarious position that it forces 
surrogate decision-makers to make life-altering decisions from, only IDOD in capacitated 
patients is something that should be outright promoted and encouraged by the health team. 
Other proposals for the procurement of organs includes organ donation euthanasia, 
procurement from prisoners, and procurement after physician-assisted suicide. In the case of 
organ donation euthanasia, the proposal states that the organ procurement operation itself 
functions as the process of euthanasia for Life Support Withdrawal Donors (LSW Donors). 
Basically, with the patient under anesthesia, after retrieving all of the abdominal and other 
thoracic organs, the transplant team removes the heart, which ultimately causes the death of the 
patient. Though this proposal was ultimately aimed at the permanently unconscious and those in 
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persistent vegetative states, it also is relevant to those LSW Donors, both capacitated and 
incapacitated, who want to ensure that something good comes from their deaths, i.e. donation.  
However, though this proposal has significant benefits over other types of organ 
donation, including greatly increased efficiency, quality, and number of organs procured, it is 
ultimately a non-starter due to its necessary violation of the normative principles governing 
organ donation, including principles that obligate the act of organ donation to (1) not harm the 
organ donor in any significant way, (2) only remove organs from brain dead individuals, and (3) 
not deliberately kill the patient.215 Further, it also inherently violates both of the ethical 
obligations of the dead donor rule – (1) organ donors must be dead before the procurement of 
organs begins, and (2) organ procurement itself may not cause the death of the donor.216 
But are there special cases where this might still be justified, such as in the case of a 
death row inmate who is about to face the death penalty? Controversial as it may seem, there 
actually may be sound ethical justifications for organ donation euthanasia in the case of an 
executed prisoner due to the differing contexts, and there are many who have proposed 
harvesting organs from prisoners in various different fashions. China is actually an infamous 
example of a nation that once, and may still, harvested organs from executed prisoners, though 
they were roundly criticized for the practice due to ethical issues of consent and the potential 
effects it had on increasing rates of the death penalty.217 The UNOS ethics committee has also 
opposed any new changes or legislation until a fuller discussion has occurred, but they also bring 
up issues of consent, how it would affect certain discriminatory practices already inherent within 
the system, and how it would affect potential jurors who might be influenced by this decision.218 
Until further analysis has been completed, I agree that this proposal is too risky to promote. 
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The final proposal involves organ donation after physician-assisted suicide. This would 
involve DCD after physician-assisted suicide. The patient could administer to themselves large 
doses of a sedative and cardioplegic agents, which would ultimately stop the heart. After the 
necessary time had passed to either ensure brain death or render the possibility of 
autoresuscitation to zero, whichever justification one is using, DCD would be completed.219 
Recent research in Belgium actually suggests the effectiveness of DCD in this scenario due to 
the controlled nature of the death and environment, and in some cases certain thoracic organs, 
i.e. the lungs, were also able to be obtained, though the heart was still unattainable.220 Since the 
act of organ donation is separate from the act of physician-assisted suicide itself, there shouldn’t 
be much controversy around this proposal, and it is something that physicians should encourage 
their patients to consider in these instances. Thus, beyond the traditional avenues of cadaveric 
and live organ donation, there are several other proposals that can be helpful for minimizing the 
organ waiting lists in the United States. Specifically, IDOD in capacitated patients and organ 
donation after physician-assisted suicide are two proposals that should be thoroughly promoted 
and encouraged in the transplant community, and in cases where surrogates have explicit 
knowledge of an incapacitated patient’s significant preference for organ donation, it also can be 
ethically justifiable to perform IDOD in these situations, too. 
1.5) A New Model for the United States Organ Donation System 
 Now that the ethical and practical factors regarding CLOD have been thoroughly dealt 
with, it is now prudent to apply this knowledge and develop a US-based system of CLOD to 
meet the surging demand for viable organs for transplantation. Additionally, the national 
cadaveric organ donation system can be revamped in the process to be more efficient and up-to-
date. By modifying the Iranian model to become more ethically palatable for a pluralistic, liberal, 
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and multicultural American society, an ethical and effective system of CLOD and mandated 
choice, opt-out cadaveric organ donation can be established in the United States, specifically by 
utilizing tax benefits as financial incentives for donation. 
As mentioned above, though the Iranian model of CLOD is the most successful system of 
its kind in history, it still suffers from the utilization of extreme bodily commodification, i.e. quid 
pro quo agreements between two parties that directly exchanges cash for an organ, due to relying 
on two separate direct monetary payments to the donor for their donated organ, which will most 
likely have to be substantially changed to be politically and ethically palatable in a multicultural, 
liberal society such as the United States, especially with our current political and medical climate 
that has struck down and criticized virtually anything close to incentivized donation.221 To 
address this weakness of extreme commodification in this model, a revised model must pass two 
conditions: (1) there must be no direct payment for organs, and (2) the notion of donation must 
be retained. However, though using things like moral or nonfinancial incentives would be 
consistent with these conditions, they do not appear to provide significant incentives to notably 
increase donation rates.222 One idea that meets these two conditions while still providing enough 
incentive for many more individuals to donate is a system based on tax benefits received for 
charitable donations one made throughout the year.  
In the United States and most other countries, individuals are allowed to deduct charitable 
donations that they made off of their taxable income. When one makes any sort of donation to a 
religious organization, non-profit organization, charity, or government agency, the amount of the 
donation is a tax write-off that one does not have to pay taxes on. These incentives are promoted 
by nations to encourage charitable giving to charities and other organizations.223 Rather than tax 
deductions, though, there is also the even better option of utilizing tax credits as incentives for 
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live organ donation, because rather than just lowering the amount of taxable income that one 
owes, tax credits actually “provide a dollar-for dollar reduction of your income tax liability.” 
Further, refundable tax credits can even reduce one’s tax liability below zero and garner the 
individual a tax refund, meaning actual cash in pocket rather just tax savings.224  
So since governmental agencies are allowed to accept charitable donations that are tax 
deductible, UNOS and/or OPTN, mimicking the supervisory and administrative roles played by 
the Iranian Ministry of Health and the Anjomans in the Iranian model, could then make donations 
eligible to be considered tax deductible transactions, or tax credits, under the framework of the 
charitable donations tax deduction. Once achieving this status, donations could then be 
incentivized without the appearance of extreme bodily commodification that is found in the 
Iranian model, because this practice could pass the two aforementioned conditions. Essentially, 
these tax benefits are incentives for charitable giving, so the tax deduction is just a benefit for 
one’s charitable gift. Of course, by definition this is still a case of commodification of the body. 
However, as argued earlier, the State has no right to legislate prohibition on these matters 
anyways, and the goal is to minimize as much as possible the appearance of commodification, or 
at least the direct connection between cash payment and donation, but not necessarily totally 
eradicate bodily commodification altogether. 
The best thing about this proposal is the significant legal precedent already established 
for such a system. For example, the first-time home buyer credit, established by the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, allowed first-time home buyers, subject to certain 
criteria, to be eligible to claim a fully refundable $8,000 tax credit, so there is precedent for these 
types of special tax credits and assorted benefits.225 Even better, in 2016 19 states already have 
laws allowing tax deductions or tax credits, generally valued at $10,000, for living donors as 
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compensation, or more technically reimbursement, for travel, lodging, and lost wages related to 
the living organ donation process.226 But the only reason that these tax benefits for living organ 
donation are available is because there are numerous states that don’t have laws to protect or 
reimburse living organ donors, which forces them to pay out of pocket to make the charitable act 
of organ donation, including costs associated with travel, lodging, and lost wages during testing 
and recovery times.227 So not only are we not currently properly encouraging and providing 
incentives for live organ donation, we’re also practically discouraging it by forcing significant 
costs upon the donors themselves. 
So if CLOD was established at the fixed price that was mentioned earlier in the 
dissertation, i.e. kidneys at $15,200 and livers at $37,600,228 or even higher due to inflation since 
2007 (when the study was completed), for the charitable donation refundable tax credit, then 
even those without a taxable income or tax liability can take advantage of this incentive, meaning 
more overall donations. Of course, more legislation would ultimately be, and currently already 
is, needed to better protect and reimburse living organ donors for lost wages and other expenses 
accrued throughout the process of donation, along with increased medical and psychological 
support after the operation.229 Beyond increased donations, there are even other benefits to this 
proposal. For instance, a recent study in Canada suggests that CLOD can actually save the 
healthcare system money in the long run.230 And as mentioned above, other studies support this 
claim, with some research suggesting savings from $90,000 with 3.5 additional QALYs to 
$270,000 per patient when also considering the monetary value of those QALYs, and this is 
ultimately due to the outrageous costs associated with government-funded dialysis.231 Further, 
the fact that the incentives aren’t necessarily instantaneous after the procedure, but come during 
tax refund season, also fosters an environment where voluntariness is respected and ensured and 
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short-term financial crises aren’t primary motivators for donating organs, which also allows 
more time for patient evaluations, interviews, and meetings to ensure the overall health and 
properly informed consent of the patient. 
The last issue to address with this proposal is funding. Due to the United States’ 
particular political context and its heavy reliance on a private healthcare system, it’s not as 
simple as just having the federal government take the hit with these losses in tax revenue, and 
even the shelling out of more tax refunds, because the US federal government is not as involved 
in the healthcare system as other national federal governments are in more socialized forms of 
healthcare, such as single-payer systems. However, there are several ways around this. First, as 
stated above, the cost-savings of instituting a system of CLOD might ultimately pay for itself, 
since it would save the federal government enormous costs involved with government-funded 
dialysis. Second, it’s not unprecedented to reallocate funds in the budget to fund these types of 
new programs. For example, the most recent military budget has the United States spending a 
whopping $596 billion in defense spending, which is nearly $30 billion more than the next seven 
countries combined, so it could very well be argued that this is a non-controversial, very 
beneficial potential source of reallocated funding for this new program, especially due to the 
program’s modest financial needs for compensation.232 Third, we could even create new taxes 
and/or initiatives as a funding source, as Illinois did in the 1990s utilizing the “Live and Learn” 
initiative to fund a successful media campaign aimed at increasing organ and tissue donation 
rates in the state.233 We could even have individual state markets or regional markets around the 
country, which would ensure that local tax increases would go to aid local organ donation 
efforts. 
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Finally, the federal government could also work in conjunction with private insurance 
companies and require them, either the recipient’s insurance company or the actual donor’s 
insurance company, to reimburse the federal government for lost tax revenue and/or the amount 
of the refund for that individual. Depending on which insurance party would ultimately be 
responsible for reimbursing the federal government, this might be the most logical option due to 
over a quarter of our population already receiving Medicaid benefits as it is.234 That is, this might 
make the most sense if most of the donors are already utilizing entitlement healthcare, which 
would keep the same party, i.e. the federal government, at both ends of the transaction and 
eliminate the need for a third-party reimbursement. This kind of involvement and cooperation of 
private insurance companies has also been posited elsewhere in markets for organs from 
cadaveric, rather than live, organ donation.235  
Thus, this proposal offers a unique, practical avenue of incentivizing live organ donation 
via a tax framework that is already largely present that does not fall into the ethical conundrum 
of extreme bodily commodification like the Iranian system does. But it certainly isn’t the only 
proposal that has been proposed regarding CLOD. Dr. Arthur Matas, an outspoken proponent of 
CLOD, has also posed a somewhat similar type of proposal with a centralized agency regulating 
the entire trade, though he posts that the incentives could be varied depending upon the donor, 
e.g. health insurance vouchers or scholarships rather than direct financial considerations.236 
Another proposal by attorney Sarah Krieger Kahan also puts control of the trade in a centralized 
agency, but she proposes that this agency would actually purchase organs from donors and 
allocate them in a way similar to how we allocate cadaveric organs now.237 So there are several 
significant proposals that hold promise as efficient models for regulating CLOD, and though they 
differ substantially in methods, they all share the same underlying assumption that a centralized, 
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federal agency should solely and strictly regulate the process to avoid corruption and unethical 
situations that are commonplace in open, unregulated markets. 
But even beyond developing a system of CLOD, the cadaveric organ donation system can 
also be revamped to be more efficient and up-to-date. One way to do this is to take advantage of 
certain non-cognitive biases and tendencies that humans have. Due to the advancements of 
disciplines such as psychology and behavioral economics, it is now known that humans are not 
nearly as rational as we once thought we were, and we are subject to irrational influences and 
cognitive biases that substantially affect our decision-making. For example, default settings and 
the way that information or options are presented to an individual, i.e. choice-framing effects, 
can significantly affect the decision that an individual will make depending upon how these 
default settings and choice-framing effects are set up and presented.238 Manipulating these 
irrational biases can then be considered “choice architecture,” and libertarian paternalism, or a 
“nudge,” can be defined as “any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives.”239  
 In actual policy, libertarian paternalism is then used in a couple of differing ways. First, 
there are certain default settings that necessarily require one preference over another, such as 
when the default is bifurcated into one of two options, as it is in organ donation. As Sunstein puts 
it, “default rules and starting points often matter, institutions can't avoid nudging people -- and 
hence can't avoid a kind of paternalism, or at least a nudge.”240 Thus, the argument is that since a 
preference must necessarily be set in the default setting, as long as there’s an option to opt-out of 
the default, then it might as well be one that promotes the best outcomes. Some posit that 
providing incentives or disincentives for particular actions, states, or purchases constitutes a 
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nudge, such as “sin taxes” that are measured hikes in taxes for certain purchases considered 
“sins” or undesirable habits.241 These have recently been employed in public health strategies 
aimed at curbing obesity, such as the UK’s decision to return to sin taxing sugary drinks based 
on the amount of sugar that they contain.242 Similarly, disincentives might also be used by 
eliminating options altogether, such as Bloomberg’s New York City large soda size ban.243  
However, these types of disincentive policies that eliminate options or punish individuals 
for choosing one option over the other are not consistent with the conditions of libertarian 
paternalism. The reason nudges are compatible with liberalism in many default settings is 
because they allow the individual to easily opt-out without being unduly forced and coerced to 
participate in the behavior. In eliminating options or sin taxing, though, there is no ability to opt-
out, and you are either forcing individuals to change their conception of the good by taking away 
options or forcing them to modify their behavior, or otherwise suffer the consequences, which 
are higher taxes paid on items. Remember, this type of action is expressly prohibited in the 
definition of a nudge itself when it is stated, “To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be 
easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruits at eye level counts as a 
nudge. Banning junk food does not.”244  
Similarly, incentives are not technically nudges either, because utilizing these facts 
doesn’t conform to the concept and definition of libertarian paternalism. This is for two reasons. 
First, incentives work on the “Reflective System” of human thinking rather than the “Automatic 
System” of human thinking that nudges work on, because incentives work through rationality by 
giving the individual a reason to act, which is opposed to the instinctual, unconscious mode of 
thinking in the “Automatic System.”245 Financial incentives then rely upon rational processes 
rather than cognitive biases to change behaviors, which, by definition, makes them incompatible 
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to be considered nudges.246 Second, by definition, nudges must work without “significantly 
changing their economic incentives.” However, that’s exactly how incentives work to influence 
decisions, so utilizing incentives is by definition not consistent with libertarian paternalism. But 
this isn’t to say that incentives aren’t behavioral economic interventions or part of a good choice 
architecture either, because they clearly are.247 Similarly, this also isn’t to say that incentives 
aren’t effective either, because many empirical studies have shown the effectiveness of using 
cash incentives or even lottery-based incentives to further promote public health aims.248 
One area where nudges are extremely beneficial is the concept of organ donation, 
because the default donor status is extremely preference-laden. Currently, in the United States 
the default setting for cadaveric organ donation is negative, and attempts to change this default 
setting to positive, presumed consent has largely been met by skepticism, especially by the 
AMA.249 However, studies suggest that though other factors are also necessarily involved in 
organ donation rates, there is strong evidence that opt-out, presumed consent systems have 
increased organ donation rates over opt-in, explicit consent systems.250 Other studies corroborate 
these findings.251 And though incentives, both financial and non-financial, are not technically 
nudges, they are also beneficial in organ donation, and this has led some to argue for the 
institution of organ donation prioritization incentives, where those that sign up to be cadaveric 
organ donors would ultimately receive priority over non-donors in issues of organ allocation.252 
These types of incentives or nudges are very similar to what Israel has instituted, and the 
introduction of these incentives in Israel has greatly increased both the number of deceased organ 
donors and the number of newly signed donor cards.253 
Nudges and other incentives are then an effective way to increase cadaveric organ 
donation rates; however, as argued above, with opt-out systems it’s hard to justify any argument 
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that automatically presumes donation without actual explicit consent. This is why both of the 
aforementioned nudges and incentives, i.e. the opt-out default setting and prioritization, should 
be combined with a mandated choice strategy on the national or federal level. By combining 
these three strategies, you provide two differing nudges or incentives, i.e. the default/status quo 
bias and prioritization, to each individual making a decision about becoming an organ donor.254 
The process would go something like this. First, via completion of driver’s license 
applications, state identification cards, tax returns, or some combination of these options, you 
mandate each individual to designate their organ donation preference. During this process, you 
provide them with the necessary educational information to make an informed choice, either 
personally or with detailed instructions for where to find more information regarding organ 
donation, such as a website, and along with this information will be information regarding both 
the prioritization incentive and the positive default status for organ donation, which gives you a 
far-reaching response rate for explicit consent.255 (It is explained below how a positive default 
status is consistent with a mandated choice approach.) Since there will already be information 
regarding the CLOD tax deduction and credit on the income tax return and the ACA has already 
established precedent for conducting this type of business on income tax returns, i.e. inquiring 
about one’s health insurance status, it seems that the mandated choice question for cadaveric 
organ donation should necessarily be on income tax returns, perhaps in addition to other state-
issued forms to ensure widespread coverage.256 
This type of system has two main advantages. First, this system increases the percentages 
of explicit consent from the actual donor, rather than a presumed consent or consent from the 
family, because you mandate the choice to be made by individuals themselves. This is ideal, 
because it is uncertain how many families really understand the preferences for organ donation 
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of the potential donor, which could lead to wasted organs and violated preferences or, even 
worse, organ donation from someone opposed to donation. From 2010 to 2016, the NHSBT 
estimated that 1,200 people missed out on life-saving organ transplants due to English families 
vetoing approximately 547 potential organ donation cases.257 The question is this - how many of 
those 547 patients truly did have a preference for organ donation that was missed out upon due to 
the family misjudging their preferences? With this system, though, that won’t be a worry for the 
majority of cases, because the health team will have either explicit consent for or against 
donation, which will ultimately keep the family from having to make yet another tough 
decision.258 The explicit choice of the individual should also be honored in both brain death 
organ donation cases and DCD cases, where possible. 
The second major advantage of this system is its ability to lessen the ethical concerns 
with default settings of presumed consent, which is ultimately how a positive default status is 
consistent with a mandated choice approach. As stated above, the main ethical issue with 
presumed consent legislation is that it seems to go against some deeply-rooted ideations about 
individuals’ sovereignty over their own bodies, and it is argued that it does not respect individual 
autonomy and individual sovereignty to presume a preference for organ donation across a 
population.259 However, in this system actual donation based on presumed consent would be at 
an absolute minimum, because most of the given population would be mandated to give an 
explicit preference to donation. Though since no system is perfect and reaching every single 
member of a population isn’t really feasible, we would have to rely on the family of the patient 
to decide upon organ donation, under a substituted judgment standard.  
Still, though, there might be exceedingly rare cases where a patient meets the criteria for 
organ donation, a mandated preference is not on file, and no family can be located. This would 
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be the only time that presumed consent would be used on a patient, and it’s not like there isn’t a 
precedence for this type of thing either. The Anatomy Act in several Indian states allows 
unclaimed bodies to be given to medical and teaching institutions for anatomical examinations 
and teaching purposes.260 Many states in the US have similar policies, including West Virginia, 
whose Department of Social Services has a detailed policy regarding offering unclaimed bodies 
to the Anatomical Board of Gift Registry after a search for an advanced directive, next of kin, 
and authorized representative has come up empty and the individual is to be buried at the public 
expense.261 So given these realities, a fairly persuasive argument can be made that those brain 
dead patients whom cannot be claimed become the responsibility of the state, and consent can be 
presumed on the basis of the best interests of the state as a whole.  
Thus, this is essentially the justification for having a positive default status combined 
with a mandated choice approach. Ideally, the State tries to elicit explicit preferences from 
patients themselves regarding donation, and if that fails, then family members become the 
primary decision-makers regarding donation. If no family is present, then consent is presumed 
based on the responsibility and interests of the State, as there is precedent for in other contexts. 
Utilizing this positive default status as a nudge would then entail presenting this default setting to 
the individual as the “status quo” when they are making their decision. For example, the question 
could say something like: “Though we first try to elicit and rely on (1) you or (2) your family’s 
preferences for organ donation, the default option when these preferences are unknown is a 
willingness to donate your organs upon your death. Would you like to change this donation 
status now, or would you like to continue your willingness to organ donation?”  
This would essentially be a modified version of a soft opt-out donation format that would 
proactively try to elicit and mandate donation preferences from individuals. When the individual 
 70 
has not given their preferences, then the default setting would also be of use to organ 
procurement specialists in their attempt to get the family to agree to organ donation. By 
informing the family of its default status, you take advantage of the status quo bias and greatly 
increase the likelihood of an affirmative decision for donation. Therefore, by adjoining the 
mandated choice philosophy with the nudges of the default/status quo bias and prioritization, 
cadaveric organ donation can be effectively incentivized, and we can enhance and protect 
individual autonomy by ensuring that individuals’ preferences are being met by garnering 
explicit consent for or against organ donation in much larger percentages.262 And by connecting 
this cadaveric organ donation proposal with the CLOD proposal, along with the promotion of the 
types of IDOD mentioned above, the United States organ donation system becomes completely 
revamped and updated, and it constitutes a significantly more ethical and efficient system to 
effectively serve the needs and respect the dignity and autonomy of thousands upon thousands of 
Americans across our nation. 
To conclude, this first chapter has laid the groundwork for an expanded argument of the 
thesis throughout the rest of this dissertation. The remaining chapters will be dedicated to 
expanding upon the brief introductory analysis contained within this chapter, and each chapter 
will systematically address the complex philosophical, ethical, and practical issues that are 
associated with the concept of CLOD. It is my hope that the remaining chapters provide a cogent 
and compelling argument against the moral justification calling for a prohibition of CLOD.
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Chapter 2 - Practical Need for Compensated Live Organ Donation 
 The starting point of every argument for compensated living organ donation (CLOD) 
begins with the practical need for a market in organs, especially kidneys due to their ability to be 
procured from live patients. Primarily, this practical need concerns the major disparities between 
organs needed and organs available and the significant waiting times for organ transplants, 
including: over 120,000 Americans currently on organ waiting lists; over 100,000 of those 
Americans on the kidney waiting list alone; and a median wait time of 3.6 years for one’s first 
kidney transplant.263 However, this significant practical need has many contributing factors, 
including the failure of both cadaveric and altruistic modes of organ donation to effectively meet 
the organ supply, and when these failures are combined with the practical effectiveness of 
financial incentives for live organ donation that has been well documented in many instances 
across the world, a practical argument for CLOD is created. Further, considering the emergence 
of regenerative medicine and its possibility of relieving the mass organ shortage in the near 
future, along with its conceptual similarities to CLOD, a moral argument is also present in favor 
of the possibility of a regulated market of CLOD in the United States. 
 This chapter focuses on the background and practical and moral contexts for the 
possibility of establishing a regulated system of CLOD in the classically liberal society of the 
United States. Specifically, the chapter first looks backwards in time at numerous differing 
systems and policies of organ donation throughout the world and history of organ donation, and 
it is highlighted how cadaveric and altruistic means of organ donation have long been 
insufficient to effectively manage our transplantation needs. Next, the chapter moves to the 
present time and analyzes several differing current models of organ transplantation to highlight 
the effectiveness of financial incentives, and other types of incentives, in increasing organ 
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donation rates in the organ donation process. It then looks forward in time to the developing field 
of regenerative medicine and discusses how this promising field might ultimately alleviate mass 
organ shortages. Finally, the chapter ends by defining the moral obligations that we have as a 
society to at least consider the possibility of a regulated market of CLOD, and the medical, 
moral, and political contexts for such a regulated market in a pluralistic, classically liberal 
society are spelled out and analyzed. 
2.1)  Present and Past Systems: Efficiency 
 To begin the practical argument for the necessity of a market in organs to effectively 
service our growing organ needs, it is necessary to examine some examples of both non-
compensated and compensated systems of organ donation of the past and present. These systems 
range from non-compensated, altruistic cadaveric organ donation to compensated cadaveric 
organ donation to compensated live kidney donation. After this examination, it will be 
sufficiently clear that altruistic measures are not sufficient to effectively serve our organ needs. 
2.1.1) Non-Compensated Systems of Cadaveric Donation 
 The traditional format for cadaveric organ donation consent is known as an opt-in 
consent system. Also referred to as an explicit consent system, this consent system requires 
individuals to “opt in” to become a donor, hence its name. Opt-in systems come in soft and hard 
formats. Soft opt-in formats generally allow the deceased’s family to have the final say regarding 
the organ donation, even when the deceased individual opted in to become a donor; whereas, 
hard opt-in formats do not allow the deceased’s family to stop organ donation from an individual 
who has opted in, though these formats are rare.264 
 Though an explicit, active choice is inherent to the opt-in philosophy, these systems have 
been implemented in various different ways across the globe. For example, in the UK individuals 
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must opt in to the Organ Donor Register or carry an organ donor card if they wish to donate their 
organs after death. However, since this rarely happens the deceased’s family is oftentimes the 
ultimate decision-maker in whether or not to donate the deceased’s organs.265 Of course, it 
should be noted that not all of the UK is like this, because Wales recently converted to an opt-out 
system in December of 2015.266 Further, though it does not have a national registry, Germany 
employs a similar explicit consent system. To be an organ donor, a form known as the 
“Organspendeausweis” must be filled out for an individual to register as an organ donor. The 
form can also serve as an objection to organ donation or as an avenue of selecting a surrogate to 
decide for you.267 Things are similar in the United States, because in most states Americans must 
actively fill out a form or registration if they desire to become an organ donor. However, in some 
states the organ donor decision is required on state-issued forms. In the state of Illinois, for 
example, to receive your driver’s license you must indicate whether or not you would like to sign 
up to be an organ donor. This type of consent system is known as “mandated choice” or 
“required consent,” and it has given Illinois a 22 percent higher donor signup rate than the 
national average.268 We’ll talk more about this type of consent system in a later chapter. 
 A more modern system of cadaveric organ donation, the opt-out consent system is the 
counterpart to the opt-in consent system. Also known as a presumed consent system, this system 
presumes that individuals consent to cadaveric organ donation, and only those who have “opted 
out” of organ donation will not have their organs donated upon death. Like opt-in systems, opt-
out systems come in several different formats, including hard, soft, and hard-group formats. Hard 
opt-out formats allow physicians to remove the organs of every individual that has not registered 
to opt out of organ donation after death, even when the family objects and knows that the 
individual would not have wanted her organs removed. Hard group opt-out formats function the 
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same as hard opt-out formats, but certain preselected groups, such as religious groups opposed to 
organ donation after death, are excluded from donation. Soft opt-out formats take the opposite 
approach, because they allow the deceased’s family to override an unwanted donation, even 
when the individual did not opt out of organ donation after death.269 
 Though less varied than opt-in systems, opt-out systems still do contain a level of 
variance in how they’re implemented, as evidenced by the distinctions between the differing 
formats. For example, Austria’s hard opt-out format passed in 1982 legally gives doctors the 
right to remove organs from every individual who has not recorded their objection with the 
national registry, even if the family objects. In practice, though, it’s believed that doctors 
generally succumb to the family’s wishes in order to keep the public perception of cadaveric 
organ donation high. In Belgium, their 1986 Law on the Removal and Transplantation of Organs 
enacted a soft opt-out format. Though this doesn’t hold when the deceased has given explicit 
consent for organ donation, this format allows the deceased’s family to override an organ 
donation if the individual had not opted out into the national registry, giving only presumed 
consent.270 Spain also employs a soft opt-out format, but one major difference distinguishes 
Spain’s system from Belgium’s system. Where in Spain it is expected for the doctors to 
explicitly ask the deceased’s family about organ donation, in Belgium this is neither expected 
nor required, which distinguishes between these two similar types of soft opt-out cadaveric organ 
donation systems.271 
 Intuitively, it would seem that opt-out systems are more efficient than opt-in systems at 
increasing the organ supply. In 2002, thirteen out of the top fifteen nations in number of people 
donating organs per million were nations with opt-out systems, including Spain, Austria, and 
Belgium making up three of the top four nations.272 Ten years later in 2012 the disparity between 
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the two systems is even greater with the opt-out systems of Spain (35 people per million), 
Croatia (34 people per million), and Belgium (30 people per million) producing many more 
viable organs than the opt-in systems of the US (25 people per million), UK (18 people per 
million), and Germany (12 people per million).273 This was further verified in a recent 
international study on the effects of opt-in versus opt-out legislation on the actual numbers of 
organ donation. It was found that opt-out systems of consent lead to more cadaveric organ 
donations than opt-in systems of consent, and opt-out systems also provide the highest 
cumulative numbers of organ donations, including both cadaveric and live donations, though 
interestingly there was a correlation between opt-out systems and lower rates of live organ 
donation.274 
 However, others have recently challenged this claim on two main fronts. First, some 
argue that the apparent necessity to receive the deceased’s family’s permission for donation, 
even in opt-out countries, is just as much of an obstacle for opt-out systems as opt-in systems. 
Second, others argue that outside contextual factors are also at play beyond the differences in 
consent. For example, some studies have suggested that the difference between donation rates in 
opt-in countries versus opt-out countries is negligible after controlling for the differences in each 
country’s relevant mortality.275 Other contextual factors might be the environment of organ 
donation, including the attention paid towards organ donation and its priority within the nation. 
Many point to the very active and energetic approach that Spain took towards organ donation to 
show that other contextual factors are in play. Whatever the case may be, though, it is undeniable 
that neither system can effectively eliminate or greatly reduce organ waiting lists on their own, 
and both systems ultimately require live donors to meet their quota.276 In fact, Sigrid Frye-
Revere reports that even under the most optimistic of predictions that consider all potential 
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cadaveric donors as actual donations where kidneys are procured, less than 1/3 of the United 
States kidney waiting list would be eliminated, which highlights how cadaveric organ donation, 
especially altruistic cadaveric organ donation, is simply not a viable method in itself to 
satisfactorily minimize organ waiting lists, even with the aid of altruistic live donations.277 
2.1.2) Compensated Systems of Live Donation 
 Outside of cadaveric organ donation, there have been numerous examples of systems of 
CLOD in recent history. For example, at one time India had a robust kidney bazaar, or market, 
and their system represented one of the most thriving true open market for kidneys in the world. 
Rather than putting forth regulation regarding the terms, limits, and procedures for organ sales, 
India merely didn’t prohibit the sale of organs through legislation, and this led to a true open 
market on organs without regulations in place to restrict prices or practices. This allowed the 
economic principles of supply and demand to really guide market prices and practices, and it led 
to India becoming one of the largest transplant centers in the world with low organ prices, 
specifically for kidneys, and almost immediate organ availability.278 India’s reliance on the sale 
of organs during this time was due to the lack of brain-death criteria for cadaveric organ donation 
and large cultural taboos that disapproved of the act of obtaining organs from cadavers.279 In 
fact, the general public had a supreme disapproval of cadaveric organ donation. At that time, the 
process of cadaveric donation was thought of as neo-cannibalism, and this significantly restricted 
the use of cadaver organs for transplantation until the Transplantation of Human Organ Act 
established brain-death criteria in 1994, even though kidney transplants from live donors had 
been prevalent since the 1970’s.280 
 However, major ethical and human right abuses were soon observed, and they eventually 
caught up with this open market that relied on organ trafficking, which is defined as: 
 86 
 
…the recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, or receipt of living or deceased persons or their 
organs by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving to, or the 
receiving by, a third party of payments or benefits to achieve the transfer of control over the 
potential donor, for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of organs for transplantation.281 
Organ trafficking is generally administered and utilized by organ brokers, and these individuals 
would connect, and sometimes coerce, poor Indian individuals with wealthy Indian residents, 
and even non-residents. These buyers would regularly pay anywhere from $2,500 to $4,000 for a 
kidney, and the actual donor would receive less than $1,000 with the broker pocketing the rest. 
Oftentimes, though, the broker would “stiff” the donor, who would then not receive any 
compensation at all for donating their kidney.282 In addition to ethical problems of non-payment, 
reneging on promises and contracts, and coercion of donors, problems of informed consent and 
exploitation also arose from this open market. Many donors did not give proper informed 
consent to donating their kidney, because they did not fully understand the information presented 
or, even worse, were not even informed about the procedure. Many other human rights violations 
also accompanied these abuses in this open market.283 
After years of social pressure from the West over their allowance and tolerance of the 
abuses going on in their organ trade, Indian leaders finally decided to prohibit unrelated live 
organ transplants in their Transplantation of Human Organ Act of 1994. This Act prohibits living 
organ donation from anyone that isn’t a first relative of the recipient, though exceptions can be 
made when a first relative isn’t available or willing to donate an organ. In addition to this 
prohibition, the Act also established brain death criteria, which set a precedent for cadaveric 
organ donation from brain-dead patients that was not an option earlier.284 The problem with this 
Act is the significant loophole that many brokers are still using to make money off of kidney 
transplants. When first relatives aren’t available for organ donation, exceptions can be made by 
authorization committees of hospitals for a non-relative donor, as long as the intent is altruism 
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and not financial gain. Kidney brokers then use this exception to their advantage, and they coach 
up clients to be able to fool these committees. Almost all of these committees end up approving 
the non-relative donation, because it brings quite a bit of money and resources to their hospitals. 
This is all in addition to India’s underground organ trafficking and black market in kidneys that 
are transplanted in “back-alley clinics” and clandestine transplant centers that don’t even bother 
to go this route. Thus, though officially prohibited in India, many of India’s poorest are still 
selling their organs through black markets or the fooling of authorization committees.285 
In a similar sort of situation, the Philippines also employed a system of compensated 
donation that received worldwide attention. Ferdinand Marcos, the notorious leader and dictator 
of the Philippines from the 1960’s through the 1980’s, suffered from kidney disease, and this 
prompted him to establish impressive medical institutes dedicated to kidney health and 
transplants. In fact, he even had two kidney transplants himself and eventually died from kidney 
ailments. This created an atmosphere in the Philippines that supported kidney transplants and the 
selling of organs. Though also occurring during this time, the Philippines’ organ trade did not 
really take off and receive worldwide attention until 1999 when a Manila television reporter 
filmed a television program based on the local organ trade.286 
This television program spiked a huge increase in organ sales and trafficking activities, 
and the Philippines’ poor became a main target of organ brokers. These brokers would go to poor 
villages and slums to perform blood tests on potential donors and get their medical and contact 
information, and when a tissue match came in needing a kidney the potential donor was 
notified.287 This type of organ sale become so rampant and out of control that the Philippines 
government issued an administrative order to form a program to govern sales that aimed to curb 
these cases of organ sale that didn’t meet professional and ethical standards of transplantation. 
 88 
 
This program was called the Philippine Organ Donation Program (PODP), and the program and 
administrative order actually explicitly stated that the sale and purchase of kidneys was 
prohibited. However, this was in theory only, because the program also established a “gratuity 
package” for donors as an incentive. This package included lost wages compensation, a stipend 
for livelihood assistance, and life insurance. Between the lost wages compensation and the 
stipend for livelihood assistance, the amount came out to roughly PhP 175,000. During this time, 
the annual family income average of the Philippines was about PhP 172,000. Thus, this package 
provided a large financial incentive for donors, and it ultimately amounted to a government-
approved system of kidney sale, of course without the necessary safeguards, oversight, and 
regulations that have been effectively utilized elsewhere.288 
Though the PODP’s establishment in 2002 was aimed towards the goal of curbing organ 
trafficking and transplantation outside of federally regulated standards, hospitals, and transplant 
centers, it performed this aim poorly and had virtually no effect. In fact, the Philippines 
government had to issue an Anti-Trafficking in Persons law just a year later in 2003 to try and 
further curb this illegal and abusive trafficking activity that did not adhere to federally regulated 
standards. Rather than stopping the organ trade that the government felt was good for their nation 
altogether, the law illegalized the act of using force, coercion, violence, or deceit in the procuring 
of organs from individuals.289 Predictably, though, this law also failed as a deterrent for organ 
trafficking, and though several cases have been filed in court, to date no convictions have been 
brought against organ traffickers from this law. While trying to force more transplants through 
the PODP, the laws actually had an opposite effect creating a much larger trade outside of the 
PODP. For example, from 2004-2006 1,182 unrelated kidney donations were registered through 
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the Philippine Renal Disease Registry (PRDR), but only 97 of those were completed through the 
PODP.290 
Part of the issue surrounding the prevalence of organ trafficking outside of the PODP can 
be attributed to a certain regulation of the PODP that limited the number of transplants to foreign 
recipients to ten percent of each transplant facility’s total number of annual kidney transplants. 
The problem with this regulation was that most Filipinos were poor and could not afford to buy a 
kidney without charitable relief, so a vast majority of the kidney buyers came from foreign 
countries to buy kidneys from the Philippines. This is highlighted in the statistics that show a 
1,200 percent increase in foreign transplants from 2002-2007 with over half of the transplants 
going to foreign recipients during this time. This led the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
2007 to include the Philippines on the list of five nations of “organ trafficking hotspots.”291 
This practice of transplantation to foreign recipients from local donors is known as 
transplant tourism, and it is one of the most significant bioethical issues within global ethics and 
transplant ethics. This practice usually involves individuals who need a kidney transplant coming 
over from a country that doesn’t allow organ sale to the Philippines where they can legally buy 
themselves a kidney for transplantation. These individuals are usually motivated by long organ 
waiting lists in their home country and the lack of an opportunity to buy an organ from another 
due to their country’s prohibition. This is an extensive process that usually involves organ 
brokers and other health care professionals to manage the procurement of the organ, the 
exchanging of money, and the scheduling and location of the transplant.292 This practice 
continued and thrived in the Philippines from 2002-2008. In 2007, the Philippines Department of 
Health tried revising the PODP to cut back on commercial organ transactions for foreign 
recipients, but pressure from groups such as the WHO eventually forced the President of the 
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Philippines to enact a direct ban on all kidney transplants from unrelated living donors from the 
Philippines to foreign recipients. Though this ban still stands, a high poverty level and high 
corruption index suggests that transplant tourism still exists outside of the law in the Philippines, 
and illegal organ trafficking is still present in the black market sale of organs there today.293 
Another recent example of an open, unregulated market in human kidneys is Pakistan. In 
many ways, Pakistan’s situation largely mirrored the Indian situation, because Pakistan was a 
true open market in kidneys without any national laws regulating the process, just like in India 
prior to their Transplantation of Human Organ Act of 1994. Further, Pakistan’s reliance on live 
organ donation was a result of the lack of a national system of cadaveric organ donation, largely 
due to cultural and religious objections to the practice, just like India.294 At first, these live 
kidney donations were primarily between Pakistani family members; however, these statistics 
changed from 75% between Pakistani family members in 1991 to 80% between unrelated donors 
in 2003, and 50% of these recipients were foreign nationals, meaning transplant tourism was a 
major issue. This change from altruistic donation to commercial donation largely coincided with 
an increasing number of private hospitals offering “transplant packages” that would charge 
kidney recipients between $13,000 and $27,000 for a kidney transplantation, which obviously 
attracted many wealthy foreign nationals to Pakistan.295  
Noting these drastic changes from altruistic to commercial donations and the large 
incidences of transplant tourism, the Pakistani government was subject to extreme pressure and 
scrutiny from both national and international sources of the press, in addition to influential 
international organizations, like the WHO. This finally led to a presidential ordinance known as 
the Transplantation of Organs and Tissues Ordinance, 2007, though it was vigorously fought by 
many in the transplant community, even to the point of one petition being filed claiming the 
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Ordinance violated Sharia law and was therefore unconstitutional. But this petition was struck 
down, and the Ordinance was unanimously ratified into law in 2010 by the National Assembly 
and Senate of Pakistan in 2010. This Ordinance ultimately: 
…supported living related donation, recommended deceased donor programs, criminalized 
transplantation of organs from Pakistanis into foreigners with stiff fines and imprisonment for 
those convicted of these offences, and ordered the setting up of a national registry and oversight 
body (HOTA—Human Organ Transplantation Authority) at the federal level.296 
Soon after the ratification of the Ordinance, there was a marked drop in transplant 
tourism operations, but in recent years there have been increasing reports of transplant tourism 
making a comeback in Pakistan, albeit in a much smaller scale. In addition to the Human Organ 
Transplantation Authority being inefficient and subject to corruption, this is primarily due to the 
continued cultural and societal resistance to cadaveric organ donation in Pakistan, which thwarts 
any attempt to firmly establish a national, robust system of cadaveric organ donation. Further, 
misconceptions regarding the harms of live, related kidney donations are widespread. Thus, with 
the lack of a cadaveric organ donation system and a lack of trust and knowledge regarding living, 
related kidney donations, the black market, organ trafficking, and transplant tourism are still 
alive and present in Pakistan today.297 
 Another national example that suffers from transplant tourism, organ brokering, organ 
trafficking, and a black market in organs is Bangladesh. Organ sale has been illegal in 
Bangladesh since 1999 with the passing of the Organ Transplant Act by the Bangladeshi 
Parliament. Violations of this law are punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years and a 
minimum fine of 300,000 Taka, which is around $3,800 today. However, Bangladesh’s 
underground organ trade is still robust and growing, and like the examples of India and Pakistan 
above, this is largely due to a significant poor population in Bangladesh and the virtual absence 
of a cadaveric organ donation program. This underground organ trade takes many different 
forms, too, including foreign nationals coming to Bangladesh for transplant tourism, domestic 
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organ trafficking with both the recipient and donor being Bangladeshi and having the transplant 
procedure in Bangladesh, and international organ trafficking where the recipient and donor travel 
to another country, usually India, for the transplant procedure. Moniruzzaman’s ethnography 
studied the plight of these Bangladeshi compensated kidney donors, and as seen in the organ 
trafficking in India’s open market prior to legislation, many accounts of exploitation, broken 
contracts, and coercion were reported from these donors about both organ brokers and the organ 
recipients.298 Clearly, open, unregulated markets and black markets are not effective, safe, or 
ethical methods of CLOD, especially for the donors themselves. 
Unlike these previous four national examples of open organ sales, transplant tourism, 
and/or black markets in organs that are generally considered failures and required legislation to 
prohibit and/or substantially limit their usage, the remaining two national examples actually 
demonstrate more effective means of CLOD. For example, the Iranian kidney donation and 
transplantation system has evolved drastically for the better in the last fifty years. Originally, Iran 
was part of the Eurotransplant Network, and Iranian patients would either go abroad for a 
transplant or, in rarer cases, have a cadaver organ sent to Iran for transplantation. However, the 
Iranian Revolution in the late 1970’s collapsed this relationship, and due to certain cultural 
taboos and a lack of infrastructure and resources, a living rather than cadaveric organ donation 
system was implemented to serve their organ, specifically kidney, needs. Similar to India’s 
previous system, the Iranian system originally functioned as an unregulated international market 
that was welcome to anyone willing to pay the price and do the work of finding a suitable kidney 
match. Medical professionals initially “looked the other way” regarding this blatant form of 
organ sales, but over time they began condoning and ultimately accepting the practice. Beginning 
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, however, many noticed numerous problems with this open, 
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unregulated practice, including reneged promises from both donors and recipients, coercion, and 
other administrative issues that overly complicated the process, and Iranians began to 
contemplate regulating this compensated donation system in order to address these problems.299  
Thus, the Iranian parliament and Ministry of Health ultimately started to get involved 
with the practice. By the late 1980’s, the Ministry of Health was compensating donors out of its 
own budget, and by 1995 this practice was formalized by law with its own budget and 
organization responsible for compensating donors, known as the Charity Foundation for Special 
Diseases. Further, in the early 1990’s the most profound development occurred in the licensing 
of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to ultimately administer and regulate the everyday 
processes of kidney donation, procurement, and transplantation, along with the compensation 
that came with the donation. These NGOs, known colloquially and collectively as the Anjomans, 
function primarily in the same way that an Organ Procurement Organization (OPO) does in the 
United States in the administration of cadaveric organ donation, though they also have the 
responsibility of writing contracts, holding money in escrow, and providing social services to 
both the recipient and donor, since live donation contains two separate living parties.300 
 Today, the Iranian system is a tightly regulated system that is seen by many as a good, 
though not perfect, model of a functioning system of CLOD, and it has effectively eliminated the 
Iranian kidney waiting list since 1999.301 The Anjomans register the statistics and information of 
both candidates for kidney transplants and willing donors into a database to find a match for each 
party. After obtaining the proper consents, the matched pair is introduced to each other, and the 
pair comes to an agreement on an acceptable price to be paid from the recipient of the kidney to 
the donor of the kidney, which is separate from the payment given from the government.302 The 
role of the Anjomans and other NGO and charity organizations that also help with the matching 
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and financial components of the practice cannot be overstated, because their involvement cuts 
out the “middle-man” of organ brokering and trafficking. This greatly lessens the chances of 
corruption, favoritism, and exploitation, because no conflicts of interest will occur if these 
organizations and the transplant teams have no financial ties to the matching of the pair.303 
 After the matching of the two parties and they’ve agreed on an acceptable payout from 
the recipient to the donor, the kidney transplant takes place, which is paid by health insurance 
agencies and the Iranian Ministry of Health and Medical Education.304 Once completed, the 
NGO Charity Foundation for Special Diseases rewards the kidney donor for their gift with 
further monetary compensation, known as the “gift for altruism,” in addition to a one-year free 
medical insurance voucher and an exemption from Iran’s mandatory two-year military service 
for men.305 To ensure proper protocols, fair payment, and ethical application, all transplantation 
centers and compensated kidney donations are located and performed in university hospitals 
under close supervision of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education. Iranian compensated 
kidney donation is further exclusively limited to Iranian citizens, and foreigners must provide a 
donor from their own nationality in Iran, which disallows the highly controversial practice of 
transplant tourism within Iran.306 
 Though this model has been successful in eliminating kidney waiting lists and keeping 
organ brokers and the black market at bay, it does have several weaknesses that should be 
amended in any updated model. First, the model relies on an extreme form of bodily 
commodification that comes from the dual direct quid pro quo agreements of cash for kidneys – 
the “gift for altruism” and the negotiated amount paid from the recipient to the donor. Ideally, 
any updated model would find a way to financially incentivize donation in a more ethically 
palatable and less controversial way. Second, there is significant leeway given to interpretation 
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and implementation of the process of CLOD among the various differing Anjomans, provinces, 
and even healthcare institutions in Iran, which leads to various differing implementations and 
formulations of the larger “Iranian model” across the nation. For example, the most extreme 
example of these variations is in Shiraz where there is no outside payments from recipients to 
donors allowed, and the governmental “gift for altruism” is considered more as a reimbursement 
for donation-related expenses than a payment, which is a significantly different conception of the 
practice than described above.307 And this is where much of the conflicting literature on the 
Iranian model stems from, because differing formulations and implementations of the laws 
ultimately leads into differing observations and effects. Further, these differing interpretations 
and implementations of the practice ultimately open up the possibility for corruption, abuse, and 
trafficking between provinces and different areas of Iran, so an ideal model would create a more 
static and strict implementation of the practice across a nation. 
 Finally, the last system to examine is that of Israel. Of all the developed nations of the 
world, perhaps none is as notorious in their hesitancy towards organ donation as Israel. This 
traditional aversion to organ donation has several causes. First and foremost, many traditional, 
orthodox Jewish groups reject brain death criteria as a valid determination of death, which 
virtually destroys any chances of cadaveric organ donation. Similarly, a second reason involves a 
seemingly hypocritical, “free riding” type of philosophy that many Israelis hold to. For example, 
many Israelis refuse to be organ donors themselves, via rejecting brain death criteria; however, 
they still allow themselves to be active candidates to receive organ transplants. Last, due to these 
first two reasons, Israeli medical insurance agencies have traditionally generously reimbursed 
those Israelis who travel abroad to receive organ transplants, because usually organs aren’t 
available within Israel itself.308 
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Unlike Iran, though, Israel does not actively compensate organ donors with cash 
incentives. Rather, they compensate donors through financial reimbursement of lost wages and 
expenses and other non-financial incentives. In fact, one of the main incentives for registering as 
an organ donor is the non-financial incentive of gaining prioritization during situations of organ 
allocation. Basically, differing levels of prioritization for organ allocation will be given based 
upon one’s willingness to be an organ donor. For example, those Israelis who have signed an 
organ donor card or have given permission to donate the organs of a recently deceased first-
degree relative will be given priority in organ allocation over those who have neither signed an 
organ donor card nor gave permission to donate the organs of a deceased first-degree relative. 
Furthermore, even first-degree relatives (children, spouse, siblings, etc.) of those who have 
signed an organ donor card are given priority in organ allocation, though it is less priority than 
actually signing the organ donor card oneself. This prioritization has also recently been extended 
to past live organ donors who are now in need of an organ themselves.309 This whole notion of 
helping those who are willing to help others is derived from the ethical rule of reciprocal 
altruism, and it has provided an attractive incentive for those willing to sign organ donor 
cards.310 
In addition to granting prioritization in matters of organ allocation to those who agree to 
sign an organ donor card, financial reimbursements are also granted to altruistic living donations 
that are approved by the national ethics committee. Salary reimbursement is granted on an 
individual basis for up to forty days of lost wages, and it is based on the average amount made 
during the three months immediately prior to the donation. Transportation and transplant medical 
costs are also reimbursed, including recovery medical costs and up to five psychological 
consultations. Last, reimbursements are made for five years’ worth of work capability loss and 
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life/medical insurances. Essentially, live organ donors are compensated for their altruistic organ 
donation by being granted five years of free life insurance and medical insurance, which are 
refunded and reimbursed unto the individual upon submission of receipt of payment. These non-
financial incentives and financial reimbursements are meant to incentivize both cadaveric organ 
donation and live organ donation, while also discouraging the behavior of “free-riding” that is so 
prevalent within Israel.311 
It is then clear to see that financial, and even certain non-financial, incentives for organ 
donation are effective ways to increase organ donation rates. In both Iran and Israel, the rate of 
organ donation was dramatically increased by the implementation of compensated donation. In 
Israel, both the number of deceased organ donors and the number of new organ donor cards 
signed monthly rose sharply after the implementation of the new law.312 In Iran, their single 
greatest achievement is the elimination and lack of a renal waiting list since late 1999.313 Further, 
it is also clear that regulated systems of CLOD, such as Iran’s current system, are far superior to 
the open, unregulated systems of CLOD, such as those that were present in India, the 
Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and even early Iran, where coercion, trafficking, exploitation, 
and black markets ultimately thrive. Thus, there is a significant practical argument for the 
adoption of a regulated system of CLOD in the United States. But before moving on, further 
practical and ethical considerations must be discussed regarding regenerative medicine and the 
future of organ donation and transplantation, because these considerations ultimately bolster the 
practical argument and initiate the ethical narrative that describes our obligations and limits 
regarding a regulated system of CLOD in the United States. 
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2.2) Potential Future Options 
Though the Human Genome Project has brought much public interest to the study of 
genetics in the past 25 years, many people are unaware of the tremendous practical value that 
fruitful research in genetics can bring to the human race. This is especially true in the newer and 
younger realms of regenerative medicine, tissue engineering, and xenotransplantation, because 
the advancement of fruitful research in genetics, specifically regarding embryonic stem cells and 
other pluripotent stem cells, can have life-changing results for millions of people who suffer 
from organ and tissue ailments that must be repaired.314 
2.2.1)  Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine  
 Being a very young field of study, there is yet to be one widely accepted definition of 
regenerative medicine, but one definition that broadly encompasses the far-reaching aims of the 
new study of regenerative medicine defines the concept thusly:  
Regenerative Medicine is an emerging interdisciplinary field of research and clinical applications 
focused on the repair, replacement or regeneration of cells, tissues or organs to restore impaired 
function resulting from any cause, including congenital defects, disease, trauma and aging. It uses 
a combination of several technological approaches that moves it beyond traditional 
transplantation and replacement therapies. These approaches may include, but are not limited to, 
the use of soluble molecules, gene therapy, stem cell transplantation, tissue engineering and the 
reprogramming of cell and tissue types.315 
In addition to being a comprehensive definition of regenerative medicine, this definition 
also makes distinctions among three different approaches of regenerative medicine: rejuvenation 
and repair, replacement, and regeneration. The first approach of rejuvenation and repair relates to 
the body’s ability to heal itself. It has recently been found that certain specialized cells in the 
body that were once thought to be terminally differentiated can be remodeled in a way to 
promote self-healing, and these even include highly specialized cells in the lungs, nerves, and 
heart. Thus, by remodeling these cells and enhancing the self-healing process, organ and tissue 
ailments can be, at least somewhat, alleviated by natural processes of the body. The second 
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approach of replacement is well-known in our society, because it focuses on organ and tissue 
transplantation. This approach aims to find methods that overcome issues of 
immunosuppression, host organ rejection, and organ and tissue donor shortages.316 
The third approach of regenerative medicine is regeneration, which is the most promising 
approach. Regeneration can come in a couple of forms. The first form is tissue engineering, and 
this function essentially combines scaffolds, i.e. a natural or artificial framework to grow tissue 
on to mimic biological processes, cells, and biologically active molecules into tissues that may 
be used to repair or improve damaged organs and tissues within the human body.317 The second 
form is simply referred to as regeneration, and it focuses on the utilization of stem cells to restore 
and regenerate organ and tissue function, usually via cell-based or genetic therapies. Thus, stem 
cells play an extremely important role in the realm of regenerative medicine, especially in 
therapies that repair, regenerate, and improve organ and tissue maladies.318  
Since the discovery of the technique to isolate and grow human embryonic stem cells in 
1998, the nature of stem cells has been one of the main focuses of genetic research due to the 
tremendous potential that stem cells have for human health.319 Two main characteristics 
distinguish stem cells from the other cells that make up our body, and it is due to these 
characteristics that stem cells contain so much potential for medicine:  
(1) they can divide to produce copies of themselves (self-renewal) under appropriate conditions 
and (2) they are pluripotent, or able to differentiate into any of the three germ layers: the 
endoderm (which forms the lungs, gastrointestinal tract, and interior lining of the stomach), 
mesoderm (which forms the bones, muscles, blood, and urogenital tract), and ectoderm (which 
forms the epidermal tissues and nervous system).320 
The most well-known and discussed source of stem cells in the human body is embryonic 
stem cells. Embryonic stem cells are harvested from the inner cell mass of the blastocyst before 
these cells have had a chance to differentiate and specialize. These embryos that the embryonic 
stem cells are harvested from come from the process of in vitro fertilization (IVF), either from 
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left-over fertility treatments or egg and sperm donations, which are grown in extremely intricate 
cultures that allow the zygote to develop into the blastocyst that provides the inner cell mass of 
stem cells.321 There are several other ways of harvesting stem cells, or stem cell-like cells, from 
embryos, too, including harvesting stem cells from “dead,” i.e. non-dividing, or genetically 
abnormal embryos, i.e. IVF embryos that have a genetic disorder, isolating primordial germ cells 
from older (five to seven weeks) embryos to create embryonic germ cell lines, utilizing single 
cells from embryos to create embryonic stem cell lines, and using parthenogenesis to create stem 
cell lines from unfertilized ovum.322 
Though being potentially extremely valuable for medicine, embryonic stem cells are not 
without their fair share of controversy. Though several methods of harvesting stem cells without 
destroying the embryo have been proposed, including utilizing single cells from embryos to 
create embryonic stem cell lines and using parthenogenesis to create stem cell lines from 
unfertilized ovum, certain ethical and practical reasons have kept these methods from being 
clinically tested and proven, which means that harvesting embryonic stem cells still necessarily 
means the destroying of a human embryo.323 Obviously, this is very ethically concerning to many 
people. Another practical issue that hinders a widespread utilization of embryonic stem cells is 
the relative lack of efficiency in the survival rate of the cells, because the “process of generating 
an embryonic stem cell line is somewhat inefficient, so [embryonic stem cell] lines are not 
produced each time cells from the preimplantation-stage embryo are placed into a culture 
dish.”324  
These ethical and practical issues inherent to embryonic stem cells have led researchers 
to look for an additional source of stem cells. This search includes both identifying new, existing 
sources of pluripotent stem cells and possibly “reprogramming” non-pluripotent cells to become 
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pluripotent cells. Amniotic fluid stem cells have proven to be a better, more practical, and more 
ethical option than embryonic stem cells, and they provide several notable advantages over 
embryonic stem cells: easily obtained, rich-sample resource, non-controversial ethically, and 
better histological matches with low immunogenicity, especially with skin grafts and 
transplants.325 Other reprogramming methods of turning non-pluripotent cells to pluripotent cells 
include reprogramming through altered nuclear transfer, cell fusion, and somatic cell nuclear 
transfer, though this latter option also includes destroying an embryo-like entity. However, the 
most exciting and promising new source of reprogrammed stem cells is the creation and 
discovery of induced pluripotent stem cells.326 
Induced pluripotent stem cells are created through nuclear reprogramming in vitro from 
mature somatic cells of an adult. This process involves introducing differing genes into the 
mature somatic cell “that encode critical transcription factor proteins.” By forcing these cells to 
express these new genes that are involved in the creation and maintenance of pluripotency, these 
cells can be reprogrammed into an embryonic stem cell-like state that is extremely similar to the 
actual functioning of embryonic stem cells.327 How similar these cells are to embryonic stem 
cells was once up for debate with many experiments showing subtle differences between the two, 
though it wasn’t known if these were actual variations or merely due to the handling and 
reprogramming of the induced pluripotent cells.328 However, a recent study has concluded that 
induced pluripotent stem cells are ultimately practically equivalent to embryonic stem cells, 
though there is still some work to do before induced pluripotent stem cells can totally erase the 
need for embryonic stem cells.329 
One difference that is thought to be known concretely is that induced pluripotent stem 
cells “appear to be truly pluripotent, although they are less efficient than ESCs with respect to 
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differentiating into all cell types.”330 But they do have other advantages over embryonic stem 
cells. For example, they expand the possibility of generating autologous cells for cell-
replacement therapy, regeneration, and transplantation, which lessens the rejection concerns that 
are still apparent with therapies from embryonic stem cells.331 This advantage is discussed in 
more detail below. Induced pluripotent cells have also recently been shown to be able to be 
reprogrammed at much more efficient rates, with some experiments even reaching one hundred 
percent conversion rate at reprogramming these non-pluripotent cells into induced pluripotent 
stem cells. This is much more efficient than the relative inefficient nature of establishing and 
maintaining embryonic stem cell lines in even sophisticated cultures.332 
Thus, it is clear that stem cells are then very important in regenerative medicine as it 
pertains to organ failure, transplantation, and regeneration. This is due to several differing 
characteristics that make stem cells an ideal medium to use in regenerative medicine. Firstly, and 
most importantly, stem cells’ characteristic of pluripotency, i.e. their ability to differentiate into 
any cell type of the three germ layers of the endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm of the body, 
makes them immensely valuable in the pursuit of regenerating damaged tissues and organs.333 
This process is known as cell-based therapy, and it is a treatment where stem cells are induced to 
differentiate into the specific cell type required to repair damaged or destroyed cells or tissues. 
The next section discusses cell-based and genetic therapies with stem cells in more detail.334  
Secondly, the fact that stem cells are able to proliferate, or replicate, themselves virtually 
indefinitely means that they are abundant, accessible, and practical to use, once it is figured out 
how to more efficiently proliferate stem cell lines.335 In an area where scarce resources are the 
norm, specifically in viable organs for transplantation, this virtue of stem cells cannot be stressed 
enough. And both of these characteristics, i.e. pluripotency and proliferation, are observed in 
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both embryonic stem cells and induced pluripotent cells, which makes both types of stem cells 
extremely valuable and useful in the realm of regenerative medicine.336 Finally, a third reason 
that induced pluripotent cells in particular are so valuable and important in regenerative medicine 
is the potential to generate autologous cells, i.e. cells obtained from the same individual that they 
are to be used in, for cell-based therapies, tissue engineering, and even xenotransplantation.337 
Graft-versus-host disease and organ and tissue graft rejection are serious concerns in organ and 
stem cell transplantation, and these immunological concerns really hinder the efficacy and 
practicality of many types of transplantations and stem cell therapies. However, the promise of 
induced pluripotent cells is that transplants and therapies will be able to be “individualized,” i.e. 
the reprogramming of cells from individual patients themselves to use in their own therapies, 
which should create induced pluripotent cells that are immunological matches that avoids 
possible rejection by the immune system. Thus, stem cells can and will play a major role in the 
further development of regenerative medicine as a therapeutic tool for clinical application.338 
 Now that it has been shown how important genetics and stem cells are for regenerative 
medicine’s application to organ failure, transplantation, and regeneration, we can look at some of 
the specific treatments and methods that will be available in the near future for clinical 
application to aid organ and tissue ailments. The main methods and treatments of regenerative 
medicine involve stem cell-based therapies, genetic therapies, and the use of biomaterials and 
scaffolds to artificially recreate tissues and organs for transplantation, and these three methods 
will most likely have to work together to create the most effective applications of regenerative 
medicine.339 Another related method of regenerative medicine is a concept known as 
xenotransplantation, which is the transplanting of organs or tissues from one species to another, 
usually from pigs or cows to humans.340 
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2.2.2) Cell-Based and Genetic Therapies 
Stem cell-based therapies are treatments in which stem cells are induced to differentiate 
into the specific cell type required to repair damaged or destroyed cells or tissues.341 In this 
regard, stem cell-therapy might work on two different mechanisms. First, they might work as 
“vehicles that deliver complex signals to a target tissue without actually integrating into the 
tissue itself.” Via this mechanism, stem cells actually function as drug-like entities to deliver 
drug-like effects, such as anti-inflammation, to the damaged tissues. There is even evidence of 
the efficacy of this mechanism in certain recent studies, though this is controversial because it is 
not well understood how this mechanism operates. Second, stem cells could also “restore tissue 
function…as integrated participants in the target tissue,” i.e. by ultimately becoming regenerated 
tissue of the targeted organ.342 Though there is still much to learn and many practical hurdles that 
keep this method from being a widespread clinical tool today, this second mechanism is the 
desired and overall better method that is hoped to become a practical reality in the near future. 
Rather than merely relying on some poorly understood beneficial side effects of stem cell-based 
therapies, actual diseased tissue, such as cardiac tissue, could be regenerated and replaced in the 
heart itself, and thanks to the promises of induced pluripotent stem cells, autologous cell 
replacements could ultimately make these therapies much more effective by eliminating the 
issues of immunosuppression and host rejection.343 
 Though stem cell-therapies regenerating damaged heart or neural tissues are still a 
concept for the future right now, there are currently several stem-cell therapies that do effectively 
work under this second mechanism. The “gold standard” of this type of therapy is the 
transplantation of hematopoietic stem cells.344 Hematopoietic stem cells are multipotent cells 
ultimately responsible for the replenishing of the approximately one hundred billion new 
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hematopoietic cells that the body needs each day, because they are the only source of these cells 
for the blood system. These stem cells have several unique qualities: after proliferation each cell 
can choose between self-renewal and differentiation; they migrate in a regular and standardized 
fashion; and they’re regulated by apoptosis, or programmed cell death.345 In certain cancers and 
autoimmune diseases, the hematopoietic and immune systems can be severely damaged or 
dysfunctional and in need of replacement. By obtaining hematopoietic stem cells from bone 
marrow, peripheral blood, or “cord blood” from the placenta, these multipotent cells can be 
transplanted into the patient to replace their own host immune system. This transplant can either 
be autologous (host’s own cells) or allogenic (donor cells); however, the host’s immune system 
must be significantly weak enough with allogenic transplants to avoid graft rejection, which 
usually requires chemotherapy or radiation to attain the proper weakened status of the host 
immune system. Due to the danger and risks inherent to this process, the transplantation of 
hematopoietic stem cells are generally only used in life-threatening situations, though they still 
are an effective stem-cell therapy that work via this second mechanism.346 
 Stem cells are also useful in gene therapy. In genetic diseases where corrupted genes are 
responsible for an ailment, genetic therapies aim to replace the corrupted gene with its 
appropriate version through genetic intervention. By taking advantage of certain viruses’ ability 
to attach to a host’s DNA and supplant certain genes, gene therapy aims to use genetically-
engineered viruses, which are modified to be not toxic or infectious, that are equipped with the 
healthy gene in order to replace the damaged or dysfunctional gene.347 This can be done in two 
ways: direct gene transfer or through living stem cells as vehicles for gene transfer. Direct gene 
transfer is a relatively simple process of the direct transfer of genes into the targeted tissues or 
organs. However, tissue or organ accessibility and the lack of control of gene integration really 
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limits the practical use of this method. By utilizing living stem cells as vehicles, though, such as 
hematopoietic stem cells, gene transfers can be manipulated in vitro, where genes are integrated 
much more efficiently, and then returned to the body. Additionally, the utilization of stem cells 
also retains “the ability to contribute to all mature blood cell types of the recipient for an 
extended period of time.” Embryonic stem cells and induced pluripotent stem cells are even 
more useful than adult stem cells as vehicles for gene therapy due to their unlimited 
differentiation abilities.348  
In cases where hematopoietic stem cell transplants are not an option due to the severity of 
an immunodeficiency disease greatly increasing the risk of graft-versus-host disease, gene 
therapy is a life-saving alternative that doesn’t carry this risk.349 Additionally, a recent study has 
cured a genetic abnormality leading to cirrhotic liver disease by creating an induced pluripotent 
stem cell, replacing the genetic fault, and then converting or differentiating the cell into a liver 
cell, where the cells were working correctly six weeks later. The standard treatment for such a 
disease is liver transplantation, which also comes with a life-sentence of medication to prevent 
organ rejection. Thus, both cell-based and genetic therapies are extremely valuable methods for 
regenerative medicine to deal with issues of organ and tissue ailments and failures both now and 
in the future.350 
2.2.3)  Tissue Engineering 
  Though many tend to use the concepts of regenerative medicine and tissue engineering 
interchangeably, there are substantial differences between the two concepts. Primarily, the main 
distinction between the two concepts is that tissue engineering is actually just one of the primary 
and main components and fields of the overall larger discipline of regenerative medicine.351 
Tissue engineering then “is an interdisciplinary field that applies the principles of engineering 
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and the life sciences toward the development of biological substitutes that restore, maintain, or 
improve tissue function.”352 In fact, tissue engineering can be seen as a middle ground option 
between the more fundamental aspects of regenerative medicine in stem cell-based and genetic 
therapies, where tissues and organs are regenerated, for the most part, in vivo from the 
application of stem cells, and the more practical and current aspects of allogenic transplants of 
whole tissues and organs. By utilizing “natural, synthetic, or semisynthetic tissue and organ 
mimics that are fully functional from the start, or that grow into the required functionality,” 
tissue engineering provides a middle ground option to grow tissues and organs ex vivo, most 
likely from autologous cells, that can then be transplanted into the individual.353 
 The process of tissue engineering is rather complex, and it necessarily involves three 
different components, named the tissue engineering triad – stem cells, scaffolds, and growth-
stimulating signals for the cells to grow. Scaffolds are similar to the extracellular matrix found 
surrounding most cells; in fact, they’re produced to mimic the functions of the extracellular 
matrix itself. There are several main functions of the extracellular matrix: to provide structural 
support for cells; to provide an environment for cells to grow, attach, migrate, and receive signals 
amongst each other; to give tissues their structural and mechanical properties; to provide 
bioactive cues to surrounding cells for regulation of cellular activities; to act as a reservoir of 
growth factors; and to provide a degradable environment that allows for neovasculation and 
remodeling in response to physiological, pathological, and challenges during dynamic tissue 
processes.354 Thus, the extracellular matrix is essentially just a complex framework, or a skeleton 
in a sense, that gives tissues shape and acts as a mediator and in-between amongst the various 
cells that reside in its vicinity. Scaffolds then work as a complex skeleton from which stem cells 
and the growth stimulating agents and materials are embedded. Ideally, after being embedded an 
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optimal microenvironment for cellular growth appears, and the stem cells grow, proliferate, and 
fill out the structure that is given by the scaffold. After a certain amount of growth, the newly 
formed tissue is implanted into the individual, and as the cells begin and continue to proliferate, 
differentiate, and integrate into the surrounding tissue, the degradable scaffold itself ultimately 
dissolves and the tissue starts functioning as it should.355 
 Scaffolds can be created or prepared in several differing forms. The main approach is to 
use pre-made scaffolds of either natural or synthetic biomaterials, which is actually where the 
vast majority of research focuses on in tissue engineering. Another approach is to use the 
extracellular matrix itself. By stripping the matrix of its cells, a process known as 
decellularization, the acellular matrix can then be revamped with new cells to grow tissue to be 
implanted in another individual. The advantages of this type of scaffold is its naturalness, i.e. it’s 
as close to the real thing as you can get, and utility, because cellular matrices can be used for a 
plurality of tissue types and locations rather than being limited to the tissue type and function it 
was derived from. Further, since it has been decellularized, there is no immunity compatibility 
issues between donor tissues and the recipient.356 
 But many tissue engineers are advancing beyond these traditional scaffold options into 
the realm of 3D organ printing. Organ printing is defined as a “rapid prototyping computer-aided 
3D printing technology, based on using layer by layer deposition of cell and/or cell aggregates 
into a 3D gel with sequential maturation of the printed construct into perfused and vascularized 
living tissue or organ.”357 Essentially, 3D bioprinting involves a 3D printer that harnesses a 
modified inkjet technology to develop a 3D tissue or organ from a 2D CT scan blueprint. Upon a 
biocompatible and degradable scaffold, the 3D bioprinter applies this “ink,” which is essentially 
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a medium made up of growth factors and living stem cells that have been differentiated to the 
appropriate type for the tissue, in a layered format to ultimately achieve the 3D object.358 
 Though there are several other methods of 3D bioprinting, such as laser-based or 
extrusion-based, inkjet-based bioprinting, i.e. the method detailed above, is by far the most 
common and most promising approach. This method also has a set process and routine:  
(1) create a blueprint of an organ with its vascular architecture; (2) generate a bioprinting process 
plan; (3) isolate stem cells; (4) differentiate the stem cells into organ-specific cells; (5) prepare 
bioink reservoirs with organ-specific cells, blood vessel cells, and support medium and load them 
into the printer; (6) bioprint; and (7) place the bioprinted organ in a bioreactor prior to 
transplantation.359 
The successes of these methods of 3D bioprinting are substantial. In 2014, approximately $537 
million was spent on printed body parts throughout the United States, and researchers regularly 
used printed tissues and simple organs to test experimental drugs.360 Though issues with 
vascularity limit the potential applications of 3D bioprinting to smaller tissues at the moment, 
new research is progressing on advancing life-sustaining vascular networks for the possibility of 
printing larger and more complex tissues and organs. Thus, though this technology is currently 
limited to simpler types of tissues, tissue engineering as a whole has immense value to 
regenerative medicine’s application to organ and tissue ailments, and eventually we’ll have the 
knowledge, technology, and resources to make modern day transplants between individuals a 
thing of the past.361 
2.2.4)  Xenotransplantation  
 Finally, a third option is xenotransplantation. Xenotransplantation is the transplantation 
of organs or tissues from one species to another, and generally in the medical and ethical 
literature, the main focus is on the transplantation of tissues or organs from non-human species to 
humans, even though many more xenotransplants have been performed the other way around.362 
In many ways, xenotransplantation is a method that has a long history and is still currently 
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researched and in use in some measures today. For example, tissues from other species, i.e. 
xenogeneic tissues, are regularly used as scaffolds in tissue engineering after being 
decellularized, because by stripping away the cellular content of the tissues and leaving the 
xenogeneic extracellular matrix, you largely remove the issues with immunocompatibility and 
rejection.363 Further, pig heart valves and intestinal submucosa (for bladder repair) have long 
been used in transplantation under the same type of method.364 This concept actually dates back 
to the 1960’s, too, with one patient transplanted with a kidney from a chimpanzee actually 
surviving for nine months, though the patient and others ultimately died from the effects of 
xenorejection from the transplant.365 The “Baby Fae” case in 1984 of a newborn infant who died 
after rejection of a xenograft heart transplant is also another infamous case of 
xenotransplantation gone wrong.366 
 Ultimately, the issue of xenorejection, i.e. the natural incompatibility and ultimate 
rejection of xenografts transplanted into differing species, has limited xenotransplantation as an 
effective clinical tool. This is mainly due to the cell surface antigen alpha-Gal that all 
nonprimates possess, because humans have antibodies that cause immediate rejection when they 
come into contact with alpha-Gal in these animal cells. Two main methods are currently being 
researched to overcome this hurdle. The first involves genetic engineering. Certain research 
indicates that if you could genetically change the animal enough and, as John Fung of the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center puts it, make the pig “less piggish,” then you could 
possibly avoid xenorejection. Several companies in both the UK and US have had some success 
in that route by developing pigs that carry human genes that might block activation of the 
complement system, which should ultimately prevent rejection. A differing route of genetic 
engineering focuses on replacing the alpha-Gal antigen that causes rejection with a “human sugar 
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residue, fucosyl transferase," though it’s unknown how effective this therapy would be at 
preventing rejection and if these transgenic pigs would even survive the change in chemistry.367 
 The second method would be to make human/nonhuman chimeras to try and avoid 
xenorejection. Though some might argue that this method is and should be conceptually distinct 
from xenotransplantation, it inherently involves the core concept of xenotransplantation, so I will 
treat this method of creating chimeras as a part of xenotransplantation. Human/nonhuman 
chimeras are organisms that are composed from two different sets of cells from differing species 
– one human and one not. Generally, chimeras are created by integrating two different embryos, 
and this results in cells from differing origins in many different tissues throughout the body. If 
the process of localizing the chimera’s human cells in certain tissues and organs in high enough 
proportions is perfected, then human/nonhuman chimeras could conceivably be viable organ 
donors for human recipients. Though this is far from being a clinical reality, the recent advances 
in knowledge of induced pluripotent stem cells and “the ad hoc creation of solid organs 
within…chimeras” might make the use of human/nonhuman (specifically pig) chimeras a real 
possibility for organ transplantation in the near future.368  
Other recent studies in induced pluripotent stem cells and mouse and rat chimeras also 
show promising results for the efficacy of induced pluripotent stem cells in disease modeling.369 
Other chimeric research involves actually implanting potential organ recipients with bone 
marrow cells from the donors, and if these cells survive, then the potential recipient becomes a 
chimera of sorts, i.e. containing cells from two differing individuals. Several human-to-human 
heart transplants have been successful using this technique, and research shows some promise for 
this method in xenotransplantation, too.370 However, the most promising chimeric and 
xenotransplantation research involves the new CRISPR technology. By utilizing the gene editing 
 112 
 
capabilities of CRISPR, it may be possible to delete a pig embryo’s ability to grow a particular 
organ, implant human induced pluripotent cells to replace that ability in the pig embryo’s DNA, 
and grow a human organ within the developing pig. There is actually already a current team at 
the University of California, Davis experimenting with this type of procedure, though they are 
only allowing the embryo to grow for 28 days before ultimately destroying it for analysis.371  
Thus, along with cell-based and genetic therapies and tissue engineering, 
xenotransplantation is yet another potential tool utilizing regenerative medicine and stem cells in 
the treatment and therapy of tissue and organ ailments. Though there are some ethical issues 
attached to some of these potential methods, including issues of justice, allocation, and animal 
rights, most of these methods, outside of certain elements of xenotransplantation, seem to be 
largely ethically acceptable options that only contain practical ethical issues rather than 
conceptual ethical issues. Further, though the majority of these methods are not yet feasible, it is 
generally believed that our scientific knowledge and capabilities in regenerative medicine will 
ultimately combine with transplant medicine to create viable, efficacious methods that ultimately 
eradicate, or at the very least greatly lessen, the two major current issues in transplant medicine – 
immunosuppression-free transplantation and a renewable, potentially inexhaustible source of 
organs and tissues.372 Unfortunately, most of these procedures are still quite a few years away 
from human testing, which means that thousands of Americans will still suffer on dialysis for 
long periods of time and ultimately die from the lack of access to a transplantable organ or cure 
for their organ ailments. 
Therefore, since we know that (1) incentives, both financial and non-financial, do 
improve organ donation rates, (2) it is essentially just a matter of time until progress in 
regenerative medicine ultimately lessens or eradicates the need for incentivized donation, and (3) 
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until that time, thousands will live in misery on dialysis and ultimately die without access to an 
organ, we have a strong moral responsibility to do everything that we can to save the lives of 
those suffering from organ failure and tissue ailments today. By not allowing these individuals 
with organ ailments to help themselves, we’re essentially damning them to a life of misery on 
dialysis and ill health, or even worse, death, due to living in a time a couple of decades before the 
luxury of regenerative medicine, which is discrimination based upon a non-moral property that 
these individuals had no choice in bringing about, i.e. their time of existence. And many 
opponents of CLOD will even admit as much, because the vast majority of opponents openly 
admit that there isn’t another way to effectively minimize the waiting list in such a way to 
prevent these types of deaths. They simply claim that CLOD is a “moral price” that is too high to 
pay, even for all of its practical and ethical benefits, which is an extremely paternalistic argument 
given our society’s extreme preference for individualism and acceptance and promotion of 
individual rights and autonomy. 
Furthermore, there’s another argument to be made that the moral distinction between 
purchasing an organ from another individual and ultimately purchasing an organ that was 
engineered in the lab or harvested from an animal is skeptical at best, though we’ll discuss this 
issue in more detail in chapter four when we discuss the issue of commodification of the human 
body. So there is assuredly a sufficient practical justification to at least attempt to investigate the 
possibility of the establishment of a system of CLOD here in the United States. And if we do 
find that there is such a system of CLOD that minimizes harms while maximizing potential 
benefits, both practically and ethically, and can actually be implemented in an ethically palatable 
way, then we have the moral obligation and responsibility to enact and allow such a system in a 
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pluralistic moral society, where each individual can decide on their own whether or not they 
want to participate in such a practice. 
2.3) The Medical, Political, and Moral Context of Living Organ Donation 
 Now that it has been established that there are sufficient practical justifications and moral 
obligations to seriously consider the possibility of instituting an ethically palatable system of 
CLOD in the United States, before moving on to the actual moral arguments for and against 
CLOD, it is prudent to situate the concept of CLOD in its proper context. Specifically, the 
medical, political, and moral background and context for CLOD should be fleshed out and stated 
to fully set up the following arguments against the prohibition of CLOD in the United States. 
2.3.1) The Medical Context 
 It is widely accepted that the benefits of live kidney donation greatly outweigh the harms 
associated with the practice, as evidenced by the widespread acceptance of altruistic live kidney 
donation.373 For example, many studies suggest that there are minimal short-term and long-term 
medical risks involved in kidney donation, with one study even finding an 85 percent survival 
rate 20 years after kidney donation.374 Other studies have found the same minimal risks, with 
short-term risks only constituting a .03 percent chance of mortality and a 20 percent chance of 
morbidity shortly after the donation procedure.375 These results of the safety of live kidney 
donation have also been corroborated in a more recent 2010 study of over 80,000 live donors, 
and the results once again provide evidence that “live kidney donation is safe and free from 
significant long-term excess mortality.”376 Another recent study in 2009 had similar findings 
regarding the mortality rates of live kidney donation, along with finding no increased risk of end-
stage renal disease compared to non-donor controls. The study states: 
Our results indicate that the life span of kidney donors is similar to that of persons who have not 
donated a kidney. The risk of [end-stage renal disease] ESRD does not appear to be increased 
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among donors, and their current health seems to be similar to that of the general population. In 
addition, their quality of life appears to be excellent.377 
And though there are a few studies that have found very minimal increases in the rates of 
end-stage renal disease and other complications, even these studies conclude that their “findings 
will not change [their] opinion in promoting live kidney donation.”378 Further, though less 
common and a slightly more serious operation, recent studies suggest that living liver donation is 
comparably as safe as living kidney donation, and mortality for donors does not significantly 
differ from healthy non-donors.379 Thus, it’s clear that living kidney, and even liver, donations 
are safe, effective methods of treating organ ailments, specifically end-stage renal disease and 
acute and/or chronic liver failure. And other than being far from compelling, any argument about 
the safety or possible harms to donors is just as relevant and applicable to altruistic donation as it 
is to CLOD, which renders any such objection ineffective at qualitatively distinguishing between 
the two practices by this measure. 
2.3.2) The Political and Moral Context 
 Beyond the medical context, it is also necessary to discuss the political and moral context 
for which any system of CLOD will be situated in, specifically the threshold and requirements 
that any such system would need to meet for justifiable prohibition or allowance by the State. 
Being one of the Enlightenment’s most successful achievements, the political philosophy of 
classical liberalism emphasizes the equality and freedom of all peoples and the primacy of the 
individual.380 Compared to other political philosophies, classical liberalism is then mainly 
focused on individual freedoms and rights and the protection of these freedoms and rights from 
government intrusion.381 Namely, this political philosophy perceives these freedoms and rights to 
be personal autonomy, i.e. the capacity for rational self-governance, self-determination, and 
personal freedom, which specifically includes the ability to develop one’s own conception of the 
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good, or view of how to live one’s life based on one’s values, desires, and beliefs. Thus, two 
things must necessarily be absent in this political philosophy in order for individuals to 
consistently exercise their autonomy: State perfectionism and paternalism. First, State 
perfectionism is the view that there are some conceptions of the good that are better than others, 
and it is the prerogative of the State to promote these particular conceptions.382 Second, 
paternalism can be defined as “when those in positions of authority refuse to act according to 
people’s wishes, or they restrict people’s freedom, or in other ways attempt to influence their 
behavior, allegedly in the recipients’ own best interests [as judged by those in authority].”383 
 For liberalism, both State perfectionism and paternalism unjustifiably violate individuals’ 
rights to autonomy and the freedom to develop and practice one’s own conception of the good. 
However, these are the exact types of actions, i.e. paternalism and limiting behaviors that are 
thought to be bad, immoral, or evil for society to allow, that characterize government 
interventions and laws, because, otherwise, we would ultimately live in an anarchic state. 
Clearly, then, liberalism’s focus on the individual runs counter to the utilitarian outlook of many 
governmental interventions into the lives of the population, even if that comes at the expense of 
certain individual liberties. Therein lies the liberal answer to the vast majority of governmental 
interventions – the liberal objection, which states that governmental interventions are 
objectionable, unjustifiable, and illegitimate due to them ultimately amounting to State 
interference into individual autonomy, rights, and freedoms. However, personal autonomy within 
liberalism, and ultimately ethics, is not absolute, which is where the harm principle comes into 
the picture.384 
 Though being known primarily for his advancement and fuller development of the 
normative ethical theory of utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill was also substantially interested in 
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political philosophy, specifically the relationship between individuals and the State. Since certain 
limits must necessarily be placed on individual autonomy, or risk anarchy, he developed the 
harm principle to determine when and how it was appropriate for the State to legitimately 
interfere with individual liberties and freedoms in a classically liberal State. This principle states: 
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the 
dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means 
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That 
principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant [emphasis added]. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the 
opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating 
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling 
him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from 
which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only 
part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign [emphasis added].385 
Whether explicitly or implicitly, this principle has long been a guiding measure to 
determine the justifiability of State intervention upon individual liberties within liberal societies, 
even in the United States. According to the harm principle, State intervention is only justifiable 
to prevent harm to others, and though the promotion of benefitting oneself and others and the 
prevention of harm to oneself are noble pursuits, they are not legitimate State interventions into 
individual freedoms. In fact, the last sentence of the above passage explicitly states that “over his 
own body…the individual is sovereign.” This is due to the harm principle’s allowance of self-
regarding harm. As long as the harm that someone potentially brings on oneself is self-regarding, 
doesn’t violate any specific duty, such as becoming intoxicated while on police duty, and doesn’t 
cause perceptible harm to any particular person, then individuals should have the freedom to 
partake in it. Even potentially harmful actions that may affect other people can be justified under 
the harm principle, as long as the harm is “through” the individual “in the first instance.” For 
example, while mountain climbing, a climber could fall and become injured, which would risk 
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others’ lives and safety in an attempt to save him; however, since this harm occurs “through” the 
individual himself and wasn’t directed at anybody in particular, this is a chance and cost that 
society should be willing to pay in order to maximize individual freedoms.386 
 Regarding the moral and political context of CLOD in the United States, this sets the 
limit for what the State can and cannot justifiably prohibit for its citizens. Since our liberal 
society is dedicated to a pluralistic understanding of conceptions of the good, i.e. a denial of 
State perfectionism, and avoiding paternalism is necessary to implement this dedication to 
pluralism, the State cannot justifiably, either morally or politically, prohibit any action or 
behavior that does not protect others and prevent them from harm from others, and this is a 
necessary requirement since protection from self-regarding harm is not justified by the harm 
principle, as mentioned above. Thus, as long as an ethically palatable system of CLOD can be 
developed that does not explicitly or implicitly harm others, then the State has no moral or 
political justification for its prohibition by law. The remaining chapters of this dissertation will 
now focus on justifying the ethically palatable nature of regulated systems of CLOD and 
developing a practical national system for implementation. The following chapter starts this 
process of ethical justification, and it examines the ethical concepts of autonomy, justice, and 
exploitation and how they relate to the issue of CLOD.
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Chapter 3 – Autonomy, Justice, and Exploitation 
 With the practical need and moral obligation to consider a market in organs fleshed out 
and defended, the moral arguments for and against a regulated system of CLOD can now be 
addressed. There are certain standard moral arguments for and against CLOD that have been 
discussed at length throughout the professional literature. For example, arguments revolving 
around the concept of donor, and recipient, autonomy are some of the strongest arguments in 
favor of a regulated system of CLOD. Other pro-CLOD arguments center on the ethical principle 
of justice, and these arguments are aimed at both the donor and recipient. On the other hand, 
many suggest that the practice of CLOD is unethical for several reasons, including an immoral 
commodification of the human body and the overall suppression of altruistic organ donation, 
which is discussed in the next chapter. But the most common, and perhaps strongest, type of 
argument against CLOD revolves around the concept of exploitation, which is inherently related 
to the moral principles of autonomy and justice, and opponents argue that CLOD unethically 
exploits poor populations to exchange organs for financial considerations, which unjustly takes 
advantage of their socioeconomic vulnerabilities.387  
This chapter analyzes these ethical arguments for and against CLOD, specifically those 
arguments dealing with the concepts of autonomy, justice, and exploitation. The chapter begins 
by analyzing the pro-CLOD ethical arguments dealing with the principles of autonomy and 
justice, and each argument will be fleshed out and defended. The rest of the chapter is dedicated 
to analyzing the exploitation objection to CLOD, and it is argued that (1) CLOD is not an 
example of immoral exploitation when properly regulated and (2) even if it was, the exploitation 
objection is insufficient to ethically distinguish CLOD from other market transactions and justify 
its complete prohibition by law. This argument starts with an examination of the rather vague 
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conception of exploitation to provide a more workable and explicit concept. The next section of 
the argument highlights how regulated forms of CLOD do not meet the specific conditions and 
definition of the concept of immoral exploitation that was fleshed out in the previous section. 
Finally, the argument concludes by examining the most common claims of the exploitation 
objection, and these claims are challenged to illuminate their inaccuracy and/or insufficiency as a 
moral justification to prohibit a regulated system of CLOD in the United States. 
3.1)  Autonomy and Justice 
 The strongest and most significant moral arguments in the debate surrounding CLOD 
revolve around the applied ethics concept of principlism, which contains the four main ethical 
principles guiding modern bioethics: autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence.388 In 
particular, the principles of autonomy and justice are particularly relevant in this debate, 
especially in our very individualistic society that pays special attention to social justice. From 
self-ownership of one’s body to fair treatment and opportunity, these ethical principles provide 
compelling arguments for the moral justification of CLOD. 
3.1.1)  The Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
 Though not a universally shared sentiment, many feel that the principle of autonomy is 
the primus inter pares, or first among equals, of the four principles approach, because it is one of 
the main reasons for the existence of morality and plays a major role in the other three 
principles.389 Autonomy is defined as a concept of self-governance that is free from controlling 
interferences from others and impediments on meaningful choice. The autonomous person acts 
according to a self-chosen plan without unduly interference or limitations upon that plan from 
other individuals. When one does not act autonomously, it is due to the incapability of realizing 
the plans and desires of the individual, and this incapability arises from some sort of inability to 
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express one’s will or the excessive hindrance upon the freedom of the agent.390 Three conditions 
are necessary for autonomous action: intentionality, understanding, and noncontrol.391 For the act 
to be autonomous, the action must be intentionally willed, and the agent must adequately 
understand the action and its consequences. The agent must also not be under the controlling 
influence of another, because an agent can only act autonomously when the act is not directly 
affected by an impressionable factor or influence that affects the agent’s plans.392 
 The principle of autonomy does have its limits, though, and restrictions upon autonomy 
are usually justified in protection of the autonomy of others.393 This is in accordance with the 
negative obligation imposed by autonomy, which states that autonomous agents should not 
interfere in the autonomous actions of other agents. There is also a positive obligation imposed 
by autonomy, and it states that autonomous agents should foster autonomous agency for fellow 
agents, which includes the dissemination of information that is potentially relevant to an action 
they are deliberating on.394  
In medicine and healthcare, the main practical avenue of respecting autonomy is the 
practice of informed consent. By garnering informed consent from patients before any medical 
intervention, physicians respect the integrity of the patient by honoring their autonomy and right 
to make decisions regarding their own body. Similar to the concept of autonomy itself, there are 
several conditions or steps to the process of informed consent, including disclosure of all 
relevant information, understanding of that information, voluntariness of the decision, and the 
actual process of attaining formal consent.395 In bioethics, both of these ethical principles are of 
the utmost importance, so it’s not surprising that they’re two of the very first mentioned global 
ethical principles in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.396 
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In support of CLOD, Gerald Dworkin labels this type of autonomy as the right to bodily 
autonomy, and he defines it as the “capacity to make choices about how [one’s] body is to be 
treated by others… [and] the primary good achieved by such a right is the recognition of the 
individual as sovereign over his own body.”397 This is not a trivial right either, because outside of 
certain religious sects where there’s a belief that our bodies are not our own but the property of 
God, most of our secular, liberal society holds this right in high esteem, which is highlighted by 
legislation protecting abortion rights. This right is even explicitly mentioned in Mill’s harm 
principle that was discussed in the previous chapter: “In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual 
is sovereign.”398 Thus, pro-CLOD arguments from the principle of respect for autonomy take a 
rather libertarian stance to this issue. These arguments claim that agents have the moral right to 
exercise their autonomy, specifically bodily autonomy, and as long as transactions of CLOD pass 
the obligations and conditions imposed by the principles of respect for autonomy and informed 
consent, they are morally justifiable.399 Further, any prohibition of CLOD by the State would 
then be unjustifiably paternalistic, because respecting individual autonomy both justifies the 
practice and obligates the State to allow such a practice without a prohibition.400 
But this is where much of the controversy arises regarding the principle of respect for 
autonomy and the concept of exploitation in CLOD. Proponents argue that in regulated systems 
of CLOD, these types of transactions pass the negative obligation of autonomy, because no other 
agent’s autonomy is restricted in individual organ sale, as opposed to the coercion and deceit 
associated with organ trafficking. Furthermore, a strictly regulated system of CLOD would have 
safeguards to foster autonomous decision making and informed consent, which reflects the 
positive obligation of autonomy.401 Opponents come to the opposite conclusion by not 
 128 
 
qualitatively distinguishing between a regulated system of CLOD and an unregulated, open 
system of CLOD, which almost always involves organ trafficking, so they argue that the 
conditions and obligations of these principles are not met in these transactions, which leads to the 
exploitation objection that will be discussed below. But even most opponents of CLOD admit 
that if the obligations and conditions of autonomy and informed consent are met in CLOD 
transactions, then these moral principles would support and justify the concept of CLOD, though 
of course they deny that it ever, or rarely, happens in reality. Thus, the principle of respect for 
autonomy provides a strong, compelling argument of justification for CLOD, so long as the 
necessary conditions and obligations are met, and if a regulated system of CLOD can ensure that 
these transactions meet these conditions and obligations to respect individual autonomy and 
informed consent, then this principle provides a significant moral obligation to allow and support 
the use of CLOD in our pluralistic, liberal society that greatly values the individual conscience. 
3.1.2)  The Principle of Justice 
 Another concept of principlism is the principle of justice, and it is also used by some to 
support CLOD. As a concept, justice cannot be restricted to a singular definition, but in the 
context of organ donation and transplantation, it usually refers to matters of fair treatment and 
fair distribution of scarce resources.402 Traditionally, the principle of justice is regarded as an 
other-regarding virtue that can be bound to a character or an act.403 It also provides a guide to 
areas of concern for specific normative theories to address.404 There are three main differing 
conceptions of justice – utilitarian conceptions of justice, libertarian conceptions of justice, and 
egalitarian conceptions of justice.405 Utilitarian conceptions or principles of justice are grounded 
in the principle of utility, and they seek to maximize utility and positive value over disvalue. 
Libertarian conceptions of justice focus more on individual liberties and ensuring that State 
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actions do not inhibit or interfere with these liberties or fair free market processes that grant 
individuals the same freedom and opportunities to improve themselves, which is consistent with 
the spirit of the harm principle. This conception of justice then aims more toward just procedures 
rather than just outcomes, and the United States healthcare system generally follows this 
libertarian ideal with privatized healthcare that allows and protects each individual’s right to 
decide upon their own healthcare needs.406 Generally, it seems fairly uncontroversial that both 
utilitarian and libertarian conceptions of justice are heavily opposed to any sort of prohibition of 
CLOD that would limit both (1) overall utility and (2) individual freedoms by an act of the State, 
both of which would necessarily occur under such a prohibition. 
On the other hand, egalitarian conceptions of justice focus more on the inherent equality 
of all humans, and this equality can be manifested in differing ways where every individual 
“should get the same, or be treated the same, or be treated as equals, in some respect.” In more 
detail, people “should be treated as equals, should treat one another as equals, should relate as 
equals, or enjoy an equality of social status of some sort.”407 These conceptions of justice are the 
most likely to oppose CLOD transactions compared to libertarian and utilitarian conceptions of 
justice. However, certain egalitarian theories and principles are consistent with CLOD 
transactions, such as Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory of justice. One of the most 
influential egalitarian theories of justice, the capabilities theory provides the principle of justice 
with normative content tailored to a global and international context.408 This theory of justice 
focuses on certain basic capabilities that any just system of government must provide to its 
citizens in order to respect human dignity and allow human flourishing. This focus on 
capabilities rather than actual human functioning is primarily to allow many differing 
“conceptions of the good” to be enacted under such a just system, which is due to a respect of 
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individual rights and conscience, and this allows individuals to partake or refrain in differing 
capabilities in proportions that they please.  
In the context of CLOD, it can be argued that prohibiting CLOD transactions has denied 
many in need of organ transplants the essential capabilities of life, good bodily health, and the 
right not to die prematurely, which are all essential conditions of her capabilities theory of 
justice.409 Since we know that (1) live kidney transplantation is a safe and effective method to 
treat several differing otherwise fatal kidney ailments; (2) those on the transplant list (and even 
those thousands more on dialysis) who do not receive a kidney transplant will perish without a 
transplant; (3) financial incentives are effective at increasing organ donation rates; and (4) the 
State has prohibited CLOD primarily for paternalistic “moral” reasons rather than practical 
reasons, a compelling argument can be made that the State is denying certain individuals the 
basic and essential capabilities of life, good bodily health, and the right not to die prematurely 
for paternalistic “moral” reasons that should be left up to individuals to decide for themselves. In 
fact, this also could constitute another denial of the essential capability of practical reason, 
which is the capability to be able to form a conception of the good and engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s own life.410 This argument from justice becomes even 
more compelling when combined with another normative egalitarian principle, specifically the 
fair-opportunity rule. Beauchamp and Childress describe the fair-opportunity rule as asserting 
that: 
…individuals should not receive social benefits on the basis of undeserved advantageous 
properties and should not be denied social benefits on the basis of undeserved disadvantageous 
properties, because they are not responsible for these properties. Properties distributed by the 
lotteries of social and biological life do not provide grounds for morally acceptable 
discrimination between persons in social allocations if people do not have a fair chance to 
acquire or overcome these properties [emphasis added]…When persons are not responsible for 
their disabilities, the fair-opportunity rule demands that they receive help to reduce or overcome 
the unfortunate effects of life’s lottery of health.411 
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Thus, the fair-opportunity rule states that since those needing transplants aren’t 
necessarily morally responsible for this disadvantageous property, at least in the majority of 
cases, it is immoral and unjust to deny them benefits and opportunities based off of this 
biological contingency and unfortunate effect of “life’s lottery.” Since many patients ultimately 
die waiting for a kidney due to a kidney supply shortage, paternalistically prohibiting CLOD 
transactions for “moral” reasons is immorally and unjustly discriminating against those 
individuals with the biological contingency of poor kidney health. So even certain theories and 
principles within egalitarian conceptions of justice morally obligate the allowance of a regulated 
system of CLOD under considerations of fairness and equality. 
Now where these pro-CLOD arguments from justice are oriented towards the recipient, 
other arguments from justice are oriented towards the donors. For example, Robert Veatch 
argues that since the goods of life have been systematically denied to the poorest and most 
vulnerable of our society, it is unethical and unjust to prohibit one of the last financial benefits 
these families might have to better themselves, namely CLOD transactions.412 Further, after the 
Eliot Spitzer prostitution scandal, Martha Nussbaum came out with a very similar argument to 
Veatch’s in favor of prostitution, arguing that “the idea that we ought to penalize women with 
few choices by removing one of the ones they do have is grotesque...”413 In an earlier article, she 
argues that it is short-sighted to “rule off-limits an option that may be the only livelihood for 
many poor women…”414 Though this is aimed at prostitution rather than CLOD transactions, it is 
similarly short-sighted and unjust to remove the option of donating one’s organs for a profit and 
reducing one’s ability to better oneself even further, because this treats these individuals different 
than wealthier individuals and disallows them the opportunity to reach that level, which is unfair 
and unjust to these individuals. These arguments are related to both the Non-Worseness Claim 
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(NWC) and the paradox problem of the exploitation objection, which will be detailed in the 
following section. Thus, clearly there are significant arguments and conceptions of justice that 
are consistent with CLOD transactions, and this provides another compelling moral obligation 
against the unjustifiable nature of State prohibition of CLOD transactions. This chapter now 
switches its focus to a prominent objection to CLOD that inherently involves the ethical 
principles of autonomy and justice, specifically the exploitation objection to CLOD. 
3.2)  The Exploitation Objection 
 Though being a common concept of discussion in applied ethics, the concept of 
exploitation is not very well defined due to the numerous differing “conceptions of exploitation” 
within the professional literature and the differing claims and arguments made from these 
conceptions.415 Beyond this apparent opaqueness, though, at its base the concept of exploitation 
centrally concerns the presence and relationship among three key ethical principles, i.e. 
autonomy, human vulnerability, and justice. When the presence and/or proper relationship 
among these three ethical principles is corrupted, this ultimately results in one party taking unfair 
advantage of another party, which is the core premise of exploitation.416 Objections to CLOD 
from exploitation then generally revolve around three main themes or claims: unfairness to the 
donor, the undermining of donor autonomy, and the existence of constrained choice sets.  
3.2.1)  The Background and Context of Exploitation 
 Before the exploitation objection to CLOD can effectively be fleshed out, the concept of 
exploitation must be defined, because without a solid grounding or clarity in the concept of 
exploitation itself, the legitimacy of the exploitation objection as a sufficient reason to prohibit 
CLOD is in question from the very start. However, as previously stated, the problem is that there 
are many differing “conceptions of exploitation” in the literature.417 For example, while some 
 133 
 
conceptions of exploitation inherently rely on Marxist interpretations, others rely on the Kantian 
notion of treating parties instrumentally. Further, where some conceptions require consensual 
issues to be present, others hold that exploitation can still occur in fully voluntary situations, and 
similar discrepancies among the various differing conceptions of exploitation are present with 
factors such as harm to the exploitee, the use of force or coercion, etc.418 
 But establishing a basic working definition that encompasses the vast majority of these 
conceptions of exploitation isn’t impossible, because there are certain necessary components that 
are required for the act of exploitation to take place. Essentially, three things must be present in 
every case of exploitation – the exploiter extracting some benefit from the use/involvement of 
the exploitee, the exploiter benefitting at the expense of the exploitee, and unfairness.419 Thus, 
one basic working definition for the concept of exploitation that both fits the majority of the 
various differing conceptions of exploitation and takes into account these three necessary 
components is “taking unfair advantage of another,” or more precisely - “A exploits B when A 
takes unfair advantage of B.”420 
To highlight the function of these three necessary components and how exploitation 
necessarily takes unfair advantage of another, it is necessary to view them in action in a 
paradigmatic case of immoral exploitation. Coincidentally, these three components can best be 
examined in the examples of open, unregulated markets for organs in developing nations of the 
past, which is an entirely different concept than this dissertation’s proposal for CLOD. For 
example, when India was a burgeoning open kidney market before it was illegalized and pushed 
the trade underground, organ brokers would regularly bring the poorest individuals together with 
wealthier individuals needing a transplant, and they would generally pay around $2,500 to 
$4,000 for a kidney. However, the donors usually received less than $1,000 of that sum due to 
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the organ broker’s fees and price of administration, and many times donors even received much 
less, or nothing at all, due to corrupt organ brokers, which highlights one of the main problems in 
open, unregulated markets as the presence of exploitative organ brokers.421 
 Thus, it’s easy to see how the donor is being unfairly taken advantage of due to the three 
required components of exploitation being met in this example - both the organ broker and buyer 
derived benefit from the donor (profit and an organ for transplantation), this benefit came at the 
expense of the donor (unfair price for an organ, not receiving the entire payment for the organ 
due to the broker, and/or being cheated out of the agreed upon price), which ultimately makes 
this situation seriously unfair due to the presence of fraud and an unfair price. Of course, it could 
be argued that this benefit does not come at the expense of the donor, because the donor actually 
was paid and is now better off due to the situation. However, exploitation deals with the 
normative rather than the descriptive, so coming at the expense of the donor is in relation to a 
fair transaction rather than whatever transaction actually obtained. This is termed the difference 
between the no-transaction baseline and the fairness baseline, where the former corresponds to 
the descriptive and the latter corresponds to the normative. Relative to no transaction 
whatsoever, exploitation often betters the exploitee. But the requirement of the benefit coming at 
the expense of the donor isn’t necessarily related to what did happen in this transaction versus no 
transaction whatsoever, i.e. the no-transaction baseline, but rather what should have happened 
under a fair transaction, i.e. the fairness baseline. So while the donor might actually be better off 
in this situation due to the sale of an organ, the donor would have been even better-off after the 
sale of an organ in a fair transaction, which realistically would be more than approximately the 
$1,000 that is usually received, meaning this truly does come at the expense of the donor.422 
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 This brings up another important fact about exploitation – as shown above, and in other 
cases such as clandestine sweat shops, immoral exploitation can still occur when the exploitee 
benefits from the exploitation itself.423 Thus, a distinction should be made between two differing 
sets of types of exploitation, specifically between nonconsensual exploitation and consensual 
exploitation and between harmful exploitation and mutually advantageous exploitation. The 
difference between nonconsensual and consensual exploitation is the presence of valid, informed 
consent to the exploitative transaction. The other distinction is between harmful exploitation, 
where only the exploiter benefits from the transaction purely at the expense of the exploitee, and 
mutually advantageous exploitation, where both the exploiter and exploitee benefit in some way 
from the transaction. In cases involving nonconsensual transactions or one-sided harmful 
exploitation, it’s clear when exploitation has taken place. On the other hand, certainly there are 
cases of consensual, mutually advantageous exploitation (CMAE) transactions where it’s not 
always clear that immoral exploitation has occurred, because both sides seem to agree upon a 
transaction that benefits both of them without seemingly, at least on the surface, coming at the 
expense of the exploited.424 For the purposes of the exploitation objection to CLOD, then, this is 
of utmost importance, because any argument against the immorality, and potential prohibition, of 
CLOD will necessarily rely on both proper consent and mutual advantages to both parties. 
 This is actually an area of the professional literature on exploitation that there is not a 
consensus view on. In virtually every major conception of exploitation in the literature, there are 
moral undertones to the presence and act of exploitation, as seen with “unfairness” being a 
necessary component of exploitation. Thus, the accusation of exploitation is almost always 
considered a moral judgement, i.e. acts of exploitation are considered immoral and wrong. 
However, the moral component of “unfairness” isn’t necessarily the clearest and most direct 
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concept, and it’s certainly not an inherently and/or absolutely immoral concept, i.e. every single 
unfair scenario is not necessarily immoral. There are varying levels of unfairness, and there are 
quite a few things in the world that aren’t really fair, yet we fail to consider them immoral. This 
falls right in line with the intuition that certain CMAE transactions aren’t necessarily immoral, 
even if there is a level of unfairness to them. So in cases of CMAE transactions, there actually 
might be arrangements that aren’t necessarily immoral due to not being “unfair” enough.425  
This sentiment is best justified by what is referred to as the Non-Worseness Claim 
(NWC). The NWC argues that, “in cases where A has a right not to transact with B, and where 
transacting with B is not worse for B than not transacting with B at all, then it cannot be seriously 
wrong for A to engage in this transaction, even if its terms are judged to be unfair by some 
external standard.”426 So even if there is some inherent unfairness in a certain CMAE transaction, 
the NWC argues that if there’s no moral obligation to get involved and involvement is no worse 
than non-involvement, then there is nothing seriously wrong with an exploitative transaction that 
is consensual and mutually advantageous. Of course, certain critics argue against the NWC due 
to some of these counterintuitive implications that suggest that there’s nothing seriously wrong 
about these types of exploitation, e.g. price gouging. 
But this interpretation is based on an overly simplified and static bifurcated notion of 
ethics that just isn’t really practical or representative of real life, everyday moral decisions. 
Generally, people tend to distinguish solely between right actions and wrong actions, and in this 
view actions must be either completely right or completely wrong, or otherwise non-moral. But 
this is a very limited and illogical fashion to think about ethical judgments, because there is 
without a doubt a sliding scale on both sides. For example, stealing and mass murder are both 
considered ethically wrong, but certainly mass murder is much more seriously wrong than 
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stealing. On the other end of the spectrum, we run into the issue of obligation and duty. Certainly 
there are good actions that we are obligated to perform, but then there are other good actions that 
are outside the realm of obligation that are good to do, though not necessarily required to do. 
This is known as supererogation, or supererogatory moral acts. These are non-obligatory moral 
actions that go “beyond duty, fulfil more than is required, over and above what the agent is 
supposed or expected to do.”427  
In fact, Islamic ethics/religious law actually explicitly breaks down moral actions to be 
placed into one of five differing ethical categories that tend to represent this notion of a sliding 
scale: recommended (supererogatory), necessary (obligatory), indifferent (morally neutral or 
permissible), blameworthy (disfavored - conditionally evil), and forbidden (prohibited - 
inherently evil).428 Though not necessarily representative of Islamic moral theology, it could be 
that even individual categories have a sliding scale, e.g. one act more blameworthy or 
recommended than another. Unfortunately, at least in the West, when we talk about ethical 
actions we mostly talk about obligatory or supererogatory moral acts, and we clearly associate 
ethical actions with the more noble/higher categories of supererogatory moral acts and obligatory 
moral acts. However, as shown above, these do not constitute the whole range of ethical actions, 
and there are at least some moral actions that are permissible that are neither necessary 
(obligatory) or recommended beyond duty (supererogatory). 
Now most Western conceptions of ethics do not make such explicit distinctions among 
categories, but with notions such as duty, obligation, and an action being inherently evil, at least 
some major Western conceptions of ethics actually function implicitly in this mold. And when it 
comes to the NWC, this is the best way to view these types of actions, because while technically 
still a bifurcated system where ethical judgments are broken down into one of two areas, i.e. the 
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ethical actions of the categories of recommended, necessary, and indifferent and the unethical 
actions of the categories of blameworthy and forbidden, this type of perspective on ethical 
judgments is dynamic in nature and able to qualitatively distinguish among ethical or unethical 
actions according to their nature, severity, or obligation. In the case of CLOD, then, rather than 
thinking in terms of the ethical versus the unethical, we should deliberate upon whether or not 
this particular act is morally permissible, which is the least restrictive form of ethical actions that 
are still ethical and permissible. When we use this sort of moral language that qualitatively 
distinguishes among differing ethical and unethical actions, the notion of CLOD becomes much 
more ethically palatable due to being put in its proper moral context. 
Thus, if we view the NWC, and morality in general, in these terms, then the implications 
become much more ethically palatable and understandable than under the perspective of a static 
bifurcated system of merely right and wrong/ethical and unethical. If ethicality constitutes more 
of a sliding scale of judgments rather than a static bifurcated system of “the ethical and the 
unethical,” then this type of CMAE transaction seems ethically palatable as an action that is 
ethically permissible, or perhaps at least not unethical, though not necessarily obligatory or 
recommended as an ethical judgment that is beyond duty. Assuming premises one and four, 
which are the fundamental parts of the NWC, the logical argument then goes like this: 
1. A is not morally obligated to get involved with the affairs of B;  
2. If an action is not morally obligated, then it is ethical (or at least not ethically impermissible) to not 
perform that action; 
3. Therefore, non-involvement is ethical (or at least not ethically impermissible); 
4. For B, the involvement by A is no worse, and is usually more beneficial, than non-involvement by A;  
5. Therefore, in this situation, involvement is greater than or equal to non-involvement ethically; 
6. Consensual, mutually advantageous exploitative transactions constitute this type of involvement; 
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7. Therefore, consensual, mutually advantageous exploitative transactions between A and B are not 
ethically impermissible when there is no moral obligation to get involved and involvement of A with B 
leaves B no worse off than A’s non-involvement with B. 
And even if one does reject this notion of ethics as a sliding scale or the NWC in whole, then the 
burden of proof is still on the individual, because outside of disagreeing with the fundamental 
assumptions of the NWC, i.e. premises one and four above, it seems sufficiently counterintuitive 
to argue that involvement in such a situation is in any way ethically worse than non-involvement. 
So as long as the unfairness ultimately is in relation to the fairness baseline and not the 
no-transaction baseline, i.e. involvement doesn’t make the exploited’s situation worse, and there 
is sufficient benefit for both sides, then the levels of unfairness in CMAE transactions are not 
necessarily sufficient enough to qualify this act as unethical. Of course, some might question the 
moral character and motivations of the exploiter in this type of exploitation, but moral character 
and motivations aren’t necessarily relevant or defeating for the NWC. Discussing the issue of 
price gouging, which is also an example of a CMAE transaction, Zwolinski offers the following 
regarding character and the NWC: 
But NWC is not a thesis about moral character, it is a thesis about the wrongness of moral acts. 
And this is importantly different. Vicious people can perform morally permissible [emphasis 
added] actions. Think, for instance, of Kant's shopkeeper who returns the correct change to a naive 
customer only out of a selfish concern for his own reputation and long-term profit. If he could be 
sure he could steal a penny from a child's change and get away with it, he would, but prudence 
dictates restraint. Such a person has a bad moral character. But the act he is performing—giving 
the child back her correct change—is perfectly innocent… Thus, Snyder's concerns about NWC 
do not give us reason to prohibit price gouging, or even condemn it. For all his arguments show 
(correctly, I think) is that price gouging can sometimes be done by morally vicious people. They 
do not show that the act of price gouging itself is morally impermissible [emphasis added].429 
Thus, we can now distinguish among three different types of mutually advantageous 
transactions: nonconsensual, mutually advantageous exploitation (NCMAE), consensual, 
mutually advantageous exploitation (CMAE), and non-exploitative mutually advantageous 
(NEMA) transactions, which we have no reason to suspect are unethical. As stated above, since 
CLOD is necessarily a mutually advantageous transaction and the latter two mentioned types of 
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mutually advantageous transactions are ethically permissible types of transactions, for the 
exploitation objection to CLOD to be sufficient in its aims for prohibition, it must be determined 
that CLOD is (1) an example of a NCMAE transaction, (2) ethically distinguishable from other 
similar types of NCMAE transactions that are currently not prohibited by law, and (3) “harmful” 
enough, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to justify prohibition by law. Unsurprisingly, the 
majority of the claims made by the exploitation objection are aimed directly at the process of 
consent in CLOD, so the objection is still capable of meeting these demands. However, before 
getting into the differing claims and other arguments made by the exploitation objection, we 
should first briefly look at CLOD transactions themselves to see whether or not they meet the 
definition of exploitation. 
3.2.2) CLOD and Exploitation 
 To ethically analyze the issue of CLOD to determine its status as an exploitative practice, 
it must be compared with the necessary components of exploitation that were discussed above, 
namely - the exploiter extracting some benefit from the use/involvement of the exploitee, the 
exploiter benefitting at the expense of the exploitee, and unfairness.430 The first component is 
obviously present, because it’s clear that both sides are significantly advantaged and benefitted 
by the transaction. Unfairness is also obviously present, because it’s the lack of complete equity 
between individuals that allows the transaction to take place in the first place, albeit in differing 
areas, i.e. the donor lacking in money and the recipient lacking in organ health. This unfairness is 
empirically verified, too, because using Iran as an example, though there are significant other 
motivations to donate a kidney in Iran, such as the moral and religious value of charity, financial 
reasons were also a major donor motivation, as evidenced by the pool of commercial donors 
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consisting primarily of the poor.431 Thus, unfairness is present in the unequal starting positions of 
each party rather than within the transaction itself. 
 But can one really make the argument that the recipient (exploiter) benefits at the expense 
of the donor (exploitee)? Actually, no, at least in regulated markets, that is. This is because the 
donor is receiving a fair price for the organ, or at least what we can reasonably conclude as a fair 
price according to certain economic studies that have been completed on this issue. For example, 
in an attempt to find a minimum threshold amount that would constitute a fair payment to 
significantly incentivize live organ donation in the United States, noted economists Gary S. 
Becker and Julio Jorge Elias completed a study that came to a price of a little over $15,000 for a 
kidney and $37,600 for a liver that would be needed to effectively incentivize CLOD in the 
United States.432 In Iran the price is even greater, though difficult to quantify by American 
standards due to changing monetary values and exchange rates not being suitable methods of 
comparison. After making a research trip in 2008 to Iran to study their model of CLOD, Sigrid 
Fry-Revere had this to say regarding the payments made to donors in Iran: 
Perhaps the best way to understand how much kidney sellers are paid in Iran is to use the type of 
comparison Dr. Ghods used when I spoke with him in New Haven, Connecticut in April 2008. He 
told me the going rate for a kidney at the time we spoke was equivalent to six months' salary for a 
registered nurse. In the United States the median salary for six months for a registered nurse in 
2008 was $ 32,565. See the Bureau of Labor Statistics website at www.bls.gov. To expand on this 
type of analysis, the going rate for a kidney when I was in Iran at the end of 2008 was almost 
twice what the average Iranian made that year or enough to feed a rural family of four for several 
years. (It takes more than twice as much to stay above the poverty line in Tehran than in outlying 
areas.) Yet, even this type of analysis is incomplete because almost all kidney sellers received 
more than just monetary payment: They also received goods and services, such as health insurance 
vouchers, dental care, job placement services, and donations of household goods, clothing, and 
food. I estimate that a more realistic U.S. equivalent in purchasing power for the overall fees and 
services received on average by kidney sellers in Iran is closer to $ 45,000.433 
Remember, for the benefit to come at the expense of the donor, the transaction must make 
the donor worse off relative to the fairness baseline, even if it makes the donor better off relative 
to the no-transaction baseline. But in this case, the donor is actually better off relative to both 
baselines, because (1) the transaction is better than no transaction for the donor and (2) the 
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transaction is based on, what we can reasonably conclude as, a fair price for the organ, which I 
don’t think can be argued against, especially in the Iranian model. Of course, it could be argued 
that there is no proper standard to convert the worth of an organ to monetary value, meaning 
organs are incommensurable with monetary value. However, this is a problematic claim for two 
reasons: (1) it’s not clear that goods can ultimately be incommensurable in the first place and (2) 
incommensurability doesn’t necessarily make a transaction of goods unfair, meaning it isn’t 
sufficient as an objection.434 Further, as will be discussed next chapter, there are many other 
practices in our society where we actually do assign values or prices to body parts or products, so 
we certainly don’t behave as if all body parts or products are incommensurable with monetary 
value. Mark Cherry makes this remark regarding the incommensurability claim: 
By itself, though, incommensurability will not establish that organ sales are illicit. The 
permissibility of market transactions does not require that the goods exchanged be precisely 
commensurable, but rather that the parties transact voluntarily, that deception or other 
forms of coercion are not employed, and that each is satisfied with the value to be received. 
This means that what is received in return is worth as least as much to the party as the 
which was given [emphasis added]. As others have noted, one can buy or sell “priceless” Monet 
paintings without claiming that the aesthetic or historic value of the artwork is “commensurate” 
with the money that is paid.435 
Thus, it seems clear that a regulated system of CLOD ultimately does not meet the 
required components to label it as an example of immoral exploitation. Alan Wertheimer, a 
world-renowned expert on the concept of exploitation and one of the authors who theorized the 
three required components of exploitative transactions, seems to agree with this overall analysis: 
A mutually advantageous transaction is arguably (wrongly) exploitative only if the outcome is (in 
some way) unfair to B. This is not merely definitional. After all, it may be thought that a 
transaction is exploitative whenever [it] takes advantage of B's vulnerabilities or desperate 
situation to strike a deal. That is false. For if A makes a reasonable proposal [i.e. fair price] that 
B has no alternative but to accept given B's desperate situation, A does not exploit B. If a 
doctor proposes to perform life-saving surgery for a reasonable fee, the patient is hardly 
exploited, even though the patient would not have agreed but for the fact that her life was in 
danger [emphasis added].436  
 To understand why this practice ultimately represents a NEMA transaction rather than a 
NCMAE transaction, a distinction must be made between taking unfair advantage of an 
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individual (exploitation) and taking advantage of an unfair situation (not exploitation), which are 
two vastly different concepts with differing moral motivations. This distinction is very important 
to make, because it would otherwise label professionals such as physicians and auto-mechanics 
as professional exploiters, since they rely upon a certain disadvantaged situation of an individual, 
e.g. health problems, car trouble, etc., to make a living.437 Mark Cherry labels this distinction as 
“the line between the unfortunate and the unfair,” and he further states: 
That someone is poor or otherwise disadvantaged due to unfortunate circumstances does not imply 
either that he is unable to make rational choices given his limited choice set or that one acts 
improperly when one seeks to trade with or otherwise engage such a person in a market 
transaction [emphasis added] — for example, by offering the disadvantaged person a job or the 
real possibility of securing valuable rewards. More must be said to demonstrate that one acts in 
a morally blameworthy fashion when one extends an offer to a poor individual, which seeks 
to improve his prospects and to which he had no prior entitlement [emphasis added], such as 
when one offers valuable compensation for organ donation.438 
 To justify this distinction, one needs only to look at Kant’s second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative, which isn’t surprising due to the fact that many individual conceptions of 
exploitation rely on this Kantian notion. This formulation claims that we should always treat 
individuals as ends in themselves and never merely as a means to an end, which essentially 
means that we should never treat others instrumentally.439 Taking unfair advantage would then 
equate to treating individuals as an instrument and merely as a means to an end. Specifically, this 
would take the form of recipients not respecting donors as ends in themselves and offering them 
an unfair price for donation, which would ultimately just treat the donor as a means to an end, 
i.e. a host of an organ for transplantation. On the other hand, taking advantage of an unfair 
situation does not necessarily equate to treating individuals instrumentally, and at least in the 
case of regulated systems of CLOD, both sides are ultimately taking advantage of an unfair 
situation that the other party is in, i.e. vulnerability with the donor’s finances on the one hand and 
the recipient’s health on the other hand, to benefit off of a mutually advantageous transaction, 
while still treating the other party as an end in themselves.440 
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Since neither party benefits at the expense of the other party, regulated systems of CLOD 
clearly do not meet the required conditions for exploitation, and it is simply a system of NEMA 
transactions rather than CMAE transactions. But even if we did consider regulated systems of 
CLOD to be systems of CMAE transactions, the NWC argument above highlighted why we 
should think that there’s nothing seriously wrong or immoral with CMAE transactions, 
ultimately making them ethically permissible. But going even further down the rabbit hole, even 
if we granted the contentious claim that exploitation is always harmful and morally wrong, it still 
would not justify its prohibition by law. This is because in classically liberal societies like the 
United States, which this essay is ultimately focusing on, the harm principle, i.e. the guiding 
normative principle regarding State interference into individuals’ lives, ultimately allows for 
self-regarding harm. As long as the harm that someone potentially brings on oneself is self-
regarding, freely consented to, doesn’t violate any specific duty, such as becoming intoxicated 
while on police duty, and doesn’t cause perceptible harm to any other particular person, then 
individuals have the freedom to partake in it, according to the harm principle.441 Therefore, it 
seems painfully obvious that (1) regulated systems of CLOD are not examples of exploitation; 
which (2) makes arguments from exploitation that focus on the potential unfairness to the donor 
invalid and unsound, and proves that (3) even at its worst, there is no justification for prohibiting 
consensual cases of CLOD, which brings us to the two other main claims utilized within the 
exploitation objection that specifically focus on nonconsensual transactions. 
3.2.3)  Claim One - Exploitation from Autonomy-Undermining Choices 
Though I’ve successfully shown how regulated systems of CLOD do not technically meet 
the conditions to be considered examples of exploitation, there are still several other differing 
claims from the exploitation objection that must be answered. Where the focus of the main 
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exploitation objection itself is interested in fair treatment of all parties involved, specifically fair 
prices or fair treatment that doesn’t take unfair advantage of the donor, these other claims argue 
that CLOD constitutes exploitation through faulty consent processes, which Tom Beauchamp 
labels as exploitation deriving from constraining situations.442 The first claim suggests that the 
choice of CLOD actually undermines donor autonomy rather than enhancing donor autonomy, 
and the second claim suggests that the poor donor’s limited choice set actually constrains 
autonomy enough itself, which leads to an unfree and involuntary consent to CLOD. In the 
literature, these claims have been discussed using terms such as false autonomy, coercion, undue 
inducement, etc. Further, these two claims are not necessarily represented and intended in every 
formation or use of the exploitation objection, but they are two of the main claims and 
arguments, along with the unfairness argument above, utilized by opponents with the 
exploitation objection in the literature. 
However, this brings up an issue of presumption that should be addressed prior to the two 
main claims of the exploitation objection. Virtually every single manifestation of the exploitation 
objection implicitly makes an assumption regarding the demographics of the parties of CLOD, 
namely that the poor will always be the donors and the rich will always be the recipients in 
CLOD transactions. Now, some might consider this its own separate claim of the exploitation 
objection, such as Beauchamp when he describes this type of argument as exploitation deriving 
from systemic injustice.443 But this presumption is so widely presumed in these arguments that 
it’s present in virtually every manifestation of this objection to CLOD in the literature, so it 
should be addressed as an integral part of the exploitation objection itself rather than merely a 
claim made by differing iterations of this objection. 
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This component of the exploitation objection presumes that CLOD unjustifiably exploits 
the poor in favor of the rich, due to poor populations being the most likely to be donors and rich 
populations being the most likely to be recipients in CLOD transactions.444 Further, it is argued 
that the relationship between donor and recipient ultimately pits the poor against the rich, and it 
is unethical that rich recipients are able to exploit the vulnerable nature of poor populations, who 
might desire the financial gains of organ donation over the internal organ that they never see. 
Thus, the globally rich would be pitted against the globally poor, and according to proponents of 
this claim, the market would necessarily operate under these conditions. These proponents of this 
claim further argue that inequality in wealth and socioeconomic status would necessarily be a 
defining piece of the organ market, and a market based on this concept cannot possibly be 
ethically justifiable and non-exploitative.445  
In fact, several of the more prominent objections to CLOD make this very presumption, 
and this presumption ultimately constitutes an integral part of many arguments against CLOD. 
For example, in his article entitled “The Case Against Kidney Sales,” Thomas George bases his 
claim of exploitation on an inherent relationship of the rich taking advantage of the poor: 
All arguments in favour of the trade are attempts to clothe, in the garb of reason, the concept that 
it is all right to remove a body part from a poor person and put it into a rich one [emphasis 
added] …What matters here is motive: the implicit coercion in the case of the poor who sell out 
of financial compulsion [emphasis added] …A profile of the sellers would be revealing. It will 
come as no surprise that they all belong to the Third World. And it will also come as no 
surprise that besides the wealthy in the Third World, the potential buyers will be from the 
rich, white, First World and from the petroleum driven nouveau – riche [emphasis added]!446 
Monir Moniruzzum’s ethnography on kidney sellers entitled “‘Living Cadavers’ in Bangladesh: 
Bioviolence in the Human Organ Bazaar” also makes this seemingly inherent connection 
between poor donors giving up their organs to rich recipients in his argument from exploitation: 
The bioviolence is both exploitative and unethical, as organs are deliberately removed from 
the economic underclass to prolong the lives of the affluent few. In this visceral violence, the 
wealthy recipients are beneficiaries, while the poor sellers are mere suppliers of body parts 
[emphasis added], but at the severe cost of their suffering… some liberal bioethicists have 
proposed that a regulated organ market would be an efficient way to save the lives of dying 
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patients (Cherry 2005; Friedman and Friedman 2006; Hippen 2005; Matas 2008; Radcliffe-
Richards 1996; Taylor 2005; Veatch 2000). In my opinion, these bioethicists generate a symbolic 
violence (if unconsciously) by emphasizing “saving lives” of the affluent few, while allowing 
bioviolence against impoverished kidney sellers [emphasis added].447 
And finally, in his article “The Case Against a Regulated System of Living Kidney Sales” where 
he, illogically, argues against the idea of a regulated system of CLOD by utilizing evidence from 
unregulated, open kidney markets of the past, Vivekanand Jha makes a similar connection 
between this rich/poor dichotomy and exploitation and states, “Allowing such an activity in any 
corner of the world would open the doors for rampant exploitation of the underprivileged in 
areas that are already plagued by vast economic inequalities.”448 
The problem with this presumption is that it doesn’t necessarily bear out in reality in 
regulated, closed kidney markets like it does in unregulated, open kidney markets, which 
highlights another, more substantial and pressing issue regarding these objections: they use 
faulty logic to extrapolate the effects and harms of unregulated, open kidney markets to 
regulated, closed kidney markets, which is highly illogical. For example, George’s critique of 
CLOD is based off of his experiences with the open organ trade in India, specifically transplant 
tourism and organ trafficking between the “First World” and the “Third World,” which as I 
showed last chapter was subject to much exploitation and human rights abuses due to organ 
brokers and a lack of regulation and oversight.449 Similarly, Jha also uses evidence from the 
unregulated, open kidney markets of India and Pakistan to argue against the establishment of a 
regulated, closed kidney market in Western countries, which are two diametrically opposed 
systems and contexts with no accurate analogous comparison available.450  
In fact, the only time Jha does try to use a relevant comparison in the regulated Iranian 
market, he uses the work of Zargooshi, but as Sigrid Fry-Revere has recently pointed out, this 
research was conducted before Iran started regulating their kidney market, which once again 
tries to unfairly equate unregulated and regulated markets. Fry-Revere says as much here: 
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…Zargooshi collected his data before Iran became a regulated market. The kidney sellers 
Zargooshi interviewed were people who had donated before the Iranian government began 
to regulate kidney sales [emphasis added]. As a result, Koplin is comparing a black market to 
a legal, but unregulated market [emphasis added]. If that is the comparison (an illegal market 
vs. an unregulated market) then, I, for one, agree – there really isn’t much difference between the 
two as far as compensated donors are concerned. It would be far more meaningful to compare 
black market kidney sales in Pakistan, India, or the Philippines to the way in which compensated 
donation is currently done in the Iranian provinces of Isfahan and Razavi Khorasan (the province 
where Mashhad is located). Those provinces not only have the legal protections Iranian law 
provides all compensated donors, but also take their obligations to donors so seriously that they 
provide donors with all the same types of services available to recipients.451 
Not coincidentally, Zargooshi’s work is the primary source for many opponents’ arguments 
against the justification of CLOD, specifically those critiquing Iran’s system, such as Julian 
Koplin’s work.452 She also stated that his research was significantly old, and she compared using 
this data to describe and characterize the current Iranian system as akin to “generalizing about 
the state of healthcare in the United States today based on data collected twenty years ago in 
rural Alabama.”453 Similarly, this faulty logic that attempts to equate and describe the workings 
and effectiveness of regulated, closed markets by using evidence from unregulated, open 
markets is akin to describing and discussing the practice of abortion in the United States today by 
using evidence and statistics from a time before Roe v. Wade, which was a time when coat-
hanger abortions and clandestine, back-alley abortion clinics ran out of homes were the norm.454 
 Getting back to this rich versus poor presumption that is inherent in most objections from 
exploitation, the problem with this presumption is that it really only applies to unregulated, open 
organ markets, not a strictly regulated system of CLOD like this dissertation is proposing. In 
fact, there’s evidence from Iran’s system, from which this proposed American system is modeled 
after, that this type of exploitation is not a major issue within their system. In a study analyzing 
over 500 paid renal transplants in Iran, it was found that there was no marked difference in 
education levels between the donor of the kidney and its recipient. Furthermore, though 84 
percent and 16 percent of the donors were from the poor or middle class, respectively, over 50 
percent and 36 percent of the recipients were from these same socioeconomic classes, 
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respectively, with upper class recipients only constituting roughly 13 percent of the recipients.455 
Diane Tober’s work also supports this analysis when she states, “…though the Iranian system is 
based on a commercial market, it is not only the wealthy who have access to donor organs. 
Organ recipients come from all socio-economic classes, although unrelated commercial donors 
come from primarily lower socio-economic backgrounds.”456 This evidence then supports Dr. 
Ghods’ study’s findings, and it suggests that this presumption is not necessarily as relevant to 
regulated, closed markets for organs as it is for unregulated, open markets for organs.  
In fact, in more developed countries with more socialized forms of healthcare, e.g. single-
payer systems, this argument doesn’t even apply conceptually with regulated markets, because 
there is universal coverage by the federal government that would be responsible for 
compensating donors for recipients of all social classes. This is even true in the United States 
with the social program Medicaid, which has some 97 million low-income Americans that it 
supports.457 If the federal government was the main financer and administrator of the market, 
which is true of this dissertation’s proposal, then most low-income individuals and families 
would be covered under these social programs, meaning they would be covered both as donors 
and recipients under such a system. Thus, rich individuals exploiting and taking advantage of 
poor individuals for their organs isn’t a real concern for this type of regulated system of CLOD. 
 Along the same lines of this presumption, some also presume that there are informational 
and educational hurdles that might arise with poorer populations being donors, which could lead 
to them being exploited due to a lack of understanding. Poorer individuals will generally have 
less education and knowledge regarding the transplant process, and this can lead to possible 
misunderstandings of the consequences of organ donation, at least of the severity, which is a 
violation of the principle of consent.458 Remember, ensuring understanding of the relevant 
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medical information of a procedure is one of the four key steps to attaining informed consent.459 
However, once again, in regulated systems this shouldn’t be a problem, because any tightly 
regulated system of organ donation and transplantation will have mechanisms to ensure informed 
consent of donors, similar to the safeguards we currently have for live donors at transplant 
centers across the United States. 
Now that those faulty presumptions have been dispelled, the first major claim of 
exploitation due to constraining situations can be analyzed. This claim of the exploitation 
objection actually goes beyond claims of coercion and argues that the very option and possibility 
of CLOD is both coercive and autonomy-limiting. One of the strongest arguments in favor of 
CLOD comes from the concept of bodily autonomy, which we discussed above. Because we’re a 
liberal, pluralistic, and individually-oriented society that believes that individuals both (1) have 
the right to autonomous decision-making and (2) own their own bodies, there are strong cultural 
and moral values supporting bodily autonomy in our society, and this concept of bodily 
autonomy is diametrically opposed to paternalistic prohibitions on rights and freedoms that 
determine what happens to one’s own body, such as a prohibition on CLOD transactions. 
But certain opponents of CLOD, specifically Paul Hughes, argue that rather than being an 
autonomy-enhancing option, allowing poorer populations to donate their organs for 
compensation might actually be autonomy-undermining and constraining their liberty even more. 
Hughes argues that when individual choice sets become increasingly restricted and constrained, 
certain beneficial, but not necessarily desirable, decisions become unduly attractive and 
irresistible. He further posits that certain choices can actually undermine autonomy by keeping 
individuals in their compromised autonomous states with severely constrained choice sets. So 
when these two issues are combined, certain irresistible options might serve to keep 
 151 
 
disenfranchised individuals in their situations of constrained choice sets and limited autonomy. 
Essentially, Hughes claims that it’s a paradox: the addition of an extra choice increases the 
choice set and overall autonomy, but that choice itself, which is supposedly irresistible and too 
good to refuse, leads back to a constrained choice set and limited overall autonomy. Hughes has 
this to say regarding autonomy-undermining choices: 
But the rest of the story is that the reasonable alternatives available to them are so limited that the 
addition of certain kinds of options may have a debilitating impact on a person's autonomy and 
well-being. Consider, for example, the legal option of refraining from pressing charges against 
one's assailant. This is usually regarded as part of the arsenal of choices persons need in order to 
be genuinely in control of their lives. But it has been amply demonstrated that some persons, most 
notably adult victims of domestic assault and battery, routinely exercise this option in self-
defeating ways, sometimes irrevocably so. Thus, the presence of some choices in contexts of 
injustice actually compromises autonomy and well-being. Moreover, if we think of a person's 
viable options as his real autonomy, then the presentation of additional choices which are 
constraining will leave a person worse off in terms of autonomy and wellbeing than he would have 
been without those choices.460  
Thus, this claim of the argument from exploitation argues both that the opportunity to be 
compensated for organ donation is autonomy-limiting and that the decision to actually donate for 
compensation is a forced response due to coercive financial influences and a constrained choice 
set, making it an unethical and unjustifiable practice and worthy of prohibition.461 
 If this sounds fairly paternalistic, then it shouldn’t be surprising that this argument is 
ultimately based on a neo-Marxian conception of exploitation. Marx’s original conception of the 
exploitation of the worker revolves around the criticism that the “capitalist” unfairly takes 
advantage of workers by converting the “surplus value” of the workers’ labor into profit, which 
he argues belongs to the workers themselves. However, given the constraint of options for the 
workers, i.e. they must work and produce this labor for the wages that support their families, they 
must necessarily continue to labor for their exploiter.462  
When discussing the issue of CLOD specifically, then, Hughes claims that the legislation 
of CLOD and legal option to donate one’s organ for compensation would be a forced, required 
choice of those individuals with severely constrained choice sets that couldn’t resist such a 
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tempting offer, and that choice would ultimately lead them back to a situation with limited 
autonomy and a severely constrained choice set. An autonomy-constraining option, rather than 
an autonomy-enhancing option, then would be one that “presupposes and/or reinforces” a system 
of individuals with constrained options in the original position. For example, Hughes argues that 
CLOD is only able to function in a society that presupposes large populations of poor people 
with limited, constrained options, which unduly influences them to donate their organ for 
compensation.463 Further, Hughes argues, CLOD reinforces these constrained choice-sets and 
limited autonomy by keeping these poor donors’ options constrained.464 So the addition of the 
option of CLOD would ultimately undermine these individuals’ autonomy and keep them in a 
situation of constrained choice sets rather than enhance their autonomy. 
However, once again this issue doesn’t seem to necessarily be empirically true in 
regulated markets. Remember back to the study of the Iranian donors and recipients. Though the 
majority of the donors were poor, sixteen percent were from the middle class, which is a 
significant minority.465 So a system of CLOD does not then necessarily presuppose large poor 
populations with limited, constrained options, though they certainly would make for a more 
robust market, as James Stacy Taylor notes:  
…it is not necessary for the introduction of such a market that [there] are “poor people and that we 
allow them to participate” in it. This is because all the proponents of such a market need 
presuppose is that some persons will be willing to purchase organs for transplantation, that others 
(of any economic standing) will be willing to sell them, and that the vendor and the purchaser will 
be able to agree on a price. Of course, no doubt almost all the vendors in such a market will be 
drawn from the ranks of the desperate poor, and so more organs would be sold if the poor did exist 
and were allowed to participate in such a market. But this point concerns the differential volume 
of trade that would take place in a current market for human organs with the participation of the 
poor, rather than the feasibility of such a market itself.466  
Similarly, there’s no evidence that in regulated markets CLOD necessarily reinforces 
constrained choice-sets like has been observed in the open, unregulated markets and black 
markets in organs. Like the many other articles and opponents that were discussed above, Paul 
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Hughes makes this argument by using evidence from unregulated, open markets and black 
markets in organs, such as India, which was a wildly unregulated market full of organ 
trafficking, coercion, and outright exploitation. He even openly admits that it could be different 
in regulated markets, but he essentially states that this is an empirical claim that we cannot know 
about before actually studying the consequences of an actual regulated market, conveniently 
ignoring the example of Iran.467 
In fact, recent studies from Iran’s regulated system of CLOD don’t appear to support this 
notion. For example, certain recent studies found that paid donors reported the improvement of 
either, or both, their immediate and/or long-term financial situations. In a study involving 25 
Iranian transplant centers and 600 paid living unrelated donors, 86.5% of donors felt complete 
satisfaction after donation, with 11.5% feeling relatively satisfied. A similar short-term study 
involving 30 transplant centers and 478 paid living unrelated donors had similar findings with a 
91% satisfaction rate. Further, another study involving six different transplant regions and 44 
different paid living unrelated donors reported that 73% of the donors reported that their 
financial problems were solved. Of these donors whose financial problems were solved, a little 
over half of the donors were interviewed within a year of donation, while the other half was 
interviewed in between one and seven years from their donation date, which suggests that CLOD 
is a viable solution for certain financial issues. Unsurprisingly, it was also found that nearly 90% 
of the donors interviewed were glad that they had the opportunity to donate their kidney for 
compensation in order to improve their financial situations.468 Thus, it seems fairly 
uncontroversial and clear that at least in regulated markets of CLOD, there is no necessary 
mechanism that “presupposes and/or reinforces” a constrained choice-set and limited autonomy, 
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meaning that the option of CLOD truly is an autonomy-enhancing option, rather than an 
autonomy-constraining option like this claim argues. 
3.2.4)  Claim Two - Exploitation from Constrained Choice Sets 
 But even if the choice of CLOD is actually autonomy-enhancing rather than autonomy-
undermining, certain opponents of CLOD still argue that the choice sets are so constrained and 
limited that the voluntariness of the decision to donate an organ for compensation is negligible 
and makes consent to the transaction invalid, which is exploitation, either through coercion or an 
undue inducement. This claim of the exploitation objection argues that CLOD would force upon 
poor individuals an almost impossible dilemma: keep a part of one’s body or sell it to pay the 
bills. Basically, this argument states that the decision to donate one’s organ for compensation is 
forced due to coercive influences, i.e. poverty, and a constrained choice set, and informed 
consent can never be achieved in this context due to the voluntariness of the decision, i.e. the 
third step in the process of informed consent, never being real.469 Sandel labels this component 
of the argument the “fairness objection,” and he also points to the injustice of inequality being 
the basis of the market. He states, “…market exchanges are not always as voluntary as market 
enthusiasts suggest. A peasant may agree to sell his kidney or cornea to feed his starving family, 
but his agreement may not really be voluntary. He may be unfairly coerced, in effect, by the 
necessities of his situation.”470  
Essentially, where Hughes’ argument was that adding the option of CLOD actually 
limited autonomy and the range of choices for individuals, this claim of the exploitation 
objection merely states that the range of choices for these individuals is too small in the first 
place, which makes the choice of CLOD unfree, coerced, and not appropriate to be an option for 
these individuals.471 Of course, it’s not absolutely clear that limited choice sets necessarily lead 
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to exploitation, since every individual’s choice set is at least partially constrained due to factors 
outside their control; however, this argument focuses on choice sets that are excessively 
restricted, so it is a substantial and plausible enough objection that it must be fully addressed.472 
There are two main related problems with this claim of the exploitation objection – the 
arbitrariness problem of the exploitation objection and the paradox problem of the 
exploitation objection. Let’s look at the arbitrariness problem first. 
 As shown in the statistics of Iranian donors above, a substantial minority of donors are 
from the middle class and not poor, which makes this claim of coercion only a conditional 
objection rather than absolute. And this is where one of the major problems of the exploitation 
objection arises, because it’s a conditional argument, both in substance and application, that 
seeks to “protect” poor individuals from making supposed coerced choices. The primary 
condition for this argument is obvious – the individual must be “poor enough” with a small 
enough range of options that he cannot freely make the decision to donate an organ for 
compensation without unduly, coercive influences affecting his decision. Alternatively, this 
condition could also manifest as the compensation for the act of donation being so large and 
attractive that it coercively convinces the individual to donate, i.e. undue inducement.473 
 However, in addition to this substance condition for the argument, the argument itself is 
also only applied conditionally and pointedly against CLOD, even though it is actually just as 
relevant and applicable to other market exchanges in this population. Essentially, then, this is 
what I call the arbitrariness problem of the exploitation objection – if the presence of 
coercive, unduly influences from a small range of options makes CLOD exploitative and 
unethical for poor individuals, leading to prohibition, then virtually every market or economical 
exchange by poor individuals should be considered exploitative, unethical, and prohibition-
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worthy. Singling out CLOD for this argument is then arbitrary and inconsistent. This is actually 
a common type of argument used by advocates for CLOD, because it’s an obvious, pervasive, 
and simple objection that shows a contradiction and inconsistency in treatment of CLOD versus 
various other similar actions. For example, James Stacey Taylor discusses Gerald Dworkin 
making the argument that: 
…if the poor should be prohibited from selling their organs for this reason then they should also 
be prohibited from joining the army, engaging in hazardous occupations such as high-steel 
construction, or being paid subjects in medical experiments, since these decisions are also often 
made out of economic necessity, and thus should also be considered to exhibit diminished 
autonomy.474 
Similarly, speaking about CLOD, Mark Cherry argues: 
Analogously, on the labor market, those who must settle for any unpleasant or more risky 
occupation, such as ditch digger, oil platform construction, or assembly line worker, must make 
the same type of choice; this does not necessarily mean that they are being coerced.475 
Radcliffe-Richards et al. offers a similar argument comparing the inconsistent treatment between 
the rich and the poor when it comes to dangerous undertakings for pleasure or high pay: 
If the rich are free to engage in dangerous sports for pleasure, or dangerous jobs for high pay, it is 
difficult to see why the poor who take the lesser risk of kidney selling for greater rewards—
perhaps saving relatives’ lives, or extricating themselves from poverty and debt—should be 
thought so misguided as to need saving from themselves.476 
 Thus, the arbitrariness problem suggests that this claim of the exploitation objection is 
inconsistently and prejudicially used only against CLOD when it actually applies to a plethora of 
other market transactions and decisions where poor individuals may be “disadvantaged” and 
“coerced” due to a limited range of options, such as health-risking jobs, like coal mining, or 
being paid for medical experiments. However, this is obviously immoral due to the extreme 
amount of paternalism it would lead to. So just like in other dangerous occupations or activities 
that we allow poorer individuals to partake in, it isn’t necessary to outright prohibit these 
activities, but rather we must simply regulate them enough to ensure a baseline threshold of 
safety and protection for the participants or workers. In fact, there’s sound evidence that live 
kidney donation is actually safer and less risky than many occupations. For example, on the one 
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hand, the logging industry in the United States has around 110.9 fatal injuries per 100,000 
people.477 On the other hand, recent studies have found that surgical mortality from live kidney 
donations is 3.1 per 10,000, which essentially expands to 31 deaths per 100,000, and there is no 
significant higher long-term risk of death in live kidney donors than similar, non-donor 
individuals in the general population.478 Therefore, it stands to reason that it isn’t necessary or 
justifiable to outright prohibit CLOD, but rather we just must ensure a baseline threshold of 
safety and protection for both the donor and the recipient, which can be ensured via regulation.479 
 If one still thinks that there is something substantially different about allowing a person to 
donate their kidney for compensation versus allowing them to substantially risk their health by 
working somewhere like a coal mine or logging company, then it is due to them seeing 
something inherent to CLOD itself that makes it fundamentally different than coal mining and 
inherently immoral. But by admitting this fact, one is also admitting that this claim of the 
exploitation objection in itself is not sufficient as an argument to prohibit CLOD, because, 
otherwise, it would require massive paternalistic efforts levied against poor individuals in all 
kinds of similar market transactions and decisions, which is obviously immoral and unjustifiable. 
Therefore, the exploitation objection is not sufficient in itself and must rely on further arguments, 
specifically the commodification objection, to justifiably prohibit CLOD by law and deem it 
necessarily immoral.480 
 Relatedly, the paradox problem of the exploitation objection is a similar argument 
against this claim of the exploitation objection as the arbitrariness problem, and it also highlights 
why the objection of exploitation is not sufficient as an argument against CLOD due to its 
tendency towards inconsistency and contradiction. Remember, this claim of the exploitation 
objection states that the range of choices for these individuals is too small in the first place, so 
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the choice of CLOD is unfree, coerced, and not appropriate to be an option for these individuals. 
However, this is prima facie contradictory, because it is essentially exacerbating a problem that it 
is arguing against in the first place, i.e. a constricted or limited choice set. So, paradoxically, it is 
essentially limiting an already limited choice set, which it is arguing against in the first place. 
Radcliffe-Richards et al. argues that “we cannot improve matters by removing the best option 
that poverty has left, and making the range smaller still,” because doing so would “make 
subsequent choices, by this criterion, even less autonomous.”481 Alan Wertheimer seems to 
agree. When discussing transactions that occur alongside or in cooperation with unjust 
background conditions, i.e. taking advantage of an unfair situation from earlier, he states: 
For society to say, in effect, “Because we have treated you unjustly [the poor] by failing to repair 
your background conditions, we will not let you improve your situation on terms that are fair, 
given these background conditions,” is to add insult to injury – in spades…We can lament that the 
transaction should have been unnecessary and work to render such transactions unnecessary in the 
future. But for here and now, and when the hand-waving is all done, we must ask what we should 
do about such transactions and relationships. And minor variations aside, we have just two 
choices: we can prevent them, or we can permit (and enforce) [read: regulate] them. Given those 
choices, it seems callous not to allow [one] to improve on his or her condition, simply because the 
transaction arises out of unjust background conditions.482 
In fact, just as the arbitrariness problem also shows, the exploitation objection relies on 
something being inherently immoral about compensated organ donation in order for the 
objection to make any sense, because, otherwise, the additional choice of CLOD would be 
regarded as a good thing for an otherwise limited or constricted choice set. Therefore, both the 
arbitrariness problem and the paradox problem show that the exploitation objection is not 
sufficient in itself and relies on further controversial assumptions about the inherent immoral 
nature of CLOD to succeed. Cherry stated this problem the best when he wrote: 
In general, it is difficult to count a policy as exploitative if, as in the case of legitimizing organ 
sales, it increases the number of options open to individuals. In order to see such circumstances as 
exploitative, one must hold that there is something intrinsically wrong or debasing in selling one's 
organs, so that even if one does this freely, one has been brought to do something morally 
injurious to oneself.483 
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 Thus, the exploitation objection ultimately doesn’t stand up to scrutiny as a sufficient 
argument to justify prohibition of CLOD in itself, at least in liberal, pluralistic societies such as 
the United States. But beyond these negative arguments deconstructing the claims of the 
exploitation objection, there are other more positive arguments regarding the notion of 
exploitation that can be made in favor of CLOD. First, one positive argument in favor of CLOD 
revolves around the existence of exploitation that is due primarily to the existing prohibition of a 
legally regulated system of CLOD. For example, de Castro argues that rather than worrying 
about exploitation in a heavily regulated, legal system of CLOD, we should focus on the rampant 
amount of harmful exploitation observed in organ black markets that thrive in nations worldwide 
that prohibit CLOD.484 These organ black markets are empirically verified with places like the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, and India having large clandestine, underground black markets in 
organs that are thriving, even though it is illegal in these areas.485 Furthermore, as previously 
mentioned in an earlier chapter, the only nation in the world with a heavily regulated system of 
CLOD, i.e. Iran, has effectively eliminated its organ black market due to strict governmental 
oversight and regulations over the entire system.486 Thus, not only should we worry more about 
exploitation in unregulated black markets in organs rather than regulated legal systems of CLOD, 
an argument can be made that we have a moral obligation from non-maleficence to regulate, 
rather than prohibit, CLOD, which I will expound upon in the next chapter. 
 Another positive argument in favor of CLOD argues that prohibiting CLOD only shifts 
the exploitation and coercion to the families of patients needing organs rather than eliminate it 
altogether. It’s already well known that cadaveric organ donation is hindered in many respects by 
the deceased’s family’s role in the decision to donate, which is due primarily to the emotional 
stress involved with the decision and its context.487 Hansmann even argues that it is a “misnomer 
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to call the current organ procurement system ‘voluntary’; it might be more accurate simply to 
call it ‘uncompensated,’” because families are essentially forced and coerced to make a decision 
in a time of extreme distress due to the passing of a loved one.488 The same can be said about 
living organ donation, too, and the family of a patient needing a kidney might even be put under 
more pressure and coercion to donate due to the chance to save a loved one’s life. Kishore argues 
that this family pressure and coercion is every bit as influential as poverty would be to poorer 
individuals.489 So it’s difficult to see why familial influences and coercion should be any more 
acceptable in living donation than the equal or lesser influences of poverty in a regulated system 
of CLOD, and it’s unclear how purchasing an organ for a loved one would be substantially 
different than donating an organ oneself.  
So just as with the arbitrariness problem and paradox problem above, further arguments 
are needed to morally differentiate CLOD from other similar market transactions. The principles 
of autonomy and justice provide sound moral arguments in favor of CLOD, and combined with 
the insufficiency and failure of the differing claims of the exploitation objection, along with the 
other positive arguments from exploitation, it is clear that there are compelling moral arguments 
to be made from bodily autonomy and justice against the prohibition of CLOD in our society. 
Ultimately, the exploitation objection rests on the legitimacy of the commodification objection, 
which we turn to next, along with the ethical arguments from beneficence and non-maleficence.
 161 
 
387 L.D. de Castro, “Commodification and Exploitation: Arguments in Favour of Compensated Organ Donation,” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 29, no. 3 (2003): 142-145. 
388 David F. Kelly, Gerard Magill, and Henk ten Have, Contemporary Catholic Healthcare Ethics, 2nd ed. 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 63-64. 
389 Raanan Gillon, “Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for Autonomy Should be 
‘First Among Equals’,” Journal of Medical Ethics 29, no. 5 (2003): 310-311. 
390 Tom L. Beauchamp, “The ‘Four Principles’ Approach to Health Care Ethics,” In Principles of Health Care 
Ethics, ed. Richard Ashcroft et al. (England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2007), 4. 
391 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 104-105. 
392 Jordan Potter, “Does the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation Compensation Work as an Ethical Global Model?,” 
Online Journal of Health Ethics 11, no. 1 (2015): 5, 
http://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1156&context=ojhe. 
393 Henk ten Have and Michele S. Jean, eds., The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: 
Background, Principles, and Application (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2009), 116-117. 
394 Potter, “Does the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation Compensation Work as an Ethical Global Model?,” 5. 
395 ten Have and Jean, eds., The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 126-132. 
396 ten Have and Jean, eds., The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 361. 
397 Gerald Dworkin, Morality, Harm, and the Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 156. 
398 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. by John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 13-
14. 
399 Harold Kyriazi, “The Ethics of Organ Selling: A Libertarian Perspective,” Issues in Medical Ethics 9 (2001): 44-
46. 
400 Arthur J. Matas, “The Case for Living Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections and Concerns,” American Journal of 
Transplantation 4, no. 12 (2004): 2009. 
401 Potter, “Does the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation Compensation Work as an Ethical Global Model?,” 5. 
402 Potter, “Does the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation Compensation Work as an Ethical Global Model?,” 6. 
403 Robin Gill, Health Care and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 186-187. 
404 Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics: A Systematic Approach, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 111-112. 
405 Linda Farber Post, Jeffrey Blustein, and Nancy N. Dubler, Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 125-126. 
406 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 254-256. 
407 Richard Arneson, "Egalitarianism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013), accessed November 5, 
2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/.  
408 Jan Garrett, “Martha Nussbaum on Capabilities and Human Rights,” last modified April 29, 2008, 
http://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/ethics/nussbaum.htm.  
409 Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 40-44. 
410 Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, 41. 
411 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 263. 
412 Robert M. Veatch, “Why Liberals Should Accept Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement,” Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 13, no. 1 (2003): 29-33. 
413 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Trading on America’s Puritanical Streak,” The University of Chicago Law School Faculty 
Blog, March 14, 2008, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/03/martha-nussbaum.html.  
414 Martha C. Nussbaum, “‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services,” The Journal of 
Legal Studies 27, no. 52 (1998): 723-724. 
415 Richard J. Arneson, "Exploitation," In Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker (New York: Garland, 
1992), 350. 
416 Alan Wertheimer, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/exploitation/.  
417 Arneson, "Exploitation," 350. 
418 Alan Wertheimer, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/exploitation/.  
 
Endnotes 
      
 162 
 
      
419 Matt Zwolinski, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/.  
420 Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 16. 
421 David J. Rothman and Sheila M. Rothman, Trust is not Enough: Bringing Human Rights to Medicine (New 
York: New York Review Books, 2006), 10-11. 
422 Matt Zwolinski, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/.  
423 Chris Meyers, "Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops," Journal of Social Philosophy 
35, no. 3 (2004): 320-322. 
424 Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, 13-16. 
425 Matt Zwolinski, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/.  
426 Matt Zwolinski, "Dialogue on Price Gouging: Price Gouging, Non-Worseness, and Distributive Justice," 
Business Ethics Quarterly 19, no. 02 (2009): 296. 
427 David Heyd, Supererogation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1. 
428 Daniel Brown, “Islamic Ethics in Comparative Perspective,” The Muslim World 89, no. 2 (1999): 181-187. 
429 Zwolinski, “Dialogue on Price Gouging: Price Gouging, Non-Worseness, and Distributive Justice,” 297. 
430 Matt Zwolinski, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/.  
431 Diane M. Tober, “Kidneys and Controversies in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Case of Organ Sale,” Body & 
Society 13, no. 3 (2007): 159-166. 
432 Gary S. Becker and Julio Jorge Elias, “Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ 
Donations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2007): 9-13. 
433 Sigrid Fry-Revere, The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 
2014), 219-220. 
434 Alan Wertheimer, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/exploitation/. 
435 Mark J. Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 96. 
436 Alan Wertheimer, “Exploitation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/exploitation/.  
437 Rob Lawlor, "Organ Sales: Exploitative at Any Price?," Bioethics 28, no. 4 (2014): 200. 
438 Mark J. Cherry, “Why Should We Compensate Organ Donors When We Can Continue to Take Organs for Free? 
A Response to Some of My Critics,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34, no. 6 (2009): 663-664. 
439 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 37-38. 
440 Lawlor, "Organ Sales: Exploitative at Any Price?," 200. 
441 Michael Lacewing, “Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’,” Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://documents.routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A2/Mill/MillHarm.pdf.  
442 Tom L. Beauchamp, "Methods and Principles in Biomedical Ethics," Journal of Medical Ethics 29, no. 5 (2003): 
272-273. 
443 Beauchamp, "Methods and Principles in Biomedical Ethics," 272. 
444 Arthur J. Matas, “Why We Should Develop a Regulated System of Kidney Sales: a Call for Action!,” Clinical 
Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1, no. 6 (2006): 1131. 
445 Herjeet Marway, Sarah-Louise Johnson, and Heather Widdows, “Commodification of Human Tissue,” in 
Handbook of Global Bioethics, ed. Henk ten Have and Bert Gordijn (Netherlands: Springer, 2014), 590-591. 
446 Thomas George, "The Case Against Kidney Sales," Issues in Medical Ethics 9, no. 2 (2001): 49-50. 
447 Monir Moniruzzaman, "“Living Cadavers” in Bangladesh: Bioviolence in the Human Organ Bazaar," Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2012): 69-87. 
448 Vivekanand Jha and Kirpal S. Chugh, "The Case Against a Regulated System of Living Kidney Sales," Nature 
Clinical Practice Nephrology 2, no. 9 (2006): 466-467. 
449 George, "The Case Against Kidney Sales," 49-50. 
450 Jha and Chugh, "The Case Against a Regulated System of Living Kidney Sales," 466-467. 
451 Sigrid Frye-Revere, “The Truth about Iran,” American Journal of Bioethics 14, no. 10 (2014): 37-38. 
452 Julian Koplin, "Assessing the Likely Harms to Kidney Vendors in Regulated Organ Markets," The American 
Journal of Bioethics 14, no. 10 (2014): 7-18. 
 
 163 
 
      
453 Fry-Revere, “The Truth about Iran,” 37-38. 
454 David A. Grimes, “The Bad Old Days: Abortion in America Before Roe v. Wade,” The Huffington Post, January 
15, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-a-grimes/the-bad-old-days-abortion_b_6324610.html.  
455 Ahad J. Ghods and Shekoufeh Savaj, “Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney Donation,” 
Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1, no. 6 (2006): 1140-1141. 
456 Tober, “Kidneys and Controversies in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Case of Organ Sale,” 159. 
457 “Policy Basics: Introduction to Medicaid,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, last modified August 16, 
2016, http://www.cbpp.org/research/health/policy-basics-introduction-to-medicaid.  
458 Budiani-Saberi and Columb, “A Human Rights Approach to Human Trafficking for Organ Removal,” 900. 
459 ten Have and Jean, eds., The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 131. 
460 Paul M. Hughes, “Exploitation, Autonomy, and the Case for Organ Sales,” International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1998): 89-94. 
461 Marway, Johnson, and Widdows, “Commodification of Human Tissue,” 590-591. 
462 Rob Lawlor, "Organ Sales: Exploitative at Any Price?," Bioethics 28, no. 4 (2014): 194-195. 
463 James Stacey Taylor, "Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales," Journal of Applied Philosophy 19, 
no. 3 (2002): 277-278. 
464 Paul M. Hughes, "Ambivalence, Autonomy, and Organ Sales," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 2 
(2006): 247-248. 
465 Ghods and Savaj, “Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney Donation,” 1140-1141. 
466 Taylor, "Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales," 278-280. 
467 Hughes, "Ambivalence, Autonomy, and Organ Sales," 247-248. 
468 Aliereza Hamidian Jahromi, Sigrid Fry-Revere, and Bahar Bastani, “A Revised Iranian Model of Organ Donation 
as an Answer to the Current Organ Shortage Crisis,” Iranian Journal of Kidney Diseases 9, no. 5 (2015): 355-356. 
469 ten Have and Jean, eds., The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 131-132. 
470 Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2012), 110-111. 
471 J. Radcliffe-Richards et al., "The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales," Lancet 351, no. 9120 (1998): 1950. 
472 Lisa Bortolotti and James Stacey Taylor, "Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts Are Morally 
Imperative," The Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 225 (2006): 627-629. 
473 Mark J. Cherry, “Is a Market in Human Organs Necessarily Exploitative,” Public Affairs Quarterly 14, no. 4 
(2000): 345-350. 
474 Taylor, "Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales," 275. 
475 Cherry, “Is a Market in Human Organs Necessarily Exploitative,” 346. 
476 Radcliffe-Richards et al., "The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales," 1951. 
477 David Johnson, “The Most Dangerous Jobs in America,” TIME, May 13, 2016, 
http://time.com/4326676/dangerous-jobs-america/.  
478 Dorry L. Segev et al., "Perioperative Mortality and Long-Term Survival Following Live Kidney Donation," 
JAMA 303, no. 10 (2010): 959-966. 
479 Taylor, "Autonomy, Constraining Options, and Organ Sales," 275-276. 
480 Cherry, “Is a Market in Human Organs Necessarily Exploitative,” 349. 
481 Radcliffe-Richards et al., "The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales," 1950. 
482 Wertheimer, Exploitation, 299. 
483 Cherry, “Is a Market in Human Organs Necessarily Exploitative,” 349. 
484 de Castro, “Commodification and Exploitation: Arguments in Favour of Compensated Organ Donation,” 145. 
485 D.A. Budiani-Saberi and F.L. Delmonico, “Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism: A Commentary on the 
Global Realities,” American Journal of Transplantation 8, no. 5 (2008): 925-927. 
486 Kiarash Aramesh, “A Closer Look at the Iranian Model of Kidney Transplantation,” American Journal of 
Bioethics 14, no. 10 (2014): 35-37. 
487 Thomas May, Mark P. Aulisio, and Michael A. DeVita, "Patients, Families, and Organ Donation: Who Should 
Decide?," Milbank Quarterly 78, no. 2 (2000): 323-336. 
488 Henry Hansmann, “The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law 16, no. 2 (1989): 70. 
489 R.R. Kishore, “Human Organs, Scarcities, and Sale: Morality Revisited,” Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 6 
(2005): 365. 
 164 
 
Chapter 4 – Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, and Commodification 
Though the pro-CLOD arguments from the principles of autonomy and justice and the 
objection to CLOD from considerations of exploitation constitute the most popular and extensive 
arguments for and against CLOD, there are several other prominent arguments for and against 
CLOD that must be considered in any true ethical analysis of the concept. In addition to the 
principles of autonomy and justice, the other two principles of the concept of principlism, i.e. 
beneficence and non-maleficence, also provide strong arguments in favor of CLOD that revolve 
around the benefits of increased organ donation rates and cost savings, along with the avoidance 
of harmful, exploitative black markets in organs. On the other hand, the commodification 
objection argues that CLOD is a moral harm that violates human dignity and unethically 
commodifies the human body and/or human person, which cannot be justified by its practical 
benefits. Other, related objections claim that CLOD suppresses altruistic live organ donation 
and/or places a stigma on the compensated donors, which it is argued are both issues that are 
substantial enough to justify prohibition.490 
This chapter analyzes these ethical arguments for and against CLOD, specifically those 
arguments dealing with the concepts of beneficence, non-maleficence, and commodification, 
along with the related objections from the suppression of altruistic donation and the potential 
stigma put on compensated donors. The chapter begins by analyzing the pro-CLOD arguments 
from beneficence and non-maleficence, and it is argued that CLOD is consistent with these 
ethical principles, along with being potentially morally obligatory in order to avoid and eliminate 
the harms associated with the black market in organs that naturally arises in the wake of 
prohibitive legislation of CLOD. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to analyzing the remaining 
major objections to CLOD, though the primary focus will be on the most significant of these 
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objections, i.e. the commodification objection. After a brief analysis of the background, context, 
and meaning of the differing formulations of the commodification objection, three rebuttals are 
given in response to the commodification objection in favor of CLOD: the first two rebuttals 
applying to the first formulation of the objection and the final rebuttal applying to the second 
formulation of the objection. After these three rebuttals highlight how the commodification 
objection is insufficient as a justifiable argument for the prohibition of CLOD, the final two 
objections from the suppression of altruistic donation and the potential stigma placed on 
compensated donors are analyzed, and it is argued that these are more practical than conceptual 
objections, which also do not provide sufficient moral justification for the prohibition of CLOD. 
4.1) Beneficence and Non-Maleficence  
Many view the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence as two sides of the same 
coin, because these two separate principles are regularly paired together in ethical dialogue due 
to their related natures. In fact, the very notion of a burden to benefit ratio analysis is based off of 
these principles, which is especially relevant regarding the concept of CLOD that inherently 
involves both benefits and burdens. However, given their differing specific focuses and the 
importance of the distinction between seeking benefits and the avoidance of harm in these pro-
CLOD arguments, it is best to treat these two related ethical principles as distinct principles with 
distinct moral obligations, rather than considering them two sides of the same coin with similar 
focuses and obligations. 
4.1.1) The Principle of Beneficence 
The ethical principle of beneficence is derived from the virtue or character trait of 
benevolence, which is the disposition to act in ways that benefit others. Essentially, the principle 
of beneficence holds that one should benefit and perform good acts to and for others. The 
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concept is traditionally associated with terms like charity, kindness, and altruism, but in applied 
ethics it is broadly used “to include effectively all forms of action intended to benefit or promote 
the good of other persons.”491 This principle then imposes an obligation upon individuals to act 
in ways that benefit other people, though this obligation isn’t absolute, and it also includes an 
element of the overall welfare and utility of maximizing good for the greatest number of 
people.492 Depending upon the context, there are differing types of beneficence, such as general, 
specific, obligatory, and ideal.493 General beneficence is beneficence towards strangers and those 
who we do not have emotional relationships with, and specific beneficence is the act of good 
towards those we do have emotional relationships with.494  
The difference between obligatory beneficence and ideal beneficence is a little more 
practically obscure, but theoretically the difference involves the act’s obligation, since as stated 
above the principle does not impose an absolute moral obligation to always benefit others. In 
obligatory beneficence, acts of beneficence are morally imposed and required; whereas, ideal 
beneficence only includes non-obligatory acts of beneficence that are nonetheless virtuous, 
heroic, and noble.495 These acts are generally known as “supererogatory” acts or acts of 
exceptional beneficence, which we talked about in the previous chapter. The line between 
ideal/exceptional beneficence and obligatory beneficence is a point of contention in applied 
ethics, because many disagreements abound in the nature, scope, and limits of our moral 
obligation to benefit others.496 Fortunately, the realm of organ donation is, mostly, devoid of 
such a debate. From the perspective of CLOD and organ donation in general, acts of beneficence 
will either be ideal/general or ideal/specific, depending upon whether or not the donor had an 
emotional relationship with the recipient, though it stands to reason that in most cases of CLOD 
it would be transactions of ideal/general beneficence. 
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Thus, unlike the other arguments from principlism, the argument from beneficence in 
favor of CLOD does not necessarily invoke a moral obligation like the arguments for CLOD 
from autonomy (obligation to respect individual bodily autonomy) and justice (obligation for the 
fair treatment of the poor/rich and sick/healthy alike). But CLOD is ultimately consistent with 
the principle of beneficence by creating many more acts of beneficence via significantly 
increased rates and acts of organ donation and helping others in need, either financially or in the 
manner of health.497 Though financial incentives for live organ donation preclude this type of 
organ donation from being completely altruistic, these acts are still considered good, beneficent 
acts that now benefit both parties rather than just the recipient, i.e. the donor via financial 
compensation and the recipient via a life-saving organ.  
In addition to the empirical evidence of the observable increased rates of organ donation 
in past organ markets, including the legally regulated market in Iran, recent studies also give 
further support to this common sense notion that providing incentives for live kidney donation 
would ultimately increase the number of kidneys donated from live donors. In an attempt to find 
a minimum threshold amount that would constitute a fair payment to significantly incentivize 
live organ donation in the United States, noted economists Gary S. Becker and Julio Jorge Elias 
concluded in a 2007 economics study that payments of roughly $15,200 would increase kidney 
transplants by 44% and payments of $37,600 would increase liver transplants by 67%, though 
larger payments could ultimately attract more donors, while also curbing the demand.498 Of 
course, this study was also completed a decade ago, so the minimum threshold for a fair payment 
might be significantly higher today. Other studies have come up with a less optimistic percentage 
of increase with a significantly smaller payment, though they still corroborate the common sense 
notion that incentives for live donation will ultimately increase donation rates.499 
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Additionally, there are several other practical ways that CLOD promotes and enhances 
beneficence via increased rates of live organ donation, including the reduction of harmful organ 
trafficking and abuse and the much greater long-term survival advantages that transplant 
recipients have over wait-listed dialysis recipients.500 This is because “both patient survival and 
graft survival are inversely [negatively] related to length of time on dialysis.”501 But beyond 
these significant benefits of adopting a system of CLOD, the most significant practical benefit of 
instituting a system of CLOD might be the cost savings that naturally follows its institution. This 
is because the federal government extends Medicare coverage to greater than 90% of Americans 
with kidney failure that need dialysis to survive via the End-Stage Renal Disease Program of the 
Medicare Act of 1972.502 And of the total fee-for-service spending by Medicare in 2014 of 
$435.6 billion, $32.8 billion of that overall total was comprised of fee-for-service spending for 
beneficiaries with end-stage renal disease, which accounts for over 7% of the overall Medicare 
spending.503 And these expenses have been continuously expanding, now accounting for $34 
billion per year for dialysis care, which is a significant portion of Medicare’s overall spending.504 
Understanding this potential for cost savings, Arthur J. Matas and Mark Schnitzler 
decided to analyze the potential for cost savings in a system where the federal government would 
pay financial incentives to live donors. With the cost savings and better quality health outcomes 
associated with quicker transplants compared to long usages of dialysis, Matas and Schnitzler 
found that over a period of 20 years this type of system of CLOD could save the healthcare 
system over $90,000 per transplant patient, along with giving each transplant patient an 
additional 3.5 quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). If society would value this gain in QALYs at 
the same rate of value per QALY on dialysis, this would add an additional $174,740 to the cost-
effectiveness of such a system, meaning the cost-effectiveness of such a system would equate to 
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nearly $270,000 per patient.505 Thus, even if the government would provide incentives in the 
range of $25,000 to $50,000, such as through tax credits, the overall system would still 
significantly benefit financially from CLOD, let alone the numerous other benefits that come 
from increased donation rates and better health outcomes. So though the argument for CLOD 
from beneficence isn’t one of moral obligation, the principle of beneficence certainly supports 
the institution of a regulated system of CLOD and is opposed to any prohibition that would 
significantly limit the overall amounts of beneficence in live organ donation. 
4.1.2) The Principle of Non-Maleficence 
The final principle of principlism is non-maleficence, and it essentially states to “do no 
harm” towards others. Though related to beneficence, non-maleficence is considered a separate 
ethical principle due to the differences in obligation between the two: where there is not always 
an obligation of beneficence towards others, there is always an obligation of non-maleficence 
towards others, though it’s not completely absolute.506 That being said, in the field of healthcare 
non-maleficence and beneficence share an almost intertwined existence due to the nature of 
healthcare usually employing cost-benefit ratios to decide whether or not the cost or harms, i.e. 
non-maleficence, of an intervention are worth the benefits or good results, i.e. beneficence. This 
highlights the fact that some harms can be justified for good results, and this challenges the 
conventional notion of non-maleficence’s priority over beneficence in healthcare.507 This is 
especially relevant for CLOD, because at its core there is a rather distinct cost-benefit analysis 
that weighs the benefits of the act with its likely costs or harms.508  
When it comes to the principle of non-maleficence and CLOD, this principle presents the 
most fascinating relationship with the concept, because it doesn’t necessarily interact directly 
with CLOD as the other principles do. Generally, in the context of organ donation the principle 
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of non-maleficence is associated with the harms inflicted upon the donor during the process of 
donating the organ.509 However, as highlighted in the previous chapter, it is widely accepted that 
the benefits of organ donation greatly outweigh the harms associated with it, and this includes 
cases of CLOD, too.510 So how exactly does the principle of non-maleficence come into play 
with CLOD, and how does it form a moral obligation to accept and not prohibit CLOD legally?  
Well, two main claims have been argued. First, just as was argued from the principle of 
justice previously, some proponents argue that prohibiting CLOD is actually directly harming 
poor populations by disallowing them an opportunity to improve their situation. Robert Veatch 
actually makes this argument explicitly, though he connects this argument more with justice than 
non-maleficence.511 Further, after the Eliot Spitzer prostitution scandal, Martha Nussbaum came 
out with a very similar argument to Veatch’s in favor of prostitution, arguing that “the idea that 
we ought to penalize women with few choices by removing one of the ones they do have is 
grotesque...”512 In an earlier article, she argues that it is short-sighted to “rule off-limits an option 
that may be the only livelihood for many poor women…”513 All else being equal, this argument 
applies equally well to CLOD as to prostitution, because “ruling off-limits” one of the only acts 
that might benefit a poor person’s situation is an inherently harmful act.  
In fact, this notion finds more support in one of the more specific normative rules from 
non-maleficence that Beauchamp and Childress address, specifically the rule of “not depriving 
others of the goods of life.”514 It’s certainly no stretch to assume that paternalistically prohibiting 
poor populations from exercising their bodily autonomy and improving their situation by 
compensated organ donation is a harmful act to these persons that deprives them of at least the 
opportunity to receive the goods of life, especially if we take it a step further, like Veatch, who 
argues that society has already denied these poor populations the goods of life. This argument is 
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bolstered by the fact that the last chapter highlighted why we shouldn’t think that CLOD 
transactions are any more exploitative or unfair than any other regular market transaction that 
these poor populations partake in, meaning avoiding this harm to these populations provides a 
strong moral obligation to oppose any prohibition of CLOD, especially when nothing else will be 
done to aid these populations’ plights anyways. Further, the same can be said about donors 
themselves, too – prohibition of CLOD leads to fewer viable organs for transplantation, which is 
a significant, if indirect, harm caused by prohibition. Not only does this mean fewer kidneys 
available, it means much more time spent on dialysis, which as Sigrid Fry-Revere reminds us in 
her recent book is no picnic. Discussing her friend Steve, Fry-Revere recalls this conversation: 
“So why do you want a transplant?” [I asked] “I feel pretty damn awful, to be honest. I went from 
someone who worked full-time – you know, active runner, skier, etc., etc. – to somebody for 
whom just getting through the day has become a big deal…but I’ve done better than most people 
on dialysis.”…I had to leave, so I started to get up and put on my coat. “Hey, Sigrid,” Steve said 
firmly. When I stopped and turned to him, he stood up with difficulty. He shook my hand, tubes 
dangling from his abdomen. “Dialysis may be better than the alternative, but it’s not a solution.”515 
Thus, significant moral justifications would be required to justify these harms, which as we’ve 
seen so far just are not present or compelling to justify such burdens and harms to people. 
A second and more popular argument is that prohibiting the legal regulation of a system 
of CLOD is actually harmful via the promotion and overall acceptance of underground black 
markets in organs, organ trafficking, and transplant tourism.516 Prohibition of CLOD ultimately 
creates an environment with a high organ demand (and low supply) where black markets and 
organ trafficking can emerge and thrive, as seen in the numerous cases listed in chapter 2 where 
black markets emerged when legislation was enacted. But black markets in organs aren’t just 
affecting individuals in foreign countries. In a 2012 estimate, it was estimated that greater than 
1,000 Americans purchase kidneys illegally annually, and this contributes to the much larger 
overall global black market in kidneys, which is estimated to generate between $600 million and 
$1.2 billion annually.517 Thus, there are good reasons from the obligations of non-maleficence to 
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not prohibit such transactions, of course being contingent on the fact that there are no other 
overriding ethical obligations, which we have yet to come across. This argument is justified by 
the empirical proof provided by the only regulated, legal system of CLOD in the world, i.e. Iran, 
which ultimately eliminated their organ black market, organ trafficking, and transplant tourism 
through heavy regulation of a legal system of CLOD and taking away the need and motivation 
for these practices.518  
Though it’s debatable whether this obligation to prevent harm falls under obligations of 
beneficence or non-maleficence, it is without a doubt an ethical obligation that we are mandated 
to follow, no matter which principle it belongs to. Beauchamp and Childress identify four main 
obligations that are related to the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence: 
1. One ought not to inflict evil or harm. 
2. One ought to prevent evil or harm. 
3. One ought to remove evil or harm. 
4. One ought to do or promote good.519  
They identify the first obligation with non-maleficence and the latter three obligations with 
beneficence. Whatever the case may be, it’s clear that we have a moral obligation to both prevent 
and remove evil or harm from occurring. And since we have empirical proof in the example of 
Iran that the strict regulation of CLOD (rather than its prohibition) can more successfully raise 
the supply to meet the demand decreasing the overall motivation and need for black markets, i.e. 
removing and preventing the evils and harms of black markets in organs, all else being equal we 
have a moral obligation from non-maleficence and/or beneficence to avoid the potential harms of 
black markets and organ trafficking and strictly regulate a legal market to protect recipients and 
donors alike. And even if regulation of a system of CLOD wouldn’t be able to completely 
eradicate black markets and trafficking in organs, it would certainly significantly diminish and 
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minimize these markets and trafficking acts to a bare minimum, which is still in line with our 
moral obligations to remove and prevent potential harms. 
 One needs only to look at the recent example of abortion in America to find more 
empirical proof of this logic. Before the legalization of abortion via Roe v. Wade in 1973, women 
with unwanted pregnancies were driven into “back-alley clinics” to receive clandestine abortion 
services in unsafe conditions, using methods that were highly questionable and dangerous to the 
woman, including: turpentine, bleach, and detergents taken by mouth, toxic solutions squirted 
into the uterus, and foreign objects like coat hangers, knitting needles, bicycle spokes, ball-point 
pens, and even catheters inserted into the vagina. Dr. David A. Grimes describes the impact on 
abortion death numbers after legislation and Roe v. Wade: 
In the year I was born, U.S. vital statistics reported that more than 700 women died from 
abortion. The true number was substantially higher, and the population of the country was 
less than half of that today. In 2010, the most recent year with data available, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention reported 10 deaths from abortion nationwide. Why the 
profound change? The principal reason was the legalization of abortion in America 
[emphasis added]. Childbirth-related deaths have decreased over the decades, but not so 
dramatically. To me, it seems clear: Access to safe, legal abortion saved women’s lives 
[emphasis added].520 
 
Thus, it’s clear that all else being equal, which this dissertation has shown is true thus far with its 
deconstruction of the exploitation objection, the obligations imposed by the principle of non-
maleficence are compatible with a regulated system of CLOD. Further, it’s also clear that 
prohibition is ultimately a violation of the obligations of non-maleficence due to harming 
potential poor donors and unhealthy recipients and creating the necessary conditions and 
environment for the presence of organ black markets, organ trafficking, and transplant tourism to 
exist and flourish. It would then take significant moral justification to forego these moral 
obligations from autonomy, justice, and non-maleficence, let alone the beneficence promoted 
and encouraged by a regulated system of CLOD, and justify prohibition, which leads us into the 
commodification objection. 
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4.2) The Commodification Objection 
Outside of the exploitation objection, the commodification objection is the most 
substantial and popular argument generally utilized in favor of the prohibition of CLOD. Based 
on human dignity and the instrumentalization of the human body and/or person, this objection 
holds that CLOD is a moral harm that society should not tolerate. Relatedly, two other lesser 
objections are commonly associated with the commodification objection, specifically the 
argument from the suppression of altruistic organ donation and the argument from the potential 
stigma placed on donors. Though all of these arguments and objections make certain valid points 
and hold some merit, the remaining sections of this chapter show how these objections ultimately 
fail as a sufficient justification for prohibition when all factors are considered. 
4.2.1) The Background and Context of Commodification 
Though it has been highlighted how practical and effective a regulated model of CLOD 
can be and how even the Iranian model has dealt with the ethical issue of the exploitation of the 
poor via the tremendous work of charities in Iran and their assurances that fair payments and 
contracts are the status quo, one ethical issue that is still readily apparent is the utilization of the 
commodification of the human body that ultimately underlies the entire system.521 In fact, the 
Iranian system takes an extreme form of commodifying the human body, because it essentially 
operates off of dual quid pro quo agreements that directly exchange cash for organs. 
The argument from commodification is essentially based on the very first principle of the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, the principle of human dignity, which 
states: Human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected.522 
Though being a widely utilized concept in ethics and human rights language, the concept of 
human dignity is notoriously ambiguous, and it is difficult to find any unanimous agreement on 
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its true definition. As a practical concept and principle, though, human dignity generally refers to 
the intrinsic value every single human being contains, and this value is an inherent dignity that 
must be unconditionally respected.523 Kishore explains this value and dignity as “an expression 
of the human content of Homo sapiens. It is an expression of the properties or virtues due to 
which a human creature is known as a human being. These are the characteristic or attributes that 
are unique to the human race and not possessed by any other living form.”524 The Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Elaboration of the Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on 
Bioethics actually defines the concept of respect for human dignity as “[flowing] from the 
recognition that all persons have unconditional worth, each having the capacity to determine his 
or her own moral destiny. Showing disrespect to human dignity could lead to the 
instrumentalization of the human person.”525 
This is an ideal that is very prominent in Kantian moral philosophy, because Kant posited 
that humans contain an inherent value that makes us intrinsically valuable. Speaking about 
Kant’s vision of human dignity, James Rachels has the following to say: 
…humans have “an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity,” because they are rational agents - that is, 
free agents capable of making their own decisions, setting their own goals, and guiding their 
conduct by reason [emphasis added]. Because the moral law is the law of reason, rational beings 
are the embodiment of the moral law itself. The only way that moral goodness can exist at all in 
the world is for rational creatures to apprehend what they should do and, acting from a sense of 
duty, do it. This, Kant thought, is the only thing that has “moral worth.” Thus-if there were no 
rational beings, the moral dimension of the world would simply disappear [emphasis added]. 
It makes no sense, therefore, to regard rational beings merely as one kind of valuable thing among 
others. They are the beings for whom mere “things” have value, and they are the beings whose 
conscientious actions have moral worth. So Kant concludes that their value must be absolute, 
and not comparable to the value of anything else [emphasis added]. 
If their value is “beyond all price,” it follows that rational beings must be treated “always as 
an end, and never as a ‘means only.” [emphasis added] This means; on the most superficial 
level, that we have a strict duty of beneficence toward other persons: we must strive to promote 
their welfare; we must respect their rights, avoid harming them, and generally “endeavor, so far as 
we can, to further the ends of others.”  
But Kant’s idea also has a somewhat deeper implication. The beings we are talking about 
are rational beings, and “treating them as ends-in-themselves” means respecting their 
rationality. Thus we may never manipulate people, or use people, to achieve our purposes, 
no matter how good those purposes may be [emphasis added].526 
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Thus, as previously discussed, the second formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative for 
ethical action is to always treat people as ends in themselves and never merely as a means, which 
is an extension and application of respecting human dignity.527 This means that people should 
always be treated as valuable individuals and never merely as a means towards some other end. 
As argued above in the context of exploitation, consensual two-way contracts do not treat the 
compensated organ donor as a mere means in CLOD, because the donor’s intrinsic worth is 
being respected by honoring the terms of the contract, i.e. being compensated, which is the very 
basis of contractual obligations. In terms of exploitation, it’s only treating the donor as a mere 
means if one utilizes coercion, deception, or theft in the process and/or doesn’t offer a fair price. 
However, opponents of CLOD argue that the very nature of providing monetary compensation 
for a person to donate their organ treats that individual merely as a means, i.e. a collection of 
useful parts, rather than a valuable individual that is to be respected wholly, and it ultimately 
changes that individual from a “person” to a “thing.” This process treats individuals merely as a 
means rather than an end in themselves, thus making it an unethical action.528 
This process of turning “persons” into “things” is labeled objectification, and it alters 
bodily parts into commodities.529 A commodity is essentially “anything intended for 
exchange.”530 It can further be described as any object of economic value.531 Thus, the process of 
bodily commodification is to take something with intrinsic value and objectify it, and once it is 
objectified it must be commercialized to give it an exchange value, which allows it to be sold for 
a price. This completes the transition from a “person,” or thing with intrinsic value, to a “thing” 
that is subject to market relations.532 Michael Sandel describes this process as corruption of the 
human person, and he believes it promotes an objectifying and degrading view of the human 
person. He argues that this corruption is caused by adding market relations to a non-market 
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product, so to place the human body in this market situation is to corrupt the very integrity of the 
human person.533  
There are then two argument formulations for the commodification objection. Firstly, it 
can be argued that CLOD encourages a commodification of the human body, which is a moral 
evil wrong enough in itself to justify prohibition. Secondly, and more strongly, it can be argued 
that CLOD encourages a commodification of the human body, and commodifying the human 
body can ultimately lead to and cause a commodification of the human person and violation of 
human dignity, which is intrinsically wrong and should be outright prohibited by the State.534 
Many differing versions of this argument have been put forth, such as Bernard Teo’s formulation 
of the argument when he states: 
...the human body is not like other things. Since human bodiliness is intrinsically tied to human 
personality and identity, it follows that respect for the human person would also be intrinsically 
tied to respect for the human body and its parts. Because human dignity is intrinsically linked to 
human embodiment, treating the body and its parts as commodities would be to strip the human 
body of its proper dignity.535 
Cynthia B. Cohen also gives a version of this argument when she states: 
Human beings ... are of incomparable ethical worth and admit of no equivalent. Each has value 
that is beyond the contingencies of supply and demand or of any other relative estimation. They 
are priceless. Consequently, to sell an integral human body part is to corrupt the very meaning of 
human dignity.536 
By essentially arguing that commodifying the human body and/or person is a moral harm 
that has no place in our society, the commodification objection provides a seemingly serious 
hurdle to the goal of an ethically palatable system of CLOD that should be legally available. 
However, there are serious inconsistencies within both formulations of the objection that raise 
serious questions about its justification for prohibition. These areas of weakness can be 
dismantled by three distinct modes of argument: arguments from liberal political philosophy, 
descriptive arguments of arbitrariness and a lack of consistency, and normative arguments of 
missing distinctions and false comparisons. When these three modes of arguments are combined, 
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it’s readily apparent that objections based on commodifying the human body and/or person are 
inconsistent and not sufficient to support a total prohibition on CLOD. 
4.2.2) Rebuttal One - Mill’s Harm Principle 
The first rebuttal comes from John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy, and it basically 
utilizes his harm principle to argue that even if commodification is a moral harm, the State has 
no authority to prohibit individuals from participating in such a trade. Remember, the harm 
principle states that, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant [emphasis added].”537 Thus, if we take the 
harm principle seriously as a normative guideline for individual freedoms in a liberal society, 
which virtually every modern liberal society does, or at least purports to - though they sometimes 
break it, e.g. helmet mandates for motorcycle riders, then the State has no moral authority to 
prohibit freely chosen CLOD transactions that have been properly consented to. The harm 
principle itself even directly and explicitly rebukes these types of paternalistic prohibitions: 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him 
happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good 
reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating 
him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise 
[emphasis added].538 
Thus, it is perfectly within people’s rights and freedoms in a liberal society to try and 
convince and dissuade another from acting in a certain way that they view to be a “moral harm” 
to themselves, but there is no justification for the State to prohibit acts that do not protect other 
citizens from harm, even if many consider the action to be harmful to the individual partaking in 
it himself. This is due to the harm principle’s allowance of self-regarding harm. As long as the 
harm that someone potentially brings on oneself is self-regarding, doesn’t violate any specific 
duty (such as becoming intoxicated while on police duty), and doesn’t cause perceptible harm to 
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any particular person, then individuals ought to have the liberty to partake in that action, 
according to the harm principle. Even potentially harmful actions that may affect other people 
can be justified under the harm principle, as long as the harm is “through” the individual “in the 
first instance.” For example, while mountain climbing, a climber could fall and become injured, 
which would risk others’ lives and safety in an attempt to save him; however, since this harm 
occurs “through” the individual himself and wasn’t directed at anybody in particular, this is a 
chance and cost that society is willing to pay in order to maximize individual freedoms.539  
Further, Mill believed that this right and application of the harm principle to actions is 
absolute, and any self-regarding action should not be restricted or prohibited by the State.540 His 
belief in the absolute nature of this liberal principle was so fervent that he argued that if “all 
mankind minus one, were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that 
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”541 He even 
explicitly stated this in the last sentence of the fuller passage of the harm principle with a special 
mention of bodily autonomy and freedom of thought, explicitly stating: “The only part of the 
conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the 
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign [emphasis added].”542 Many 
arguments implicitly use this line of reasoning in their pro-CLOD arguments, such as Gill and 
Sade in 2002 when they discuss the “noninterference model” of laws regarding prohibition of 
CLOD.543 Even Alan Wertheimer gives what amounts to be an argument against prohibition of 
blatantly exploitative transactions, which opponents would consider CLOD to be, due to the need 
for the State to respect individual autonomy and the potential of a slippery slope to State 
paternalism, which is directly related to this argument from the harm principle.544 
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However, certain opponents don’t buy this claim. In particular, Cynthia B. Cohen argues 
that the State can and does justifiably prohibit certain actions that cross “certain lines grounded 
in basic social convictions,” regardless of an individual’s bodily autonomy and whether or not it 
affects or harms anyone outside of the individual herself. Using the examples of the certain types 
of prohibition on prostitution, pornography, and Schedule I drugs, such as LSD, cannabis, and 
ecstasy, she argues that we already have laws that prohibit certain types of behaviors, and this is 
justified based upon supposed shared, common values that we hold as a society, which allowed 
these laws to arise in the first place. She states: 
These authors would separate morality and law, retaining morality for the private sphere. 
That an action is morally objectionable, they argue, does not give the state a right to 
interfere with the action, unless it would harm others. But this claim is patently incorrect. 
…there are many laws that restrict the freedom of individuals with regard to uses of their 
own bodies, such as those against the prescription and use of Schedule I drugs, pornography, 
prostitution, and voluntary servitude [emphasis added]. 
Even though we respect the freedom of individuals to do what they want with their bodies, we 
draw certain lines grounded in basic social convictions beyond which we do not give effect to 
their free choices [emphasis added]. These convictions include that the dignity of all human 
beings is to be respected, that the bodies of human beings are a crucial aspect of who they are, that 
to sell human beings or their integral body parts is to violate their dignity as human beings, and 
that it is wrong to allow human beings seriously to damage their own bodies in certain ways. We 
have written such public beliefs into law, even though the contrary beliefs would neither 
interfere with the autonomous self-regarding decisions of individuals nor harm others 
[emphasis added].545 
Using John Rawls’ principle of “public reason,” or what she describes as the “body of generally 
accepted common sense beliefs and ways of reasoning, as well as uncontroversial scientific 
conclusions,” she further argues that the reason we still hold a basic social conviction against the 
legalization of CLOD as a society is due to the fact that nobody has been able to sway this 
“public reason” to a different stance with good arguments from publicly accepted values, beliefs, 
and ways of reasoning. Thus, she argues, CLOD is “contrary to values at the core of our life 
together and should therefore be prohibited.”546 
 There are several problems with this line of argument, but the most egregious is the 
obvious logical fallacy that is being committed here, namely the naturalistic fallacy, otherwise 
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known as the “is-ought problem” or “Hume’s Law.” When using analogical reasoning between 
morality and law, there is a problematic tendency to attempt to justify normative claims in the 
moral sphere by appealing to claims or descriptive facts in the law sphere. However, this is 
problematic due to the differing qualitative natures of the two spheres: where the law sphere is 
descriptive in nature, the moral sphere (at least in the sense that we’re discussing) is normative in 
nature. One cannot claim what ought to be on the basis of what is, just as one cannot justify a 
normative claim by merely appealing to descriptive facts. When Cohen tries to rebuke the harm 
principle as a justification for CLOD by appealing to current American laws that don’t follow 
this principle, including the current legislative prohibition of CLOD, she is committing the 
naturalistic fallacy/Hume’s Law by trying to justify an “ought” merely through an “is,” which is 
logically fallacious. Human beings are fallible, which means that unjust and immoral laws can 
still occur in the real world, but their presence does not justify the underlying unjust and immoral 
sentiment. The example used earlier of helmet mandates for motorcycle riders is a perfect 
example of an unjust law according to the harm principle, just as is the use of “sin taxes” to 
discourage the practice of supposed “vices,” such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, etc. More will 
be discussed about sin taxes in chapter six. 
 To further demonstrate this fallacy, one only needs to look at Mill’s views on these issues 
to show that these laws and Cohen’s argument are not in line with Mill’s liberal political 
philosophy in the first place. On both prostitution and drugs, specifically alcohol, and assumingly 
pornography, as well, Mill was staunchly against any sort of attempt meant to curb individuals 
from partaking in these acts due to “moral” reasons or “basic social convictions,” such as the use 
of “sin taxes” or outright prohibitions. The only time that restrictions or prohibitions could be put 
into place would be to protect others from harm, such as the regulation and policing of liquor 
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establishments or the banning of a harmful drunk from purchasing anymore alcohol, and even 
proactive regulations and rules could be justified to keep harm from others.547 Not 
coincidentally, this same arrangement with proactive regulations is consistent with the thesis of 
this dissertation, and it’s why a regulated rather than open, unregulated market is being argued 
for. Clearly, then, Cohen’s argument is fallacious, inconsistent with the harm principle, and does 
not provide normative evidence against the unjustifiable nature of State prohibition of CLOD 
transactions. 
 But what’s more, Cohen’s use of “public reason” and “basic social conventions” would 
also not sit well with Mill, because that falls right in line with Mill’s worry about the “tyranny of 
the majority.” In a very Nietzschean fashion, Mill’s worries about the tyranny of the majority 
squandering individuality and individual freedoms were very real: 
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, 
or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny 
more formidable than many kinds of political oppression [emphasis added], since, though not 
usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more 
deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the 
tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of 
the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means 
than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from 
them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality 
not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the 
model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with 
individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as 
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism 
[emphasis added].548 
Clearly, then, Cohen’s argument from “public reason” and “basic social conventions” runs 
counter to the normative framework of the harm principle and Mill’s larger political philosophy, 
because if the harm principle is as absolute as Mill contends, then no amount of “public reason” 
or societal agreement upon social conventions can override the absolute authority that the 
individual has over his own body and conscience. Remember, this is the same man who made the 
argument that if “all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, mankind would be no more 
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justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing 
mankind.”549 Thus, it seems fairly uncontroversial at this point to say that State prohibition of 
CLOD is not justified by or compatible with the harm principle, and if we take this normative 
guideline seriously, which virtually every modern liberal State purports to do, then we should 
regulate rather than prohibit CLOD transactions to ensure that the most utility and least amount 
of harm possible occurs. 
4.2.3) Rebuttal Two - Arbitrariness and Inconsistency 
Though the harm principle provides sufficient justification for denying the legitimacy of 
any State prohibition on CLOD, there are further arguments that are even more damning to the 
commodification objection. First, descriptive arguments and analogies can both counter the first 
formulation of the commodification objection and demonstrate how bodily commodification in 
this form is already rampant in our society. For example, the first formulation of the 
commodification objection states that compensated organ donation encourages the 
commodification of human bodies, which is evil enough in itself to justify prohibition. But what 
exactly differentiates the human body, specifically an organ such as the kidney, from other types 
of commodities? There are several different accounts of the process of commodification and 
what distinguishes commodities from non-commodities, but they all generally agree upon certain 
basic components, such as a denial of subjectivity (lacks consciousness; no concern for feelings), 
instrumentality (primarily has instrumental value), and fungibility (replaceable/interchangeable 
with other things, such as money).550 Another expanded account of commodities essentially 
posits these same basic components in differing language: objectification (denial of subjectivity), 
fungibility (interchangeable), commensurability (measurable by a common standard, such as 
money), and money equivalence (ability to be ranked according to dollar/money value).551 Thus, 
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a commodity is then something that is (1) objectified, (2) containing no intrinsic value or 
importance, and (3) interchangeable/exchangeable with other things, such as money. When one 
receives compensation for donating an organ, then, it’s fairly obvious that all three of these 
factors are present, meaning CLOD is most definitely an example of commodification of the 
human body.  
Though the question still remains whether or not this type of bodily commodification is 
necessarily “bad” or “wrong” enough in itself to justify prohibition. One argument against this 
notion is that according to these three basic components of commodification, CLOD fares no 
worse than altruistic live organ donation in this regard. That is, altruism does nothing to change 
the fact that the transplanted organ was (1) objectified, (2) containing no intrinsic value or 
importance, and (3) interchangeable/exchangeable with other things, i.e. the original organ, 
money due to healthcare costs, etc. In fact, these three components are pre-requisites for the very 
possibility of organ transplantation in the first place, meaning altruistic live organ donation 
commodifies the body in a similar way as CLOD. Of course, it can be argued that in altruistic 
donation money isn’t exchanged for the organ, which suggests that it’s categorically different 
from the commodifying act of CLOD due to the close link between commodification and money. 
However, something can still be treated or regarded as a commodity without the actual 
exchange of money, which is justified and proven by the fact that things can be commodified 
whether they’ve been given, bought, or even stolen.552 Further, though it’s true that money 
wasn’t exchanged with the donor herself in altruistic live organ donation, money was still 
certainly exchanged in the process in the form of healthcare and transplantation costs. So 
essentially rather than the donor benefitting financially, wealthy physicians, nurses, hospitals, 
and organ procurement organizations reap the financial benefits from the transaction. Forcing 
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altruistic donation rather than donor-compensated donation then doesn’t mean that money 
doesn’t exchange hands. Rather, it just means that money is exchanged away from the donor 
herself.553 Ultimately, then, altruistic organ donation merely compels a great self-sacrifice on the 
part of the donor in a situation where all other parties benefit in a commercial setting that 
commodifies the human body every bit as much as CLOD.554 
Similarly, it can also be argued that the advances in regenerative medicine pertaining to 
organ regeneration and transplantation will still require a significant commodification of the 
human body in order to function effectively. Specifically in xenotransplantation and tissue 
engineering, though ideally these organ transplants would be autologous, i.e. coming from your 
own cells, after being generated in the lab or a farm animal, the recipient would still essentially 
be purchasing a body part that was custom made for their body. Conceptually, this is akin to 
designing and ordering a custom part for your car online and going to pick it up when it is 
completed, which is certainly a case of blatant bodily commodification. What’s more, being a 
component of individualized medicine, this would be an extremely expensive procedure that 
would involve great cost and effort to create. And just like with both compensated and altruistic 
organ donation, the created organ in the lab and/or farm still is (1) objectified, (2) containing no 
intrinsic value or importance, and (3) interchangeable/exchangeable with other things, i.e. the 
original organ, money due to healthcare costs, etc. Thus, there are good, compelling reasons to 
think that both altruistic organ donation and regenerative medicine transplantation commodify 
the human body in similar ways as CLOD. 
To further defeat this formulation of the commodification objection, it should be noted 
that this type of bodily commodification is also rampant and well-accepted elsewhere in our 
society, which bring us to the arbitrariness problem of the commodification objection. 
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Similar to the same-named problem with the exploitation objection, this problem highlights the 
arbitrary and inconsistent nature with how the commodification objection is applied in this case. 
There are numerous other types of bodily commodification in our society that are not prohibited, 
so it’s arbitrary and inconsistent to only apply this objection to CLOD.  
In fact, many of the more notable objections to CLOD have committed this fallacy, 
including Delmonico et al. in 2015 when they argued against pilot experiments of financial 
incentives for organ donation: 
Proponents of financial incentives claim to be merely seeking pilot programs to test their 
proposals (2,4). However, an experiment that abandons a moral principle—in this case, the 
principle that the human body as such should not be treated as an object of commerce—
cannot preserve that principle [emphasis added].555 
In another instance, in addition to completely ignoring our society’s liberal values and the harm 
principle and advocating for an extremely paternalistic perspective, in 2006 Jha and Chugh 
advocated for an even stricter arbitrary position against CLOD: 
Furthermore, it is imperative that we recognize the immorality of allowing people to do serious 
damage to themselves for the sole purpose of making money [emphasis added].556 
However, as stated above this type of bodily commodification is already rampant and well-
accepted in our society. For example, one of the more well-known cases of bodily 
commodification is the ability to sign up for clinical drug trials for compensation where 
researchers can actually test the effects of certain drugs on the human body – which is pretty 
much a paragon of bodily commodification. They even have dedicated websites for finding these 
types of research studies, even a .gov site, which suggests the government is even actively 
involved already with this same type of bodily commodification. Generally, these well-known 
practices are widely accepted as a “necessary and important” practice for finding new and 
effective medications and treatments to help ailing individuals. In fact, not unlike compensated 
organ donation itself, there is also a level of “volunteerism” and “altruism” associated with this 
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practice, because at its core you are helping others while also helping yourself.557 So how exactly 
is the commodifying act of CLOD any morally different than the commodifying act of paid 
clinical drug trials, which is even much more explicitly bodily commodification than CLOD? 
Another example is the selling of eggs, sperm, and hair. Women regularly sell their eggs 
for thousands of dollars for fertility reasons or embryonic stem cell research.558 In fact, in New 
York women can sell their eggs for research for upwards of $10,000, which is even funded by 
public money, similar to this dissertation’s proposal below.559 In other instances, eggs can be 
sold for up to $50,000 under the right circumstances.560 On the other hand, men can make up to 
$1,500 a month for sperm donations at certain sperm banks.561 And even hair can be sold for 
thousands of dollars when properly cared for.562 Are these not also blatant examples of bodily 
commodification that we regularly accept and partake in already as a society? Of course, it might 
be objected that the commodification of these body products is qualitatively different than the 
commodification of body parts, which we’ll discuss in more detail below. 
One can also look towards dangerous or hazardous occupations and careers for further 
examples of this arbitrariness and inconsistency. For example, on the one hand, the logging 
industry in the United States has around 110.9 fatal injuries per 100,000 people.563 On the other 
hand, recent studies have found that surgical mortality from live kidney donations is 3.1 per 
10,000, which essentially expands to 31 deaths per 100,000, and there is no significant higher 
long-term risk of death in live kidney donors than similar, non-donor individuals in the general 
population.564 If we follow Jha’s and Chugh’s argument and “recognize the immorality of 
allowing people to do serious damage to themselves for the sole purpose of making money,” then 
we should purposefully not allow anyone to be loggers, boxers/fighters, coal miners, or any other 
significantly hazardous occupation for that matter, just like we shouldn’t allow anyone to donate 
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their organ for compensation. But of course this is an absurd, overly paternalistic argument that 
has no basis in reality, especially in our liberalized, pluralistic society that greatly values 
individual consciences and conceptions of the good, because, otherwise, vital functions and 
services that our society relies on wouldn’t be possible, let alone the massive paternalistic efforts 
it would require to undertake this feat in the first place. 
One final example should be noted to cement the issue with this formulation of the 
objection, which involves the bodily commodification inherent within the military, especially as 
it relates to combat. The military and Veteran’s Association take this bodily commodification a 
step further by actually assigning individual “prices” for compensation for bodily injuries or 
amputations that soldiers might have suffered in service of their country. For example, in a piece 
by The Washington Post that discusses a particular soldier’s journey to receive his compensation 
package for his injuries sustained in war, it is stated: 
He would almost certainly be judged 100 percent disabled, entitling him to a minimum monthly 
payment of $2,858. He’d also receive special monthly compensation. “That’s something we pay 
above the basic monthly rates because of your amputations,” Washburn [the benefits counselor] 
said. Special monthly compensation payments vary widely and can be tough to estimate. The loss 
of a single foot, hand or eye is worth $101.50 a month. Two missing legs can generate an 
additional payment of about $1,000-$1,300 a month. Missing arms are worth an extra 
$1,600-$1,800. Washburn passed Shockley a spreadsheet with the categories and rates.565 
Thus, when Dworkin used the analogy of poor individuals joining the army due to 
economic considerations being of equivalent status to poor individuals partaking in CLOD 
transactions due to economic considerations, his analogy was much more accurate than he even 
imagined, because not only are the motivations the same in each scenario, but there is apparently 
even price-to-part bodily commodification in both scenarios.566 And there are many, many more 
examples just like these ones above, which proves that it’s completely inconsistent and arbitrary 
to single out CLOD as an unethical commodification of the human body that should be 
prohibited when we live in a society that has numerous other examples of this very same concept 
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that aren’t prohibited and are even well-accepted and participated in. So when Delmonico et al. 
and others claim that the reason CLOD should be prohibited is because “the body should not be 
treated as an object of commerce,” as with the arbitrariness problem of the exploitation 
objection, this problem shows that this objection is not sufficient to justify prohibition of 
CLOD, because it doesn’t differentiate this act of bodily commodification from other non-
prohibited acts of bodily commodification, which leads us to the second formulation of the 
commodification objection. 
4.2.4) Rebuttal Three - Missing Distinctions and False Analogies 
The second formulation of the commodification objection argues that CLOD encourages 
a commodification of the human body, and commodifying the human body can ultimately lead to 
and cause a commodification of the human person, which is intrinsically wrong and should be 
prohibited. In a sense, though this claim seems stronger than the first formulation, it is also much 
harder to prove. In fact, it necessarily goes beyond merely proving bodily commodification, 
because the presence of bodily commodification does not necessarily entail commodification of 
the human person. The human person is a concept intimately related to, but ultimately distinct 
from, the human body, so there is no necessary connection between the two where 
commodification of the body necessarily entails commodification of the person.567 And 
ultimately, this distinction is why this formulation of the objection can be so easily defeated. 
Recall from earlier the definition given for the concept of respect for human dignity as 
“[flowing] from the recognition that all persons have unconditional worth, each having the 
capacity to determine his or her own moral destiny. Showing disrespect to human dignity could 
lead to the instrumentalization of the human person.”568 Essentially, this bases the concept of 
respect for human dignity on human personhood, which gives humans intrinsic, unconditional 
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worth with the ability to determine our own moral destiny, meaning respecting personhood is the 
requirement for respecting human dignity. 
 Like human dignity itself, the concept of “personhood” is a controversial moral and legal 
concept that has been long debated. However, it has long been utilized in the Western 
philosophical tradition, not legal tradition, to mean any moral agent (human or non-human) that 
possesses both (1) a consistent consciousness and rationality throughout time and (2) the ability 
to formulate ideas and plans with the ability to act out those plans.569 Essentially, this is 
consistent with the Kantian view of human dignity as being inherently connected to the rational 
component of humanity. Remember, James Rachels described Kant’s notion of human dignity as 
being an intrinsic worth that each human contains based upon that very rational agency that sets 
humans apart from other non-rational animals: 
…humans have “an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity,” because they are rational agents - that is, 
free agents capable of making their own decisions, setting their own goals, and guiding their 
conduct by reason [emphasis added]. Because the moral law is the law of reason, rational beings 
are the embodiment of the moral law itself. The only way that moral goodness can exist at all in 
the world is for rational creatures to apprehend what they should do and, acting from a sense of 
duty, do it. This, Kant thought, is the only thing that has “moral worth.” Thus-if there were no 
rational beings, the moral dimension of the world would simply disappear [emphasis added]. 
But Kant’s idea also has a somewhat deeper implication. The beings we are talking about 
are rational beings, and “treating them as ends-in-themselves” means respecting their 
rationality. Thus we may never manipulate people, or use people, to achieve our purposes, 
no matter how good those purposes may be [emphasis added].570 
In essence, then, respecting human dignity is equal to respecting the human person, which, in 
turn, is equal to respecting the rational nature and component of humanity, or in Kantian terms – 
always treating the individual as an end in themselves and never merely as a means. 
So this raises a twofold question. First, as already answered in a positive manner, does 
CLOD commodify the human body? Yes. Second, does that commodification of the human body 
lead to and cause a commodification of the human person? It’s not obvious why this would be 
true. As mentioned above, though they’re intimately connected in many ways, the human 
person/self and the human body are two distinct concepts/entities. For example, if an individual’s 
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hand is removed, then the human body loses an important part of itself; however, the human 
person is still intact and not significantly impacted. On the other hand, no pun intended, if an 
individual’s heart or brain is removed, then both the human body and the human person lose an 
integral part of themselves, since both the heart and the brain are needed for the human body to 
function and for the consciousness and rationality requirement of human personhood.  
These bodily parts’ differing qualitative associations with human personhood are due to 
the “conceptual distances” between the concept of personhood and the necessity of that 
particular body part for the existence of personhood. For example, the hand is much more 
“conceptually distant” from personhood than the heart or the brain, which are both necessary for 
the consciousness and rationality requirement of human personhood and human dignity. When 
discussing the kidney in particular, it is clear that it is extremely “conceptually distant” from the 
notion of human personhood, because humans were granted two kidneys when we really only 
need one for effective survival. Mark Cherry puts this notion best when he writes: 
Even if sales that would necessarily involve a loss of life are ruled out, if the self is different from 
the organs that are separable and distinguishable from the self, though the self may not sell some 
organs, it may sell others [emphasis added]. Just as one only requires sufficient food and 
medicine to sustain life, rather than any particular serving of food or dose of medicine, of those 
body parts that are both distinguishable and separable from the self, one only requires a 
sufficient set of body parts, rather than any particular parts or replacements, to sustain the 
biological life that in turn sustains personal life and consciousness [emphasis added].571 
Of course, it might be objected that even if personhood as a whole is not lost, it could be 
that a significant “piece” of the person is lost by losing something as important to human 
flourishing and functioning as a hand, limb, eye, etc. And this is actually the mode of argument 
for many objections to CLOD, specifically those that want to draw a distinction between selling 
certain body products, such as hair, blood, sperm, and eggs, and selling body parts. Some 
arguments claim that the “uniqueness and irreplaceability” of body parts, such as kidneys, 
compared to the common and replaceable body products makes body parts qualitatively different 
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than body products, and to sell these things would be to lose something “unique and 
irreplaceable” to the human person.572 Others, like Cohen, make a different claim from the 
Kantian notion of human dignity. Cohen claims that our bodies are intrinsically related to our 
human dignity, but certain “integral” parts of the human body, such as our kidneys, are much 
more closely related to our dignity than others, such as our hair. She argues that: 
Human kidneys are qualitatively different sorts of human bits and pieces from human hair, 
for they sustain life [emphasis added]. Hair, in contrast, serves mainly as personal adornment. 
The preservation of life is a greater value than that of exterior beautification. Kidneys, 
consequently, are ethically more significant to us than human hair. Yet the reason that we reject 
the sale of human kidneys cannot be that we think it wrong to sell something that can be used to 
keep people alive…The reason we are reluctant to exchange money for human kidneys is that 
this would deny something distinctly valuable about human beings — their human dignity 
and worth [emphasis added].  
Although ours is a pluralistic society, a basic ethical premise that underlies and allows this 
pluralism is that human beings have a certain dignity and worth. We are not disembodied beings, 
but complex combinations of intellect, emotion, appetite, spirit, and body. Our body has 
special value because it is the medium through which we express ourselves. Thus, our special 
value as human beings extends to our bodies. Yet it does not extend to all parts of our bodies. 
We do not ordinarily consider that hair, spit, or fingernail parings carry human dignity and 
worth, for these generally function as inessential human bits and pieces unrelated to what it 
is that makes human beings of special value. It is those parts of the body that are integral to 
the functioning of human beings, such as kidneys, livers, brains, hearts, and eyes, that we 
take to bear special dignity and worth because of their role. When we or our integral body 
parts are sold, our dignity as human beings is denied [emphasis added].573 
She goes on to further state that: 
This argument against selling human organs seems to contradict the view so closely associated 
with Kant that we ought to respect the autonomous choices of individual human beings. If people 
freely and rationally choose to sell parts of their bodies, some might argue, they should be allowed 
to do so. How does this putatively Kantian position square with his view that it is ethically wrong 
for the human community to allow its members to sell body parts? 
Since the body is the medium through which the whole person acts, its integrity is essential 
to Kant’s view of autonomy. Respect for autonomy entails respect for the fullness of the 
person, including our bodies. To sell an integral part of ourselves is to misuse our autonomy 
in the same way that selling ourselves into slavery does so [emphasis added]. Autonomy is an 
important ethical limit, but is itself limited in scope and weight. It meets one of its limits when the 
sale of human body parts is at issue. Even though we respect the freedom of individuals to do what 
they want with their lives, we draw certain lines based on human dignity beyond which we do not 
give effect to their free choices.574 
Though it has already been shown how Cohen’s arguments regarding State limitations 
upon individual autonomy and freedoms through paternalistic means are faulty arguments, which 
she repeats here, this analysis suffers from another flawed premise that ultimately cripples the 
entire argument, specifically the premise that the single kidney is an “integral” part of the human 
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body, human person, and/or human functioning. The word “integral” is defined as “necessary to 
make a whole complete; essential or fundamental.” Now, Cohen could mean two separate things 
here. First, she could mean that the kidneys are a fundamental part of the human body that would 
constitute normalcy and make the body complete, or at least the normal, idealized human body 
with all of its parts and no defects. However, this wouldn’t make sense, because hair, blood, 
fingernails, and the other types of body products that she qualitatively distinguishes from body 
parts are also fundamental parts of the normal, idealized human body that also play significant 
roles in our body’s functioning. 
Thus, Cohen clearly means “integral” in the second sense focusing on the “essential” 
component of the term. She even uses this language in the quote above:  
We do not ordinarily consider that hair, spit, or fingernail parings carry human dignity and worth, 
for these generally function as inessential human bits and pieces unrelated to what it is that 
makes human beings of special value [emphasis added]. It is those parts of the body that are 
integral to the functioning of human beings [emphasis added], such as kidneys, livers, brains, 
hearts, and eyes, that we take to bear special dignity and worth because of their role.575 
Cohen is then saying that kidneys play a much more essential role to the functioning of human 
beings than hair, spit, fingernails, and other bodily products, which makes these body parts much 
more connected and related to our human dignity than other bodily products, so to try and sell 
these parts would be to violate our human dignity because of these parts’ special role in 
maintaining our human dignity. This is without a doubt correct regarding the essential role of 
kidneys and their greater moral status. The filtration and blood pressure functions of kidneys are 
absolutely essential to human life, and certainly they have a greater moral status than lesser body 
products like hair and spit. Yet the problem with extending this argument to CLOD is twofold. 
First, by focusing on the function of the kidney and its role in human functioning, and 
even the liver for that matter, the argument does not apply to organ donation, either altruistic or 
compensated, since the functioning role of the kidneys is not affected by removing one of the two 
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kidneys, or even a part of the liver. As has been pointed out throughout the dissertation thus far, 
live kidney and liver donations are safe and effective procedures with very minimal to no long-
term side effects, meaning the functioning of the remaining kidney and liver is not affected by 
donation. In fact, “a single kidney with only 75 percent of its functional capacity can sustain life 
very well,” and a single kidney will actually grow and adjust to filter as much as two kidneys 
normally would in the absence of the second kidney.576 Thus, if one of an individual’s kidneys 
stopped functioning, then the other would make up for its absence in functionality, which just 
highlights the fact that a single kidney of a human pair is not necessarily integral or essential to 
human functioning. Of course, removing both kidneys or all of the liver would be consistent with 
Cohen’s thesis, but that is not what is in question or in focus here. Since the functioning of the 
remaining kidney and liver is not affected by donation of a single kidney or lobe of a liver, then 
by Cohen’s own logic, these specific body parts, i.e. the single donated kidney and the lobe of 
the liver that is donated, are not integral or essential to human functioning, meaning human 
dignity is not affected by this type of organ donation. 
Cohen foresees this problem and tries to hedge this objection with a rather peculiar 
argument that amounts to an invalid analogical argument with a faulty premise. Using blood as a 
body product that she’s trying to qualitatively distinguish from an “integral” body part like the 
kidney, she makes this analogy (incorrectly) between the two: 
...the blood taken from a donor and the kidney taken from a donor differ in their importance with 
respect to the donor’s bodily functioning. Although the whole stream of blood is integral to 
human functioning, a pint of it is not. A person can function physically even though missing 
one pint. Two kidneys are integral to bodily functioning when both are a part of the human 
body, yet a person can function with only one if need be. However, a kidney is not like an 
appendix. To remove one is to extract a discrete part of a person that up to the point of 
removal had been integral to human functioning [emphasis added]. Consequently, although 
blood and kidneys are “both physical necessities,” a kidney seems more significant for human 
bodily functioning than a pint of blood.577 
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Cohen argues that even though humans can function with only one kidney, when both are present 
in the body they are both “integral” parts of the human body that are essential to human 
functioning. But, once again, this just simply is not accurate, and it certainly is not consistent 
with the terms “integral” and “essential.” The word “essential” is defined as “absolutely 
necessary; extremely important.” But as discussed above, if one kidney would suddenly stop 
functioning, then the other kidney would grow to compensate for this issue and continue the 
overall process of kidney functioning, with a similar process occurring in minor liver damage. 
Clearly, then, a single kidney is not “absolutely necessary” to human functioning. 
 What’s more, to try and distinguish between blood and the kidneys, and even the liver, in 
this regard is peculiar and self-defeating, because it only seems to prove this point even further. 
Cohen argues that though blood as a whole is integral to human functioning, a pint of it is not, 
and a person can still function without that pint of blood. But can’t the exact same thing be said 
about a kidney? “Though kidneys as a whole are integral to human functioning, a single kidney 
is not, and a person can still function without that single kidney.” And the exact same argument 
can be made about the liver, too, due to its regenerative qualities. Thus, Cohen ultimately 
undermines her own argument here, because due to the compensatory and regenerative natures of 
the kidneys and liver, in terms of removal and transplantation these body parts are more akin to 
body products that are not “unique and irreplaceable,” meaning they’re also not “integral” or 
essential to human functioning in a way that would preclude them from being justifiably put on 
the market and in violation of human dignity. 
Second, similar to the argument above in the second rebuttal, it can also be objected that 
by Cohen’s logic CLOD is no different than altruistic organ donation in this regard, because both 
acts involve losing an “integral” or essential body part, which is contrary to human dignity. 
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Though admitting Kant does not specifically address this issue and that he’s rather inconsistent 
in his arguments in this regard, Cohen still tries to justify this distinction by arguing that: 
Although he is not always internally consistent, and sometimes says that human beings should not 
sell minor parts of themselves such as fingers, he seems to distinguish between body parts that 
are integral to physical functioning, such as testicles, and those that are not, such as hair. 
Thus, he allows circumcision, and indicates that a limb that is not essential to bodily 
functioning can be amputated to save one’s life. His point is not that because it violates 
human dignity to sell the human body, we should not sell its parts. It is that parts of the 
human body ordinarily required for normal biological functioning just are the person and 
cannot be given a sale price without impugning the dignity of the person [emphasis added]. 
Munzer also reads Kant as declaring that it is those parts of the body that are integral to the human 
being that share in his or her dignity, saying that in Kant “the emphasis lies on the integration—
the “togetherness”—of the various parts of the body that make up the entire organism. To sell 
anything that is integral to that organism impairs humanity and dignity [emphasis added].”  
Kant, contrary to Gill and Sade, probably would accept the donation of a kidney as moral, even 
though before and at the point of donation it contributes in essential ways to our ability to act in 
the world as embodied selves. Such donation would not destroy integral human functioning, 
for, once removed, the other kidney would take over kidney function. The donation of a 
kidney can be taken to uphold human dignity just because this would allow the donor to 
share something of him- or herself as a gift to another member of the realm of ends and yet 
would not destroy human functioning. Donation is a gesture of altruism and of solidarity 
with other human beings. It is the sale of a kidney, however, to which Kant would object 
because, at the time of donation, the kidney is essential to the person. It is not a mere 
appendage. To put a price on a human being in this way would be to deny embodied human 
dignity [emphasis added].578 
But once again, this argument isn’t really putting forth any serious analysis by relying on this 
faulty premise of a single kidney being an “integral” and essential part of human functioning. 
Cohen further fails to effectively distinguish how altruistic organ donation is qualitatively 
different than CLOD in this regard, and she tries to justify this faulty distinction merely by the 
presence of pure altruism in the former case. But as argued previously in this chapter, at worst 
CLOD transactions will generally have mixed motivations, including motives of altruism and 
charity, and these transactions are still considered beneficent actions that significantly help other 
people. Even certain opponents of CLOD recognize that the vast majority of CLOD participants 
will have mixed motivations that include altruistic motives.579 And there’s even evidence from 
Iran that charity, altruism, and aiding others is almost always a motivating factor in the decision 
to donate an organ for compensation.580  
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So it’s not in any way clear why a pure altruistic donation would justify such a blatant 
violation of human dignity, in Cohen’s words, any more than a partly altruistic donation would. 
Both altruistic and compensated organ donation would be acts of ideal beneficence that are not 
morally obligatory, so they both would be virtuous, beneficent supererogatory moral acts. Cohen 
doesn’t provide a compelling reason to justify this distinction, because, in her own words, “at the 
time of donation, the kidney is essential to the person” in both altruistic and compensated organ 
donation, which I showed is a faulty premise above. Clearly, then, there’s no compelling reason 
to think that the fact that one act of donation has purely altruistic motives compared to mixed 
motives of altruism and self-interest in the other act of donation is sufficient to justify and 
warrant such a blatant violation of human dignity, as Cohen would label it. 
It then seems clear that this notion that the kidney and liver are so inherently associated 
with human functioning and dignity that compensated donation would constitute an assault on 
human dignity is fallacious, because the single kidney and donated part of the liver are neither 
integral nor essential for human functioning, as evidenced by the effectiveness and safety of live 
kidney and liver donations in the first place. And even if we did accept this faulty premise as 
true, it would still not be able to qualitatively distinguish between altruistic and compensated 
organ donation, making them both assaults on human dignity, which is obviously a 
counterintuitive claim that we should not accept. And finally, this fallacious argument also 
illuminates why the distinction between body products and body parts, at least regarding the 
single kidney and part of the liver, and the “uniqueness and irreplaceability” argument are not 
relevant here, because due to the compensatory and regenerative nature of these body parts, these 
body parts are neither “integral” nor essential for human functioning, meaning their removal and 
placement on the market violates neither human personhood nor human dignity.  
 198 
 
The commodification objection then fails to give a compelling and sufficient justification 
for the prohibition of CLOD in our liberal society. However, there are still two other minor 
objections that must be addressed before moving on: the potential stigmatization of compensated 
donors and the potential suppression of altruistic organ donation. First, there is some scattered 
evidence that compensated donors have been stigmatized in their respective societies after 
donating a kidney for compensation, which has made it difficult to keep in touch with these 
donors and give them the proper follow-up care. This stigma then sticks with these individuals, 
and it can harm their reputation and ability to do certain things later on in life, such as be hired at 
a certain place of employment. Second, there is also some evidence that the presence and 
allowance of CLOD might have a suppression effect on altruistic organ donation, especially for 
family members, as they would rather purchase an organ for a loved one rather than donate one 
themselves.581 Relatedly, some claim that the allowance of CLOD might actually decrease the 
total overall number of organs donated due to fewer altruistic donations.582 Opponents of CLOD 
then suggest that these potential issues are significant enough to justify a continued prohibition. 
Obviously, these issues are more practical in nature than conceptual, which ultimately 
makes them much easier to deal with. Regarding the potential stigmatization of donors, even if 
this stigmatization of donors was severe and significantly affected donors who participated in 
CLOD transactions, it seems fairly uncontroversial that this would still be insufficient 
justification for prohibition of CLOD. In American society, differing populations place various 
different stigmas on various different practices, such as abortion, selling sperm and eggs, 
stripping, drinking alcohol, smoking tobacco, etc., yet we don’t believe that these things should 
be prohibited due to these stigmas. Once again, this is due to our society’s acceptance of classical 
liberalism, especially the harm principle and moral/value pluralism. We believe that individual 
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autonomy and conscience is a precious right that should not be infringed upon, or at least as little 
as possible, and as long as a practice does not impede upon the rights or autonomy of others, then 
we should have the right and ability to partake in such an action, though that doesn’t mean others 
can’t criticize us for those actions, as discussed above in the first rebuttal. 
Furthermore, virtually all of the evidence that supports this claim of donor stigma comes 
from places where CLOD is prohibited, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, 
etc., meaning most of this evidence is coming from black markets in organs and organ trafficking 
victims, which isn’t surprising. In fact, even the evidence that supports this claim from Iran 
comes from Zargooshi, which as I discussed earlier is a very problematic source for the Iranian 
model due to his research occurring before the modernization of the current system in Iran when 
it was essentially an open, unregulated market in organs. More recent studies even contradict 
Zargooshi’s data and detail a very high satisfaction rate among donors who would recommend 
donating a kidney for compensation, which is a far cry from this supposed stigma that is placed 
on compensated donors.583 Most likely the reason for this divergence and change in attitude is 
the normalization of the practice in Iran. Since CLOD was brought out from the shadows, 
regulated, streamlined, and promoted as a societal good, no longer is a stigma attached to this 
practice, though of course certain subpopulations may still practice this stigmatization of 
compensated donors. Though certain conservative circles in America still hold this belief today, 
abortion largely followed this same path, and it has become normalized as an acceptable practice 
today. The potential stigmatization of donors is then clearly an insufficient justification for 
prohibition of CLOD, and more than likely once the practice was normalized in our society, no 
widespread stigma would be attached to compensated donors, though surely there will always be 
certain groups and ideologies that disagree with the practice. 
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As for the suppression of altruistic organ donation, this is also another practical issue, 
though some want to make it a conceptual issue unnecessarily. First, it should be noted that any 
concerns about the institution of a regulated system of CLOD actually reducing the number of 
organs donated are greatly misplaced, because there is significant empirical evidence that 
demonstrates the effectiveness of financial incentives for increasing organ donation rates. 
Second, it’s also unclear how great of a concern the potential suppression of altruistic organ 
donation really is. Many don’t buy this as a serious, legitimate issue against CLOD, even certain 
opponents of CLOD: 
As regards the first worry, it seems that there's no compelling reason to believe that organ sale 
would undermine the practice of free donation. After all, professional social work and charitable 
social work co-exist. Also, if organ sale led to a significant overall increase in the supply of 
organs, this would more than compensate for the reduced number of free organs. But in any case, 
it is far from clear that there is a significant practice of free donation to be undermined. As Harvey 
points out, "it is doubtful that there is a great number of willing, non-related potential organ-
donors who will give without payment". Given the high level of pain and risk involved, free 
donation (except by relatives, who might well waive the fee, if it were offered) is very unlikely to 
take place anyway.584 
And this brings up another question – what is the ultimate purpose of organ donation? If 
altruistic organ donations fell off completely with the institution of a regulated system of CLOD, 
yet the organ donation rates were still much higher, would it still be justified to continue 
practicing CLOD with its suppression of altruistic organ donation? The answer is a resounding 
yes! The purpose of organ donation is to help people and to save lives, and concerns about the 
altruistic motivations of the donors only come secondary to this primary concern. Further, as 
stated several times in this chapter, CLOD transactions are ultimately beneficent actions that 
involve a significant level of altruism already, so there is still a significant amount of moral good 
and altruism being displayed and enacted in such a system, especially if the donation rates were 
significantly increased. So just as with the stigmatization argument, the potential suppression of 
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altruistic organ donation is not a sufficient justification for prohibition of CLOD, and ultimately 
it’s more than likely a worry that is more theoretically based than practically based. 
To wrap up this chapter, given the facts that (1) altruistic live kidney donation and 
regenerative medicine transplantation has been argued to be just as commodifying of the human 
body as CLOD; (2) our society already allows and promotes several different practices that 
commodify the human body just as much as, if not more than, CLOD; (3) CLOD does not 
significantly affect the functioning of the human body; and (4) CLOD does not lead to the 
commodification of the human person or violation of human dignity, it is clear that CLOD is not 
significantly different than altruistic live kidney donation, regenerative medicine transplantation, 
or other accepted practices in our society with regard to the commodification of the human body 
and person. And if CLOD is not significantly different than these other practices in this regard, 
yet we allow these other practices without prohibition, then there is no justifiable reason that 
CLOD is prohibited by law while these other practices are accepted and promoted. 
Thus, there are significant practical and moral reasons to support the lifting of the 
paternalistic prohibition on CLOD in the United States and advocate for the institution of a 
regulated market of CLOD to more effectively serve our organ transplantation needs. The last 
two chapters have been dedicated to the moral arguments for and against CLOD, so it is prudent 
to review the moral conclusions that we’ve come to during this time before moving on to the 
next chapter and cadaveric organ donation: 
 Due to the promise of regenerative medicine alleviating the organ crisis in the near 
future, we have a significant moral obligation to investigate the possibility of and 
allow the practice of CLOD if an ethically palatable system of CLOD can be 
developed. It is unjustifiably discriminatory and prejudiced against non-moral 
properties in individuals to deny an ethically palatable system for morally 
paternalistic reasons that does not protect others from harm. 
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 We have significant moral obligations from the principles of autonomy, justice, and 
non-maleficence to oppose any prohibition of CLOD and support a regulated market. 
o We have good moral reasons from the principle of beneficence to oppose any 
prohibition of CLOD and support a regulated market. 
 In a regulated market with a set, fair price paid to donors, exploitation of poor donors 
from unfair prices and being unfairly taken advantage of can be avoided. 
 The allowance of CLOD is autonomy-enhancing, not autonomy-undermining. 
 The exploitation objection from constrained choice-sets cannot adequately distinguish 
CLOD transactions from other market transactions. Thus, it is insufficient as 
justification for prohibition of CLOD and relies upon the commodification objection 
to ultimately succeed. 
 Our society’s acceptance of classical liberalism and the harm principle voids the 
commodification objection as a valid argument for the prohibition of CLOD. 
 The first formulation of the commodification objection cannot adequately distinguish 
CLOD transactions from the various other forms of bodily commodification that our 
society accepts and does not prohibit. Thus, it is insufficient as justification for 
prohibition of CLOD. 
 The second formulation of the commodification objection is not a sound logical 
argument. Thus, it is does not provide justification for prohibition of CLOD. 
 The arguments from stigmatization of donors and suppression of altruistic organ 
donation are practical arguments that are not sufficient as justification for prohibition 
of CLOD. 
 Therefore, the current prohibition on CLOD in the United States is practically ill-
advised, morally inappropriate, and unjustifiably paternalistic. 
Of course, this doesn’t mean that we should outright follow the Iranian model of extreme 
bodily commodification either, because perception matters in developing an ethically palatable 
system of CLOD in a multicultural, liberal society such as the United States. As I’ll discuss in 
chapter six, using an alternative route of compensation and couching it in the language of tax 
benefits is much more palatable than a market with quid pro quo exchanges of cash for organs. 
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But this isn’t to say that within our liberal society with autonomy-based ownership rights over 
our bodies that we don’t have the fundamental individual rights to subject ourselves and our 
bodies to that type of commodification should we so choose. At this point, it should be clear that 
even if CLOD did represent some sort of bodily commodification that led to commodification of 
the human person, the harm principle grants sovereignty over individuals’ bodies to the 
individuals themselves, meaning combined with the plethora of other similar types of bodily 
commodifying actions in our society, there would be no political or moral justification for 
prohibition of such a practice in a liberal society. However, with the addition of the ethical 
justification that strikes down the second formulation of the commodification objection, it is 
more than clear that there is absolutely no justification for prohibition on CLOD within the 
United States, and we should strive to minimize and regulate commodification rather than 
prohibit it. Once again, Cherry sums this issue up the best by stating: 
Commodification of human organs is not an obvious violation of the Kantian maxim to treat 
persons as ends in themselves absent additional arguments showing that even consensual selling of 
organs is morally injurious. The organ market respects vendors as persons and moral agents. 
Prohibition, in contrast, may demean the poor by considering them unable to make moral 
decisions about their own fates.585 
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Chapter 5 - Cadaveric, Imminent Death, and Other Organ Donation Proposals 
 Though thus far the dissertation has focused primarily on making the moral justification 
for CLOD, this chapter switches focuses and discusses some other potential proposals to increase 
organ donation rates. Specifically, this chapter will examine the ethics behind several differing 
cadaveric organ donation consent systems, including systems of opt-in, explicit consent, opt-out, 
presumed consent, and mandated choice, along with several other proposals that don’t 
necessarily belong to either of the categories of live organ donation or cadaveric organ donation. 
One such proposal focuses on harvesting organs from those patients near the end of life who 
have decided to withdraw life-sustaining treatment and let nature take its course, and these 
potential donors are designated as Life Support Withdrawal Donors (LSW Donors).586 In a 
general sense, the use of LSW Donors to increase organ donation rates can be labeled as 
Imminent Death Organ Donation (IDOD). Recently, the joint ethics committee for the Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) and United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS) has debated the potential use of certain variations of IDOD within organ procurement 
organizations across the country. However, the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee concluded in 
March of 2016 that there was not sufficient justification for further pursuing IDOD at this time 
due to a major concern of harming the public perception of organ donation.587  
This chapter ethically analyzes these various different cadaveric organ donation consent 
systems and proposals to increase organ donation rates, and each system and proposal is 
deliberated upon to decide whether or not it should have a role in any revamped system of organ 
donation and transplantation in the United States. The chapter begins by looking at the three 
main differing consent systems used for cadaveric organ donation across the globe, and it is 
argued that a mandated choice consent system combines the practical effectiveness of opt-out, 
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presumed consent systems with the ethicality and focus on autonomy that comes with opt-in, 
explicit consent systems. Next, the chapter transitions to the ethical analysis of IDOD, and it is 
argued that while one variation of IDOD certainly is unethical and can damage the public 
perception of organ donation, there is a variation that does not fit this bill and should be actively 
promoted and encouraged as a legitimate source for harvesting viable organs for transplantation. 
Finally, the chapter ends by looking at several alternative proposals related to IDOD, and each 
proposal is analyzed and judged for its practicality, ethicality, and status for implementation. 
5.1) Present and Past Cadaveric Systems: Ethicality     
Traditionally, two differing types of consent systems have dominated the debate 
surrounding consent processes in cadaveric organ donation – opt-in, explicit consent systems and 
opt-out, presumed consent systems. Each system has its particular strengths, particularly the 
focus and respect for individual autonomy in opt-in, explicit consent systems and the practicality 
and increased organ donation rates associated with opt-out, presumed consent systems. However, 
a newer type of consent system has become popularized in recent years that seemingly combines 
the strengths of the two standard systems without their weaknesses – mandated choice. 
5.1.1) Opt-In, Explicit Consent 
The opt-in, explicit consent system is the traditional consent model for cadaveric organ 
donation, and this type of consent system is generally considered the ethical “gold standard” of 
consent systems. This is because this type of consent system is essentially a donation model that 
provides the most amount of respect for the principle of individual autonomy, which is extremely 
important in individualistic societies like the United States and other states heavily influenced by 
Protestant individualism, such as Germany, most of the United Kingdom, and Canada. This 
deontological notion of freedom and autonomous decision-making with what happens to one’s 
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body after death is of utmost importance to many Americans, and this consent system has 
generally been considered the most efficient system of respecting individual autonomy, even if 
sometimes it doesn’t “catch” individuals that would’ve been donors.588  
However, though opt-in, explicit consent systems are considered the ethical “gold 
standard” option for national systems of cadaveric organ donation, this ethical benefit must be 
weighed against the practical realities – this system is rather inefficient at procuring organs and 
consent from potential donors. As detailed in chapter two, compared to opt-out, presumed 
consent systems, it is evident that opt-in, explicit consent systems are at a significant 
disadvantage in effectively producing high organ donation consent rates.589 And not only is this a 
practical concern, but ethically-speaking this represents a substantial decrease in acts of 
beneficence and good will towards others, since organ donation is an extremely beneficent act 
that is in the supererogatory moral category. There is also a concern from non-maleficence here, 
because as detailed last chapter we have obligations from non-maleficence to prevent and 
remove evil or harm from occurring.590 So it might be argued that since we know that opt-in, 
explicit consent systems are not nearly as effective as opt-out, presumed consent systems, we are 
allowing many more people to suffer on dialysis and ultimately die from not receiving an organ, 
which is something that we have a moral obligation to prevent or remove from happening. 
Finally, there is also another potential ethical issue that pervades both opt-in and opt-out 
systems, which is family consent. In both types of systems, it is unethical to limit the family’s 
decision-making ability when they have clear and objective evidence of what the deceased would 
have wanted, both to donate and not to donate. Generally, this is only seen in legislation within 
Austria’s hard opt-out format, even though it practically hasn’t been enforced.591 But whatever 
 210 
 
the case may be, if the family truly knows the deceased’s preferences and has clear evidence to 
support their claims, then legislation shouldn’t be able to hinder their involvement.   
5.1.2) Opt-Out, Presumed Consent 
Primarily, though, the ethical issues generally revolve around the notion of “presumed 
consent” within opt-out systems. Even though opt-out, presumed consent systems have been 
much more effective at increasing organ donation rates than opt-in, explicit consent systems, it 
has been vehemently argued that an opt-out system, and the overall notion of “presumed 
consent,” violates the ethical principles of autonomy and informed consent, because there is no 
express, written consent given for organ donation, only “presumed” consent based on a failure of 
individuals to express an objection to organ donation. Further, some have argued that most 
systems of “presumed consent” are ultimately nothing more than paternalistic systems of routine 
organ salvaging, as argued by Robert Veatch and Lainie Ross recently: 
Even if one is not categorically opposed to taking organs without consent, there is good reason to 
object to policies labeled “presumed consent.” The term has the appearance of a desperate attempt 
to hold on to the model of consent and donation by using the language of consent for what is really 
a policy of routine salvaging, that is, taking organs without consent. It is simply dishonest to claim 
that we can presume that someone would consent when the empirical evidence shows that 
presumption would be wrong as much as half the time. It dresses the salvaging in the flimsy outer 
garb of the consent doctrine. Instead, if one favors salvaging, it is far better to admit it openly.592  
They go on further to distinguish between true “presumed consent” laws and those laws that are 
simply disguised forms of paternalistic routine organ salvaging by the State: 
The problem with “presumed consent” is that, with a few exceptions, the existing laws never 
actually claim to presume consent, nor can they rightly be said to do so. They simply authorize the 
state’s taking of the organs without explicit permission. It therefore seems wrong to call them 
presumed consent laws. They are, in effect, routine salvaging laws.593 
Thus, where opt-in systems more closely align with the ethical principles of personal 
autonomy and expressly informed consent, due to involving an active informed decision about 
whether or not one wants to donate their organs upon death, opt-out systems align more with the 
principles of justice and beneficence, due to the increased rates of beneficent acts and the focus 
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on society’s needs over the individual.594 Veatch and Ross directly make this connection between 
the underlying political philosophies of certain States and their respective consent policies for 
cadaveric organ donation. For example, in most classically liberal Western societies and/or 
societies deeply influenced by Protestant individualism where the individual is the primary moral 
agent over the community, such as the United States, opt-in, explicit consent systems are the 
norm, because there’s a general societal agreement that the State needs individual consent to use 
individuals, or their bodies, in certain ways. On the other hand, in more communitarian, socialist, 
and/or Catholic societies where a focus on the individual is less robust in favor of the common 
good, such as many countries in Southern Europe, Scandinavia, and South America, opt-out, 
presumed consent systems are the norm, because it is accepted that the State or community might 
use individuals’ bodies for important community measures, even without individual consent.595 
Technically, though, this ethical issue is only practical in nature, because if a nation was 
able to provide massive public health education campaigns and reach full awareness of its 
citizens about the opt-out organ donation process, then a lack of opting out could legitimately be 
viewed as consent to donate one’s organs upon death. However, theory isn’t always practical, 
and having a nation’s total population reach full awareness on an issue would be a Herculean 
task and practically impossible.596 Compounding this problem is the fact that most of the 
individuals who would not be reached or informed about such a requirement and would have 
their autonomy violated would be the lesser well off individuals of society, such as the poor and 
poorly educated.597 This was the UK’s Organ Donation Taskforce’s viewpoint on the matter. 
While theoretically they had no fundamental moral objection to an opt-out system, they argued 
that practically it would be extremely difficult to implement without ensuring violations of 
informed consent and a lack of awareness in at least some of the population, so they 
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recommended that the UK exhaust all of their options at improving their opt-in system before 
switching to an opt-out system.598 Of course, it should be noted that the UK’s Organ Donation 
Taskforce’s opinion was in 2008, and since that time Wales actually officially converted to an 
opt-out system in December of 2015.599  
Thus, in opt-out, presumed consent systems a certain level of individual autonomy 
violation is ultimately accepted as a foreseen but undesirable and unavoidable consequence of 
increased organ donation rates for the common good. In a classically liberal Western society that 
values individualism in an extreme way, this is a very crucial ethical concern, because it’s 
unlikely that any consent legislation that takes power away from the individual in order to give it 
to the State could ultimately survive or thrive in the hyper-individualistic society and culture that 
rules the United States, even if it did come with increased organ donation rates. 
5.1.3) Mandated Choice 
Fortunately, there is a way to combine the efficacy of opt-out systems with the ethicality 
of opt-in systems: mandated choice. Essentially, this system requires individuals to register their 
preference for cadaveric organ donation by asking individuals about their preferences directly 
and requiring an answer for the completion of some sort of form or document, such as a driver’s 
license application. This type of system is perfectly suited for organ donation, because mandated 
choice systems work best in bifurcated systems with simple answers, e.g. yes or no, opt-in or 
opt-out, etc.600 This system has other advantages, as well. First, mandated choice systems allow 
individual preferences to be more accurately recorded via active, explicit choice. This is a very 
important advantage over presumed consent and even explicit consent systems, because many 
times the family of the individual will unfortunately deny organ donation due to not knowing the 
exact preferences of the deceasing individual. Further, many mandated choice systems then 
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allow the individual’s explicit consent to trump any family objections. For example, Illinois’ 
mandated choice system makes explicit consent from the individual sufficient for organ 
donation, meaning the individual’s family’s consent is not required. More will be said later on 
the importance of getting consent from individuals themselves rather than their families, but it is 
clear that mandated choice systems offer the advantage of more accurately recording individual 
preferences by requiring individuals to reveal their preferences for organ donation.601 
Similarly, another related advantage is the vast increase of the base number of individuals 
that are explicitly asked about becoming an organ donor. In both opt-in and opt-out systems, 
there really is no widespread mechanism to garner preferences from individuals, and this is 
ultimately the major driving factor behind the problems of both opt-in, explicit consent systems 
(inefficiency at attaining consent in high rates) and opt-out, presumed consent systems (violation 
of autonomy due to ignorance). In mandated choice, though, by requiring large proportions of 
the overall population to answer the question and register their preference for organ donation, 
usually via driver’s license applications or state identification cards, or, even better, on federal 
tax documents, which works perfectly well with the CLOD proposal that this dissertation is 
ultimately arguing for, the number of potential organ donors can more accurately reflect the 
public opinion and attitude towards organ donation, which is generally very high and 
supportive.602 
Recently, several states have switched to a mandated choice system, and drastic benefits 
were seen almost instantly. For example, in Texas in 2010 a new law came into effect that 
required individuals applying for a new driver’s license to answer the question of whether or not 
they’d like to register as an organ donor. Before that law passed in January 2010, only two 
percent of adult Texans were registered as organ donors, and by July 2010 approximately five 
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percent of adult Texans were registered as organ donors.603 The Texas Department of Public 
Safety workers, who were responsible for asking the question about registering as an organ 
donor, went through extensive training in organ donation and the donor registry in 2012 to better 
answer questions that potential donors might ask before signing up, and between this training 
and the longer usage of the mandated choice system, by January 2013 seventeen percent of 
eligible Texans were registered as organ donors.604 Similar effects have been observed in many 
other states that have recently switched to systems of mandated choice, too, such as Illinois and 
California to name a few, including a nine percent raise in registered organ donors in the first six 
months of Illinois’ adoption of a system of mandated choice on driver’s license applications.605  
Of course, some may argue that it’s paternalistic and coercive for States to require an 
answer and force individuals to register their preferences in this way, because this is a potentially 
complicated and private matter that would obstruct one’s ability to tend to their own business, 
such as renew their driver’s license, file their taxes, etc. However, with as little as is being 
required by a system of mandated choice, this argument is hardly compelling compared to the 
alternatives. In a recent journal article, Douglas MacKay and Alexandra Robinson made a 
similar argument that while there might be a minor moral wrong with the minimal coercion 
involved with mandated choice systems, it is still significantly morally better than the 
alternatives, which all utilize some form of “reason-bypassing nonargumentative influence,” or 
“nudges,” which we’ll cover next chapter, that hinders individual autonomy and influences free 
will/choice on the subject.606 While not necessarily totally agreeing with their appraisal of 
“nudges,” it does seem clear that a mandated choice system is a much more ethical and efficient 
overall option than systems of either presumed consent or explicit consent, which both contain 
significant weaknesses. Thus, there are substantial ethical and practical advantages to adopting a 
 215 
 
mandated choice system of cadaveric organ donation over a system of presumed consent or 
explicit consent, and it ultimately is the most ethical system of cadaveric organ donation that 
should be utilized in any revamped American model. 
5.2) Imminent Death Organ Donation and Other Proposals 
 Beyond the differing proposals for cadaveric organ donation consent systems, there have 
also been other recent proposals to increase organ donation rates. These proposals range from 
harvesting organs from those LSW Donors near the end of life to harvesting organs from 
prisoners and those individuals who have decided to undergo euthanasia or physician-assisted 
suicide. One proposal even suggests that organ procurement should be one potential method of 
euthanasia in order to ensure viable organs for transplantation are harvested from potential 
donors. But though all of these proposals would potentially increase the organ donor pool, not all 
of them are ethically justifiable, and some of them are not ultimately worth the potential to harm 
the practice of organ donation, procurement, and transplantation as a whole. 
5.2.1) Imminent Death Organ Donation 
 Understanding the practical context of organ donation, specifically brain death versus 
cardiac death, is critical for discussing these newer proposals for organ donation, because these 
proposals ultimately rely and focus on this crucial moral and practical distinction in the 
definition and type of death. Ever since the controversial case of Bruce Tucker in 1968, the 
concepts of “death,” “brain death,” and “organ donation” have been intrinsically linked. Thanks 
in large part to developments from this controversial case in 1968, today the concept of death is 
largely associated with the cessation of brain function, either in part or in whole, though in some 
cases the lack of a beating heart is still integral to some conceptions of death, as we will see 
below.607 The legal definition of death, which has been accepted by every state in the US as set 
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forth by the “Uniform Determination of Death Act,” requires either (1) irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, including the brain stem, to be considered legally dead.608 
 This conception of brain death is defined as a whole-brain concept of death. Though it is 
by far the most common and popular conception of death, it is rivaled by other competing 
concepts of death that don’t go quite as far as the requirement of whole-brain death. For 
example, the higher-brain death conception of death argues that only those activities associated 
with the higher components of the brain, such as human consciousness, are required to be lost to 
be considered truly dead. Further, there is also the more traditional and historical conception of 
death associated with the cessation of the functioning of the heart and lungs, and relatedly the 
loss of breathing and blood flow, and as seen above, it is still one way of determining death 
legally, which sometimes leads to awkward situations with two different ways to determine 
death. Many believe that the increased scientific knowledge regarding the brain’s functioning led 
to a fundamental shift in our conception of death in the late twentieth century.609 Of course, 
others have a more sinister explanation that claims that the addition of the concept of brain death 
is merely just a way to increase the cadaveric organ donor pool and ultimately solve a social 
problem by “gerrymandering” the lines between life and death, along with the additional benefits 
of providing clearer, more distinguishable conditions that were easy to diagnose, provided 
clearer prognoses, and allowed for smoother transitions.610 
 But it might be asked – why is the conception of death so important for the concept of 
organ donation? Well, that’s primarily due to two reasons. First, the dead donor rule, which we’ll 
discuss in much more detail below in the section on the ethics of organ donation, requires donors 
to be dead before removing vital organs.611 This deontological rule limits the utilitarian 
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justifications that can be justified in the process of organ donation, and it’s an important rule that 
keeps organ donation balanced as an ethical medical intervention. So the exact timing of death is 
crucial in this regard. Second, brain death organ donation is the absolute “gold standard” for 
organ donation, because it allows for the removal of virtually every abdominal and thoracic 
organ in a controlled environment before actually “unplugging” the cadaver from the mechanical 
life support that is continuing respiration, and thus blood flow that keeps the organs healthy and 
absent of ischemia, i.e. a lack of blood flow that damages the organs. Therefore, the diagnosis of 
brain death leads to the best possible scenario in the procurement of organs. 
  But brain death organ donation is not the only type of organ donation practiced today. In 
patients that do not meet the conditions of brain death, either as conscious, capacitated patients 
or incapacitated patients in comas or persistent vegetative states, there is still the possibility of 
donation after cardiac death (DCD) once life support has been decided to be withdrawn. There is 
also the possibility of DCD from heart attack and accident patients, too, though these cases aren’t 
really relevant to the proposals that we’re discussing. Depending upon the conception of death 
one is operating under, there are two limiting conditions that must be met before DCD can take 
place: (1) the amount of time that is required for the loss of circulation to lead to irreversible 
brain loss, and ultimately brain death, and (2) the amount of time before autoresuscitation of the 
heart is impossible. Depending upon the source of the information, the amount of time for these 
two conditions has ranged anywhere from 90 seconds to a full 10 minutes, which highlights the 
imprecise nature of this method of organ donation. Beyond this impreciseness, there’s also a 
whole host of other issues involved with DCD, including issues of consent and potential harm 
and/or moral distress for the caregivers and family.612 Furthermore, DCD is also practically 
inefficient in several ways: (1) it generally only procures abdominal organs and not thoracic 
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organs due to the ischemic injuries sustained by the thoracic organs in the cardiac death, (2) if 
the patient does not die quickly enough after the withdrawal of life support, DCD is not able to 
procure even abdominal organs due to the development of ischemic injuries, and (3) there’s only 
rudimentary, unreliable ways to determine which patients’ bodies will cooperate to successfully 
complete DCD, meaning there’s no real way to determine optimal DCD candidates.613 These 
issues highlight the need for new proposals, specifically IDOD, to avoid these practical and 
ethical issues that arise in DCD cases where patients do not meet the criteria for brain death. 
 Outside of the practical context of organ donation, there are also certain ethical norms, 
beyond the principles of principlism that we discussed in the previous two chapters, that are 
specific to organ donation that are relevant to the new proposals. One of these ethical norms that 
govern organ donation and transplantation that was previously mentioned is the notion of the 
dead donor rule. Though the principles of principlism are intrinsically linked to the ethical 
regulation of organ donation, the dead donor rule has been the guiding ethical norm for the 
practice of organ donation throughout its existence, because it is the normative tool most 
associated with the practice of organ donation.614 The dead-donor rule has two main, related 
obligations that correspond to the two differing main types of organ donation. The first 
obligation corresponds to cadaveric organ donation, and it requires organ donors to be dead 
before the procurement of organs begins. The second obligation corresponds to live organ 
donation, and it requires that organ procurement itself may not cause the death of the donor.615 
As we will see below, the several new proposals are split between the first obligation to 
cadaveric organ donors and the second obligations to live organ donors. 
 Two other ethical principles that further regulate the process of organ donation and 
transplantation and are related to the two obligations of the dead donor rule, but are separate 
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principles in themselves, should also be mentioned. The first of these is the ethical principle 
requiring brain death prior to the removal of organs. As described above, the definition of death 
has been a contentious issue recently, but most people subscribe to some sort of version of brain 
death, meaning the onset of brain death is the earliest one should begin procuring organs from a 
cadaver in order to not violate the first obligation of the dead donor rule. Of note, proponents of 
DCD justify their support of DCD by arguing that the loss of circulation necessarily leads to the 
eventual brain death of the patient, though the ultimate question is the timing rather than the fact 
of this matter. The second ethical principle is the overall prohibition on killing, though it is 
specifically aimed at the killing of patients by their physicians. Obviously, this corresponds to 
the second obligation of the dead donor rule that prohibits the act of organ procurement from 
killing the patient.616 Thus, these two separate ethical principles act as outside justification for 
the ethical obligations imposed by the dead donor rule, giving the dead donor rule further 
validation as a useful normative tool in organ donation and transplantation. 
Finally, with both the practical and ethical backgrounds and contexts of organ donation 
laid out, we can now jump into ethically analyzing the various different new proposals for organ 
donation. When we talk about LSW Donors with regard to IDOD, it is assumed that both brain 
dead and non-brain dead individuals are included in this population. However, practically this 
isn’t really the case, because as previously mentioned, brain dead LSW Donors do not really 
engender the controversy that non-brain dead LSW Donors do. This is because brain dead LSW 
Donation is ultimately the “gold standard” and preferred method of cadaveric organ donation 
today. On the other hand, due to the ethical obligations imposed by the dead donor rule, non-
brain dead LSW Donation necessarily engenders controversy, and this is one of the main reasons 
why the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee ultimately rejected Living Donation Prior to Planned 
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Withdrawal (LD-PPW) of life support. LD-PPW was the official term that the OPTN/UNOS 
Ethics Committee referred to IDOD as in their investigation, but for the remaining dissertation I 
will refer to LD-PPW as IDOD. 
IDOD is a type of organ donation that comes from patients who have previously, and 
separately, decided, either themselves or via their surrogate, to withdraw all life-sustaining 
treatment. Generally, this occurs in those terminally ill patients at the end of their lives, but it 
very well could also occur in patients who are not terminally ill but for some reason or another 
have still decided to withdraw all life-sustaining treatment. These patients are neither brain dead 
nor ideal candidates for DCD, which makes cadaveric organ donation virtually impossible. This 
type of organ donation then functions by excising the organ(s) from the still living donor, under 
anesthesia, of course, and withdrawing all life-sustaining treatment soon after the operation is 
over when the patient is stabilized.617 Since this type of organ donation is completed before life-
sustaining treatment is withdrawn while the patient is alive and non-brain dead, it is considered a 
live organ donation, and this entails that the second obligation of the dead donor rule is 
applicable to this type of IDOD, i.e. the process of procurement should not kill the patient. Due 
to this obligation imposed by the dead donor rule, at the present time discussion of this type of 
organ donation has been limited to one kidney at a time, because it is believed that it is extremely 
unlikely that excising one organ, especially a kidney, would cause, or even hasten, the death of 
the patient, though it is ultimately believed that more organs could eventually be donated from 
these types of patients.618 
 This type of organ donation actually comes in two forms, too, with each having distinct 
ethical components. First, it may occur in patients who are awake, alert, and have decisional 
capacity. Decisional capacity is a notoriously difficult concept to fully determine, categorize, and 
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define, but theoretically it ultimately represents the ability of patients to make autonomous, 
informed decisions regarding their healthcare. In fact, the criteria for determining capacity 
largely mirrors the steps of informed consent, specifically ensuring understanding of information 
and the voluntariness of the decision.619 A patient with decisional capacity can (1) appreciate and 
understand the information being relayed, (2) make a decision that is free from coercive 
influences, and (3) consistently use their values and preferences to make logical, i.e. reasonable, 
healthcare decisions. Further, rather than being a bifurcated system of capacity versus incapacity, 
a patient’s decisional capacity functions more on a sliding scale with differing levels of capacity, 
just as differing healthcare decisions require differing levels of decisional capacity to fully 
comprehend and deliberate upon.620 This is contrary to the legal notion of competence, which is 
bifurcated into an “either/or” scenario.621 
For many, this seems to be a fairly straightforward and ethically justifiable scenario in 
cases of patients with decisional capacity. Not only does it respect and promote patient 
autonomy, it also promotes significant acts of beneficence and engenders much good for the 
dying patient. This beneficence is even more apparent for the patient’s family, too. For example, 
though not specifically discussing cases of IDOD, James Childress has noted the benefits and 
positive effects that organ donation generally has for the donor’s family, who at the time of 
donation is still mourning the loss of a recently deceased loved one. In one family’s own words, 
“This was the best thing we could have ever done. Whoever the people are that got the organs, 
we’re just grateful to them to keep part of him alive in this way. We’re grateful they are 
living.”622  Said another way, this method, “could provide patients and families a middle 
ground—a way of avoiding futile medical care, while also honoring life by preventing the deaths 
of other critically ill people.”623  
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Of course, there are still a couple of ethical components that some may take issue with. 
For example, more conservative individuals might still find issue with the notion of withdrawing 
life support, even though it is currently very widely accepted as an ethical action and ultimate 
right of autonomy for patients.624 But even if one holds this position, this type of IDOD isn’t 
necessarily affected by that stance, because the act of live organ donation is completely separate 
from the act of withdrawing life support. So there’s no real conflict between the two. Another 
issue that has been brought up is the fear that IDOD could effectively offer up even less overall 
viable organs for transplantation than the method of DCD. This is because while IDOD is subject 
to the obligations of the dead donor rule, which limits the types of organs they can procure via 
this method, i.e. only abdominal organs without thoracic organs, DCD is not held to that same 
obligation due to the donor already being deceased at the time of procurement. This was a 
potential fear that the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee received in feedback from various organ 
procurement agencies from across the country.625  
But this is a fear that is largely misguided for several reasons. First, as was shown above, 
DCD is an incredibly unreliable and unpredictable method of procuring organs due to poor 
predictive tools, so while there may be a higher range of organs to procure from DCD, there’s 
also the very real chance of gaining no organs at all due to the donor body not cooperating, i.e. 
not dying fast enough, or faster rates of ischemic injury to organs. Further, while DCD can 
technically procure both abdominal and thoracic organs, in practice the procurement team almost 
always only procures abdominal organs, just like IDOD, due to the rapid development of 
ischemic injury in thoracic organs after cardiac death. So while IDOD offers a lower range of 
organs procured from the donor, the success rate and confidence of retrieving the organs is much 
higher than in DCD. Second, DCD also requires life support to be withdrawn in the operating 
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suite, making things very difficult and awkward for the family, which isn’t a concern for IDOD. 
Third, while it is currently limited to one kidney, it is believed that virtually all of the abdominal 
organs could and should be procured in IDOD, meaning there’d be a significant number of 
organs procured from just from one donation. And finally, IDOD does not necessarily entail that 
DCD will not occur, as well. In fact, many suggest that both methods should ultimately be 
utilized to maximize the gains of organ procurement, so the fear of IDOD actually offering less 
organ procurement than DCD is not warranted or compelling.626 
Others may worry that this type of operation might actually cause death in the terminally 
ill, which would violate the second obligation of the dead-donor rule. However, it is well 
supported that the excising of most non-thoracic organs, e.g. the kidneys, liver, etc., would not 
ultimately cause the death of the patient, since the patient is actively dying after removing the 
life-sustaining treatment anyways.627 Still, others worry that though death might not be an 
immediate result of this operation, these types of major operations might still hasten death to 
some degree or cause extra, unwarranted pain to the donor while they are actively dying, which 
very well could occur in certain contexts, and this would ultimately turn this concept into a 
slower version of “organ donation euthanasia.” But once again, it is well supported that this type 
of operation would neither cause nor hasten death, though additional pain after the surgery could 
ultimately arise - though it would be controllable by medication - and even in rare cases where 
complications do occur during or after surgery that actually do hasten the death of the patient, it 
could be justified by the widely accepted normative tool known as the principle of double effect. 
The principle of double effect is a normative tool that combines a deontological framework with 
utilitarian reasoning and principles to create an ethical system that determines when an action 
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that has both good and bad consequences can be morally justified. It determines this by passing 
actions through four required conditions: 
1. The action, considered by itself and independently of its effects must not be morally evil… 
2.  The evil effect must not be the means of producing the good effect…The evil effects…are 
simply unavoidable by-products of [actions] designed to produce the good effects… 
3.  The evil effect is sincerely not intended, but merely tolerated. 
4.  There must be a proportionate reason for performing the action, in spite of its evil 
consequence…According to a sound prudential estimate, the good to be obtained is of 
sufficient value to compensate for the evil that must be tolerated.628 
If the action successfully makes it through the four conditions, then it is considered an 
ethical action that merely has some bad, unintended consequences, even if they were foreseen 
consequences. In bioethics, intensive pain management at the end of life is the paradigmatic 
example of the principle of double effect in action, because there may be times when the proper 
use of intensive pain management unintentionally hastens the death of the patient. However, as 
long as the death of the patient wasn’t the true intention of the physician but rather an 
unfortunate and unintended side effect or consequence of the pain management remedy, then it is 
still a morally justifiable act, according to the principle of double effect. And just as in intensive 
pain management, as long as the true motive in IDOD is procuring an organ rather than 
hastening the patient’s death, then this act is ethically justifiable by the widely accepted ethical 
tool of the principle of double effect.629 Thus, IDOD in capacitated patients is most definitely an 
ethical action that should be promoted by organ procurement teams, and with the help of the 
principle of double effect, more aggressive procurement strategies should be implemented to 
maximize the potential viable organs garnered from each individual, though the patient’s well-
being and overall comfortability should still be the first priority by the procurement team. 
A second and more controversial option of IDOD is in permanently unconscious patients, 
i.e. those in a permanent vegetative state or those with a devastating neurologic injury that is 
considered irreversible, though not necessarily considered brain dead, or patients in an 
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incapacitated state where surrogate decision-makers would make this decision to donate the 
organ after making the decision to ultimately withdraw all life-sustaining treatment. The main 
issue with this option of IDOD involves the use of surrogate decision-making. There are two 
main and relevant standards of surrogate decision-making: the substituted judgment standard and 
the best interests standard. Sometimes a distinction is made between the prior, explicit 
articulation of the patient’s relevant preferences to the surrogate and actual substituted judgment 
based more off of analogical reasoning from differing known preferences of the patient, which 
creates an entirely new standard of decision-making; however, here I am funneling them both 
under the broader substituted judgement standard.630 Traditionally, the substituted judgment 
standard has been the preferred standard for surrogate decision-making, because it is, 
supposedly, based upon the subjective and previously known preferences of the incapacitated 
patient. Essentially, this standard requires the surrogate to use the known preferences and values 
of the incapacitated patient to make the most proper medical decision according to what the 
patient would ultimately want if they were making the decision themselves.631  
The problem is that IDOD is an extremely specific and rare medical intervention that is 
not well-known to the general public, so the chances of patients previously and explicitly 
discussing their preferences for this procedure with surrogates are minimal at best. Of course, 
there is always the possibility of this happening, and prior, explicit articulation of the patient’s 
relevant preferences for this procedure would surely need to be followed. But realistically the 
chances of explicit articulation of this preference is slim, meaning surrogates will most likely 
have to come to a conclusion based upon the values, interests, and preferences of the patient on 
other, related issues. But this also brings up some other issues. 
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Several recent studies have found that the substituted judgement standard is not nearly as 
accurate and reliable as it was once thought to be. For example, there is significant discrepancy 
in the actual preferences of the patient versus the judged preferences of the patient by the 
surrogate, meaning surrogates are sometimes judging the patient’s preferences wrong and thus 
making decisions that are counter to what the patient really would’ve wanted. One study even 
found that surrogates are only correct in their judgments about 68% of the time, which is still a 
majority of the time but far from the overwhelming accuracy that this standard was once thought 
to possess.632 What’s even more troubling in this regard is the unclear status of IDOD. While it is 
without a doubt an example of live organ donation, it isn’t necessarily equivalent to just normal 
live organ donation in healthy individuals, let alone cadaveric organ donation, which would 
definitely affect the patient’s preference regarding the procedure. For example, it’s conceivable 
that a patient would actually be more willing to be a live donor in the case of IDOD than in the 
case where the patient was fully healthy, because IDOD doesn’t really contain the recovery time 
and burdens that would come with the post-operative process for a healthy, live patient. And 
similar arguments could be made in the other direction with a patient being more willing to be a 
live donor as a healthy person than as a person who is preparing for death. 
This raises serious questions about the required threshold that surrogate decision-makers 
would need to meet in order for them to justifiably conclude through the substituted judgement 
standard that the incapacitated patient would truly want IDOD in this situation. For example, 
questions that would necessarily need to be answered to come to such a conclusion include: Did 
the patient show any sort of preference toward cadaveric and/or live organ donation? How much 
prior preference and interest should be shown by the patient in organ donation for the surrogate 
to justifiably make an affirmative decision on IDOD? Is expressing a favorable stance towards 
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organ donation enough justification for the surrogate, or is more needed to justify this decision? 
How much more? Is the patient explicitly expressing the wish to be an organ donor enough, or 
should the patient have shown enough interest in organ donation that they were previously 
signed up as an organ donor and/or evaluated for the possibility of being a live organ donor? 
Complicating things even further, along with the recent research suggesting the increased 
fallibility of the substituted judgment standard, there is also substantial evidence that patients’ 
preferences evolve and significantly change over time, especially with regard to end-of-life 
issues, meaning surrogates’ memories regarding past preferences of the patient might not be up 
to date. Furthermore, research also suggests that prior preferences aren’t necessarily even of 
primary importance to patients in end-of-life scenarios, because they value the opinions of family 
and their doctors, who they also want involved in the decision.633 
Thus, there are serious issues with the substituted judgement standard when it comes to 
surrogate decision-making in IDOD. Unfortunately, the best interests standard doesn’t seem to 
fair much better here. This standard essentially states that surrogates should make the decision 
according to the patient’s “best interests” when no prior relevant preferences from the patient are 
known, and these interests should be separate from the surrogate’s own views and preferences.634  
This standard is also supposed to be based upon what a “reasonable person” in this situation 
would want.635 Immediately, then, we can virtually toss out the decision of IDOD for 
incapacitated patients using this standard, because since this type of procedure would provide no 
benefit whatsoever to the patient, but only additional harm and burden, there is no objective 
interest in performing this donation from the perspective of the incompetent patient. Of course, 
this type of altruism could be argued to be some type of “moral benefit” in itself to the patient, 
though that seems to be a very difficult argument to justify due to the significant amount of 
 228 
 
burden and harm the transplant surgery would engender for the patient, let alone the major 
violations of bodily integrity without explicit consent from the patient. 
On top of this issue with surrogate decision-making, there is also the crucial issue of 
public perception and trust in organ donation to consider, especially with minority populations. 
Beyond the substantial minority disparities in access to healthcare, there are other significant 
minority disparities in healthcare that are related to internal bias and discrimination within the 
healthcare system. These minority disparities occur from conscious or unconscious prejudices 
and biases of healthcare providers that affect the ways they treat or make healthcare decisions for 
their patients of a minority group.636 It could also be due to an overreliance on epidemiological 
evidence of certain common minority population traits over the actual empirical health evidence 
from the individual case at hand.637 For example, several studies have shown an association 
between race and socioeconomic status and the likelihood of receiving surgery for the treatment 
of cancer, including the disparity of African Americans being significantly less likely to receive 
surgical resection for the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer compared to their white 
counterparts.638 Similar disparities have been found in minority populations in the management 
of pain. Interestingly, in one study male physicians prescribed higher doses of pain medication 
for white patients over black patients, with the opposite being true of the female physicians.639 
Other studies have corroborated these minority disparities in pain assessment and pain 
management, including everything from pain originating from cancers and chest pains to chronic 
back pains.640 
These disparities, among other things, have led to the well-known, documented distrust 
of the white-dominated healthcare by African-Americans, and this distrust and suspicion is 
present in the realm of organ donation, too.641 In fact, there is substantial substance to some of 
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these concerns based on racial discrimination, with several studies suggesting that black 
Americans are routinely much less likely to be referred to transplant services, considered good 
candidates for transplantation, and placed on organ waiting lists than white Americans, even with 
all other factors in consideration and accounted for.642 The combination of this distrust with 
actual discrimination has led to major disparities in organ donation and allocation within this 
population.643 Further, a continued reluctance towards organ donation in this population has 
largely maintained this disparity due to a lack of histocompatible viable organs for transplants in 
African-Americans.644 So with the effectiveness and success of organ donation programs relying 
so heavily on public perception and trust in organ donation, this is a serious concern that must be 
taken into account, especially with regard to minority populations that are already dealing with 
significant disparities in this area of healthcare.  
One final issue that must be discussed before moving on is the distinction between those 
patients who at one time had capacity but lost it due to some sort of ailment or accident and those 
patients who never had capacity at any point in their life. Specifically, I’m referring to newborns, 
especially profoundly disabled newborns, and the severely mentally handicapped. Since these 
individuals never had the opportunity to develop decision-making capacity, along with 
preferences, desires, and values, the substituted judgement standard is of no use for surrogate 
decision-making in these individuals, and the best interests standard is the primary tool for 
surrogate decision-making.645 As detailed above, the best interests standard firmly denotes IDOD 
as not in the best interests of patients, because it does not benefit the patient whatsoever, while 
also requiring significant burdens and bodily harms. Perhaps an argument can be made from best 
interests for IDOD in these types of incapacitated patients in the case of a sibling or close 
relative. However, certainly it’s not always in the patient’s best interests to donate an organ 
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before death, especially for non-acquaintances, and this would seemingly border the line of 
treating the patient instrumentally and merely as a means rather than an end in themselves, which 
would be a major violation of the moral obligations in Kant’s second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative.646 
So we must truly take into consideration what widespread promotion and utilization of 
IDOD in incapacitated patients would do to (1) surrogate decision-makers in their attempt to 
interpret the patient’s obscure preferences and (2) the public perception and trust in organ 
donation. This is basically the position of the chairman of the UNOS ethics committee, Dr. Peter 
Reese, when he says that IDOD “could erode public trust in donation in general.”647  This is 
especially true in minority populations, who are already suspicious of and distrust white-
dominated healthcare, including the organ donation sector. This primary concern in the public 
perception of IDOD, among other issues - such as practical issues like a possible lack of support 
from the medical staff, better guidance for when to offer IDOD over DCD, and better models to 
predict how allowing IDOD would impact the number of viable organs available for transplant, 
led the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee to conclude in March of 2016 that IDOD in 
incapacitated patients was not something to pursue further at this time.648 As a rule of thumb, I 
believe this is the correct public position to take in IDOD in incapacitated patients, though not in 
capacitated patients as argued above. This does not necessarily require a total prohibition, 
though, because certainly there can be times when surrogate decision-makers have indisputable 
evidence that IDOD is what the patient would prefer. But with the potential to severely harm 
public perception and trust in organ donation and the very precarious position that it forces 
surrogate decision-makers to make life-altering decisions from, this isn’t a practice that should 
be outright promoted and encouraged by organ procurement organizations across the country. 
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5.2.2) Other Proposals 
 Outside of the two types of IDOD in capacitated and incapacitated patients, there are 
several more controversial proposals that deserve mention. All of the following proposals 
involve active euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide in some way, and one proposal even 
utilizes the process of organ donation, specifically procurement, as the method of active 
euthanasia itself. Though these are very controversial methods in themselves, the ever-increasing 
public support of active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, combined with long organ 
waiting lists, may make these topics of policy conversation in the near future.649 
Where the two types of IDOD relied on withdrawing life support, these latter proposals 
rely on active euthanasia (and the related concept of capital punishment in one proposal) or 
physician-assisted suicide, which is the major moral distinction among the differing types. 
Where withdrawing life support is simply allowing the patient to die naturally by removing all 
life-support, active euthanasia is the deliberate and active termination of the life of a suffering 
patient, completed by a physician in response to a voluntary request from the patient.650 
Similarly, physician-assisted suicide is also a deliberate and active termination of the life of the 
patient based on a voluntary request to the physician. However, rather than asking physicians to 
terminate patients’ lives themselves, physician-assisted suicide requires the physician to merely 
aid the patient in dying by providing them with the necessary lethal medications in order for 
patients to take their own lives.651 It should also be mentioned that while the principle of double 
effect supports the withdrawal of life support as a morally justifiable action that is an example of 
“allowing to die,” it condemns both active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide as immoral, 
unjustifiable actions of “killing,” though many secular ethicists reject the principle of double 
effect and its conclusions regarding these actions.652 
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And that is what ultimately complicates the discussion of these types of proposals. These 
methods necessarily involve acts of active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, which are 
both extremely controversial applied ethical issues that there is no real consensus on, so analysis 
of these methods of organ donation will somewhat rely on some preconceived notions regarding 
these acts, which is problematic due to their controversial nature. For example, research suggests 
that the American public has long been generally in favor of the legalization of active euthanasia, 
especially since the 1970’s.653 Interestingly, though still generally viewed favorably for 
legalization and morality in the US, physician-assisted suicide consistently rates lower in 
approval ratings than active euthanasia, even though, at least secularly, it is ethically less 
problematic than active euthanasia.654 Yet even with these strong approval ratings, California 
recently became just the fifth state in the US where physician-assisted suicide is legally 
available, and there is no state where active euthanasia is legal.655 In fact, only a few nations in 
the world have currently legalized and regulated active euthanasia, including Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Colombia, and the Netherlands.656 Further, even with the majority support from the 
public, the majority of “professional groups, academics, and religious bodies have for the most 
part remained opposed to these efforts.”657 
In the case of organ donation euthanasia, then, the proposal states that the organ 
procurement operation itself functions as the process of euthanasia for LSW Donors. Basically, 
with the patient under anesthesia, after retrieving all of the abdominal and other thoracic organs, 
the transplant team removes the heart, which ultimately causes the death of the patient. Though 
this proposal was ultimately aimed at the permanently unconscious and those in persistent 
vegetative states, it also is relevant to those LSW Donors, both capacitated and incapacitated, 
who want to ensure that something good comes from their deaths, i.e. organ donation. This 
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proposal has two main advantages. Firstly, it dramatically increases the chances of retrieving all 
of a LSW Donor’s organs that can be donated after death. While DCD for LSW Donors 
ultimately requires the body’s cooperation in dying quickly enough after withdrawing life-
support, which rarely occurs and usually destroys the viability of all of the thoracic organs, this 
method of organ donation euthanasia can control those factors by ultimately keeping the donor 
alive as long as needed, i.e. until they need to take out the heart.658 Secondly, it also is less likely 
than the withdrawal of life support, which would lead into DCD, to cause the patient suffering 
while in the process of dying. In organ donation euthanasia the patient would die during the 
procurement process while unconscious, so there wouldn’t necessarily be any suffering or pain at 
all. Dominic Wilkinson, one of the main proponents of organ donation euthanasia, argues that it, 
“would give people the best chance of ensuring that their organs do not go to waste after their 
death. It would also prevent the patient from suffering after life support was withdrawn. It would 
harm no one, and would potentially benefit a number of seriously ill patients in organ failure.”659 
Of course, though there are significant practical benefits to this proposal, its acceptance 
would ultimately require violation of several of the aforementioned guiding ethical norms of 
organ donation. Specifically, it would violate both of the ethical obligations of the dead donor 
rule – (1) organ donors must be dead before the procurement of organs begins, and (2) organ 
procurement itself may not cause the death of the donor.660 Furthermore, it would also violate the 
other related, more deontologically focused principles that obligate the act of organ donation to 
(1) not harm the organ donor in any significant way, (2) only remove organs from brain dead 
individuals, and (3) not deliberately kill the patient.661 Thus, it seems clear that this proposal is 
contrary to our current ethical conceptions of organ donation, and in order for it to ever be 
ethically acceptable, there would need to be a radical reformulation of our current conception of 
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organ donation ethics. These deontological principles play an important role in safeguarding 
potential donors in a medical practice that is heavily influenced by utilitarian goals and 
reasoning, so these principles are necessary to avoid tumbling down the slippery slope that is the 
utilitarian mindset of organ transplantation. 
But are there special cases where this might still be justified, such as in the case of a 
death row inmate who is about to face the death penalty? Controversial as it may seem, there 
may be sound ethical justifications for organ donation euthanasia in the case of an executed 
prisoner due to the differing contexts, and there are many who have proposed harvesting organs 
from prisoners in various different fashions. In fact, one of the most interesting specialized 
systems of organ donation in the world is China’s peculiar situation, because for a vast majority 
of China’s transplant history over ninety percent of their viable transplant organs have come 
from executed prisoners.662 This particular source of organs really came out of necessity, because 
only in 2007 did Chinese authorities begin to implement a federal program with the purpose of 
overseeing and regulating organ transplants within the country. Before this time, no federal 
program of this nature existed, and it is believed this program will take many, many years to 
fully replace executed prisoner organs as the main source of transplant organs. This is due to 
strong cultural factors from Confucian views that are prevalent in China that believe the body 
should be kept intact after death. This cultural view has virtually eliminated the possibility of 
cadaveric organ donation throughout China’s history, which has left organ donation to come 
almost entirely from live donors and executed prisoners.663  
 China actually began harvesting organs from executed prisoners in 1984 after 
cyclosporine became available, and it started in a very secretive and clandestine manner through 
a confidential government document called “Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or 
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Organs from the Corpses of Executed Prisoners.”664 Essentially, the document gave the State 
power to use the dead bodies, or its organs, of condemned criminals if the prisoner volunteered 
before execution, the family consented, or the family did not claim the body.665 The process of 
execution starts with a physician sedating the prisoner and inserting a breathing tube in the lungs 
and a catheter in one of the veins. The prisoner is then shot in the head, and the physician 
attaches a respirator to the breathing tube and administers drugs to insure the viability of the 
organs. The prisoner is then transported to the hospital where the donor is waiting and the 
transplant surgery takes place.666 It took over two decades of international pressure from human 
rights agencies and other countries before China folded and started to implement a different 
system of organ procurement to serve their country’s transplant needs, which is still in 
implementation today.667 
However, even though they’ve long been criticized and in the last several years claimed 
to have ceased the practice, it is still widely believed and reported that China still regularly 
executes prisoners in high numbers to harvest their organs. And it has also been reported that 
many of these individuals are even “prisoners of conscience” against the Communist Party in 
China, which makes the crime that much more immoral and heinous.668 Primarily, the criticism 
surrounding the Chinese system revolves around the ethical issues of consent and the potential 
effects it has on increasing rates of the death penalty, which are already the highest in the world 
by a significant margin.669 The American UNOS ethics committee has also opposed any new 
changes or legislation for prisoner organ donation until a fuller discussion has occurred, but they 
also bring up issues of consent, how it would affect certain discriminatory practices already 
inherent within the system, and how it would affect potential jurors who might be influenced by 
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this decision.670 Until further analysis has been completed, I agree that this proposal is too risky 
to promote with its potential pitfalls. 
Finally, the last remaining proposal involves organ donation after active euthanasia or 
physician-assisted suicide. At first glance, some may wonder why this proposal would be 
controversial at all, because (1) the element of euthanasia or suicide is not necessarily causally 
connected to the organ donation in any way, (2) there is no question about capacity, since 
decision-making capacity is a prerequisite for the legal approval of active euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide, and (3) the mode of death is not necessarily relevant to the 
procurement of organs in normal situations. However, as stated above in organ donation 
euthanasia, it’s extremely difficult to separate perspectives on active euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide from perspectives on organ donation due to their interaction in these proposals, 
so some might conflate the issues and have problems justifying it. 
Thus, it needs to be addressed. There are two main types of this proposal. The first type 
would involve DCD after active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. The patient could be 
administered, or take themselves in the case of assisted suicide, large doses of a sedative and 
cardioplegic agents, which would ultimately stop the heart. After the necessary time had passed 
to either ensure brain-death or render the possibility of autoresuscitation to zero, whichever 
justification one is using, DCD would be completed.671 Recent research in Belgium actually 
suggests the effectiveness of DCD in this scenario due to the controlled nature of the death and 
environment, and in some cases certain thoracic organs, i.e. the lungs, were also able to be 
obtained, though the heart was still always unattainable.672  
A second and more radical type of this variation of IDOD would involve inducing brain 
death via the process of active euthanasia. This would require several medical interventions, with 
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increased potential for patient harm and burden, to continue the respiration and circulation of 
blood to the other organs while ultimately inducing brain death via catheter occlusion of both 
internal carotid arteries and vertebral arteries. While this would present a more ideal organ 
procurement environment that would ultimately allow for the procurement of both abdominal 
and thoracic organs, it blatantly violates several of the ethical principles that regulate organ 
donation, just as organ donation euthanasia does above.673 Furthermore, with the focus of the 
intervention shifting more toward organ donation rather than safe and effective euthanasia of the 
patient, the motivations of the procedure come into question, and the method seems to borderline 
convert the patient from an end in themselves to merely a means that is being treated 
instrumentally, which is a hallmark sign of unethical behavior, at least according to Kant. 
Beyond violation of these principles and the instrumental treatment of the patient, this 
second type would seemingly require the act of active euthanasia in order to work, which is very 
prohibited in law throughout the United States. But the first type of this variation of IDOD can 
work in cases of physician-assisted suicide, and as reported above, there are five states in the US 
where physician-assisted suicide is now legally available to terminally ill patients. So the 
question is this – is this an ethical type of organ donation that should be promoted and 
encouraged, especially to the patients themselves in these states who are contemplating assisted 
suicide? It’s hard to find something ethically wrong with this method of organ donation, even if 
one finds physician-assisted suicide ethically wrong in itself. This is because the act of organ 
donation is conceptually distinguishable and separate from the method of death itself, and there’s 
nothing conceptually hypocritical about being an advocate for organ donation in these cases, 
while still finding the method of physician-assisted suicide immoral. A practical example can 
verify this line of reasoning. Many cases of brain death actually occur from suicide attempts that 
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deprive the brain of oxygen for a substantial amount of time. In fact, recent research suggests 
that around 3.8% of all brain death scenarios are caused by suicide attempts. What’s more, the 
families of these suicide brain dead patients exhibit a much higher rate of consent to donation 
than families of non-suicide brain dead patients.674 Thus, if there’s no moral hesitancy to accept 
organ donation in these patients, there should be no moral hesitancy to accept the ethicality of 
this type of IDOD in assisted suicide donors, and it should be promoted as a beneficent and 
charitable ethical action. 
 Certainly, then, there are several differing new organ donation proposals and changes to 
our current cadaveric organ donation consent process that are both ethically justifiable and 
practically effective at increasing either organ donation rates or the larger organ donor pool. 
Mandated choice consent systems combine the ethicality of opt-in, explicit consent systems with 
the practical effectiveness of opt-out, presumed consent systems, and this system is clearly the 
preferred consent system for any revamped model of organ donation here in the United States. 
As for the other new proposals, though several of them are clearly unethical or have true 
pragmatic reasons for not pursuing, there are several proposals that are clearly ethical and should 
be promoted and encouraged to increase the organ donor pool, specifically IDOD in capacitated 
patients and organ donation after physician-assisted suicide, where legal. Not only would 
pursuing these new proposals increase the raw number of viable organs for transplantation, they 
would also increase the quality of the organs by relying less on the inefficient method of DCD. 
And finally, we would also be doing these LSW Donors and their families a great service by 
ensuring that these donors live on not only in the memories of their loved ones, but also in the 
hearts and very being of the recipients’ bodies that are continuing to enjoy the fruits of life due to 
the beneficence, kindness, and selflessness exhibited by these organ donors. Now it’s finally time 
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to put all of these pieces and insights from the past four chapters together to form a new, 
revamped model for organ donation that is both ethically justifiable and practically effective.
 240 
 
586 Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia? Alternatives for 
Maximizing the Number and Quality of Organs for Transplantation," Bioethics 26, no. 1 (2012): 34. 
587 “OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee: Meeting Summary – March 14, 2016,” Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1584/ethics_meetingsummary_20160314.pdf.  
588 Robert M. Veatch and Lainie F. Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2015), 131-133. 
589 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 143-144. 
590 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 152-153. 
591 Sjef Gevers, Anke Janssen, and Roland Friele, “Consent Systems for Post Mortem Organ Donation in Europe,” 
European Journal of Health Law 11, no. 2 (2004): 175-186. 
592 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 153-154. 
593 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 154. 
594 Gevers, Janssen, and Friele, “Consent Systems for Post Mortem Organ Donation in Europe,” 175-186. 
595 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 149-155. 
596 James F. Childress, “Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for Transplantation,” Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law 14, no. 1 (1989): 97. 
597 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 152-153. 
598 Organ Donation Taskforce, “The Potential Impact of an Opt Out System for Organ Donation in the UK,” 2008. 
pgs. 15-16, accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digi
talassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_090303.pdf.  
599 Sharon Brennan, “New Opt-Out System in Wales Aims to Revolutionise Organ Donation,” The Guardian, 
November 25, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/nov/25/organ-donation-wales-pioneers-opt-out.  
600 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, 
revised ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 88-89. 
601 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, 181-184. 
602 Aaron Spital, "Mandated Choice for Organ Donation: Time to Give it a Try," Annals of Internal Medicine 125, 
no. 1 (1996): 66-68. 
603 Cindy George, “Texas Gains Ground on Registering Organ Donors,” Houston Chronicle, July 27, 2010, 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Texas-gains-ground-on-registering-organ-donors-1695982.php.  
604 “Editorial: Saying Yes to Organ Donor Registry,” The Dallas Morning News, January 17, 2013, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130117-editorial-saying-yes-to-organ-donor-registry.ece.  
605 George H. Ryan, “’Life Goes On’ Effort Boosts Organ Donors,” Illinois Municipal Review (September 1994): 
19-20, http://www.lib.niu.edu/1994/im940919.html.  
606 Douglas MacKay and Alexandra Robinson, "The Ethics of Organ Donor Registration Policies: Nudges and 
Respect for Autonomy," The American Journal of Bioethics 16, no. 11 (2016): 3-12. 
607 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 7. 
608 United States, "Defining Death: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death,” President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1982): 2. 
609 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 43-67. 
610 Robert M. Arnold and Stuart J. Youngner, "The Dead Donor Rule: Should we Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon 
It?," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 3, no. 2 (1993): 265-267. 
611 Robert D. Truog, Franklin G. Miller, and Scott D. Halpern, "The Dead-Donor Rule and the Future of Organ 
Donation," New England Journal of Medicine 369, no. 14 (2013): 1287. 
612 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 67-77. 
613 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 35-36. 
614 Truog, Miller, and Halpern, "The Dead-Donor Rule and the Future of Organ Donation,” 1287. 
615 James M. DuBois, "Is Organ Procurement Causing the Death of Patients," Issues in Law & Medicine 18 (2002): 
21. 
616 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 38. 
 
Endnotes 
      
 241 
 
      
617 “OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee: Meeting Summary – March 14, 2016,” Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1584/ethics_meetingsummary_20160314.pdf.  
618 Robert M. Veatch, "The Conflict between Advance Directives and Organ Donation: A New Problem in End-of-
Life Planning," JAHR-European Journal of Bioethics 6, no. 12 (2015): 273-274. 
619 Henk ten Have and Michele S. Jean, eds., The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: 
Background, Principles, and Application (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2009), 126-132. 
620 David F. Kelly, Medical Care at the End of Life: A Catholic Perspective (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2006), 29-31. 
621 Alec Buchanan, "Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment," Journal of the Royal Society 
of Medicine 97, no. 9 (2004): 415. 
622 James F. Childress, “The Failure to Give: Reducing Barriers to Organ Donation,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal 11, no. 1 (2001): 9-10. 
623 Joshua Mezrich and Joseph Scalea, “As They Lay Dying,” The Atlantic, April 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/04/as-they-lay-dying/386273/.  
624 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 32-34. 
625 “OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee: Meeting Summary – March 14, 2016,” Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1584/ethics_meetingsummary_20160314.pdf.  
626 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 35-43. 
627 Veatch, "The Conflict between Advance Directives and Organ Donation," 273-274. 
628 Aaron L. Mackler, Introduction to Jewish and Catholic Bioethics: A Comparative Analysis (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2003), 30–31. 
629 Jordan Potter, “The Principle of Double Effect in End-of-Life Care,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15, 
no. 3 (2015): 526-528. 
630 Linda Farber Post, Jeffrey Blustein, and Nancy N. Dubler, Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 31. 
631 Kelly, Medical Care at the End of Life: A Catholic Perspective, 39-41. 
632 Alexia M. Torke, G. Caleb Alexander, and John Lantos, "Substituted Judgment: The Limitations of Autonomy in 
Surrogate Decision Making," Journal of General Internal Medicine 23, no. 9 (2008): 1514-1515. 
633 Torke, Alexander, and Lantos, "Substituted Judgment: The Limitations of Autonomy,” 1514-1515. 
634 Loretta M. Kopelman, "The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of All Ages," The 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 35, no. 1 (2007): 187-189. 
635 Post, Blustein, and Dubler, Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, 31. 
636 Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith, and Alan R. Nelson, eds., Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and 
Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (Washington: The National Academies Press, 2002), 162-163. 
637 Michelle van Ryn and Jane Burke, "The Effect of Patient Race and Socio-Economic Status on Physicians' 
Perceptions of Patients," Social Science and Medicine 50, no. 6 (2000): 822-823. 
638 Peter B. Bach et al., "Racial Differences in the Treatment of Early-Stage Lung Cancer," New England Journal of 
Medicine 341, no. 16 (1999): 1198-1202. 
639 Smedley, Stith, and Nelson, eds., Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities, 164-165. 
640 Carmen R. Green et al., "The Unequal Burden of Pain: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain." Pain 
Medicine 4, no. 3 (2003): 286. 
641 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 7. 
642 John Z. Ayanian et al., "The Effect of Patients' Preferences on Racial Differences in Access to Renal 
Transplantation," New England Journal of Medicine 341, no. 22 (1999): 1667. 
643 Bertram L. Kasiske et al., "The Effect of Race on Access and Outcome in Transplantation," New England 
Journal of Medicine 324, no. 5 (1991): 302-304. 
644 Laura A. Siminoff, Christopher J. Burant, and Said A. Ibrahim, "Racial Disparities in Preferences and 
Perceptions Regarding Organ Donation," Journal of General Internal Medicine 21, no. 9 (2006): 999-1000. 
645 Post, Blustein, and Dubler, Handbook for Health Care Ethics Committees, 34-35. 
646 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 37-38.  
647 David Wahlberg, “Imminent Death Organ Donation Could Help Others, Stir Distrust,” Wisconsin State Journal, 
July 6, 2015, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/health-med-fit/imminent-death-organ-donation-could-help-
others-stir-distrust/article_6c5d178a-48bc-5eee-9ba6-6c5c72fce62d.html.  
 
 242 
 
      
648 “OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee: Meeting Summary – March 14, 2016,” Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1584/ethics_meetingsummary_20160314.pdf.  
649 Jen Allen et al., "Americans' attitudes toward euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, 1936-2002," Journal of 
Sociology & Social Welfare 33 (2006): 12-17. 
650 Bert Gordijn, Ben Crul, and Zbigniew Zylicz, “Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide,” in The Ethics of 
Palliative Care: European Perspectives, ed. Henk ten Have and David Clark (Buckingham, UK: Open University 
Press, 2002), 182-183. 
651 Kelly, Medical Care at the End of Life: A Catholic Perspective, 39-41. 
652 Potter, “The Principle of Double Effect in End-of-Life Care,” 516-520. 
653 Allen et al., "Americans' attitudes toward euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, 1936-2002," 12-14. 
654 Darrel Montero, "End-of-Life Issues in the United States after Terri Schiavo: Implications for Social Work 
Practice," Advances in Social Work 12, no. 2 (2011): 168-171. 
655 Valerie Richardson, “California Becomes Fifth State to Allow Physician-Assisted Suicide,” The Washington 
Times, October 5, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/5/california-fifth-state-to-allow-physician-
assisted/.  
656 Penney Lewis, “Assisted Dying: What does the Law in Different Countries Say?,” BBC News, October 6, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-34445715.  
657 Veatch and Ross, Transplantation Ethics, 40. 
658 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 40-42. 
659 Dominic Wilkinson, “Organ Donation Euthanasia,” Practical Ethics in the News Blog, May 10, 2010, 
http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2010/05/organ-donation-euthanasia/.  
660 DuBois, "Is Organ Procurement Causing the Death of Patients," 21. 
661 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 37-38. 
662 Jiefu Huang, "Ethical and Legislative Perspectives on Liver Transplantation in the People's Republic of China,” 
Liver Transplantation 13, no. 2 (2007): 193-196. 
663 Jiefu Huang et al., "A Pilot Programme of Organ Donation after Cardiac Death in China," The Lancet 379, no. 
9818 (2012): 862-865. 
664 David J. Rothman and Sheila M. Rothman, Trust is not Enough: Bringing Human Rights to Medicine (New 
York: New York Review Books, 2006), 12. 
665 Thomas Diflo, “Use of Organs from Executed Chinese Prisoners,” The Lancet 364 (2004): 30-31. 
666 Rothman and Rothman, Trust is not Enough: Bringing Human Rights to Medicine, 13-14. 
667 Huang et al., “A Pilot Programme of Organ Donation after Cardiac Death in China,” 862-863. 
668 James Griffiths, “Report: China Still Harvesting Organs from Prisoners at a Massive Scale,” CNN, last modified 
June 24, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/asia/china-organ-harvesting/.  
669 Thomas Diflo, “Use of Organs from Executed Chinese Prisoners,” The Lancet 364 (2004): 30-31. 
670 “The Ethics of Organ Donation from Condemned Prisoners,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 
accessed November 5, 2016, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/the-ethics-of-organ-donation-from-
condemned-prisoners/.  
671 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 42. 
672 Dirk Ysebaert, et al., "Organ Procurement after Euthanasia: Belgian Experience," Transplantation Proceedings 
41, no. 2 (2009): 585-586. 
673 Wilkinson and Savulescu, "Should We Allow Organ Donation Euthanasia?,” 42. 
674 F.M. Figueiredo et al., "Organ Donation in Suicides," Transplantation Proceedings 39, no. 2 (2007): 344-345. 
 243 
 
Chapter 6 - A New Model for the United States Organ Donation System 
 Now that the moral argument in favor of CLOD has been made and defended and the 
various other organ donation proposals have been analyzed and evaluated for their ethicality, it is 
finally time to put all the pieces together and apply this knowledge to develop a United States-
based system of CLOD and mandated choice, opt-out cadaveric organ donation to better meet 
the surging demand for viable organs for transplantation. While most calls and proposals for 
CLOD and other types of incentivized donation have been met with skepticism and opposition, 
there has long been a growing interest and suspicion that financial incentives for organ donation 
might be the only way to more effectively meet our organ needs. This is evidenced by the 
numerous different legislative proposals that have been proposed in the last two decades dealing 
with providing some type of incentives, both financial and non-financial, for organ donation.675 
Furthermore, even the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee has recently finally started considering 
the possibility of financial incentives for organ donation, which is a major step forward from 
previous attitudes toward CLOD and the overall usage of financial incentives for CLOD. They’re 
currently working on a white paper that is anticipated to recommend that it is an appropriate time 
to conduct pilot studies on financial incentives for organ donation.676 Clearly, then, it is as good 
of a time as ever to develop a revamped model for the United States organ donation system. 
 By modifying the Iranian model to decrease the extreme bodily commodification present 
in their system and combining two of the previously discussed methods of garnering consent for 
cadaveric organ donation, this chapter develops an ethical and effective system of CLOD and 
mandated choice, opt-out cadaveric organ donation that can better serve the growing organ needs 
within the United States. The chapter starts off by analyzing some potential changes to the 
Iranian model’s compensation scheme to find a more ethically palatable method of live donor 
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compensation that would still provide significant incentives to increase organ donation rates 
from living donors. Next, potential funding options and other types of payment and scheme 
proposals are discussed, and it is highlighted how there is no shortage of viable options for such 
a system to succeed. Finally, the chapter ends by looking at the concept of libertarian 
paternalism, specifically as it relates to opt-out policies and “nudges,” and it is proposed that this 
concept of “nudges” should ultimately be combined with a mandated choice policy to create the 
most ethical and effective consent policy for cadaveric organ donation. 
6.1)  Compensated Live Organ Donation: Tax Benefits 
 Though the Iranian model of CLOD is clearly the most effective and ethical system of 
CLOD ever implemented, it still has several weak areas that can be updated and improved. 
Specifically, the compensation scheme, i.e. how the donors are compensated, is one area that can 
be substantially modified to make the practice of CLOD more ethically palatable and 
professional across a pluralistic, multicultural society. Further, the Iranian model’s issues with 
inconsistency in the implementation of the law regarding CLOD can ultimately be remedied via 
strict federal guidelines that all OPOs are required to follow under penalty of law, which should 
provide a much more efficient and consistent overall practice across the nation. 
6.1.1)  Tax Benefits 
As mentioned above, though the Iranian model of compensated kidney donation is the 
most successful system of CLOD in history, it still suffers from the utilization of extreme bodily 
commodification, i.e. quid pro quo agreements between two parties that directly exchanges cash 
for an organ, due to relying on two separate direct monetary payments to the donor for their 
donated organ. Ultimately, to be ethically palatable enough to be considered politically viable for 
effective legislation, this compensation scheme must be substantially changed to ever have a 
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chance of being implanted in the multicultural, liberal society that is the United States. To 
address this weakness of extreme commodification in this model, a revised model must pass two 
conditions: (1) there must be no direct payment for organs, and (2) the notion of donation must 
be retained. However, though using things like moral or nonfinancial incentives would be 
consistent with these conditions, practically they do not appear to provide enough incentives to 
meet the need for viable organs.677  
 One idea that potentially meets these two conditions while still providing enough 
incentive for many more individuals to donate is a system based on tax benefits received for 
charitable donations one made throughout the year. In the United States and most other 
countries, individuals can deduct charitable donations that they made off their taxable income. 
When one makes any sort of donation to a religious organization, non-profit organization, 
charity, or government agency, the amount of the donation is a tax write-off that one does not 
have to pay taxes on. For example, if Shelly made $50,000 annually and was in the 25 percent 
tax bracket, a $10,000 donation to UNICEF would actually only cost her $7,500, because she’d 
be able to deduct that $10,000 off her taxable income of $50,000, making it $40,000 of taxable 
income. These incentives are promoted by nations to encourage charitable giving to charities and 
other non-profit, religious, or governmental organizations.678 
 Since governmental agencies and non-profit organizations can accept charitable 
donations that are tax deductible, OPTN and/or UNOS, mimicking the supervisory and 
administrative roles played by the Iranian Ministry of Health and the Anjomans in the Iranian 
model, could then make donations eligible to be considered tax deductible transactions under the 
framework of the charitable donations tax deduction. Once achieving this status, donations could 
then be incentivized without the appearance of extreme bodily commodification that is seen in 
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the Iranian model, because this practice could pass the two aforementioned conditions, i.e. there 
is no direct payment for organ donation and the notion of donation is retained. Essentially, these 
tax benefits are incentives for charitable giving, so the tax deduction is just a benefit for one’s 
charitable gift, i.e. their kidney (or part of their liver).  
The deduction amount would have to be a large figure, though, because there’s a rather 
ungenerous exchange rate between actual tax savings and the dollar amount of the deduction, let 
alone the inherent variability of the total amount of savings based on one’s particular income 
totals. For example, let’s say this year Shelly, who is single, decided to donate her kidney instead 
of making her usual monetary donations to charity, and let’s posit that the tax deduction for a 
charitable kidney donation is $15,000. Shelly would then only be paying taxes on $35,000 of her 
$50,000 worth of taxable income, which would drop her from the 25 percent tax bracket to the 
15 percent tax bracket, according to the 2015 tax year brackets. Thus, instead of owing 
approximately $8,300 in federal income taxes this year, Shelly would save around $3,500 and 
only owe approximately $4,800 in federal income taxes, which is a far cry from the original 
$15,000 set deduction rate.679 
 But as mentioned above, the inherent variability of the use of tax deductions with 
differing income totals in a progressive tax bracket system makes this method less than ideal for 
a practice that would inherently rely on a substantial financial incentive to be effective. Further, 
nearly half of American households don’t regularly pay federal income tax due to not having 
enough taxable income or already receiving enough tax benefits/breaks to eliminate their tax 
liability anyways, meaning this deduction would essentially be useless to half of American 
households, specifically the half most likely to utilize compensated donation, too.680 Thus, it 
makes much more sense to have live kidney donations qualify as a charitable donation tax credit 
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rather than deduction, because rather than just lowering the amount of taxable income that one 
owes, tax credits actually “provide a dollar-for dollar reduction of your income tax liability.” 
And refundable tax credits can even reduce one’s tax liability below zero and garner the 
individual a tax refund, meaning actual cash in pocket rather just tax savings at the end of the 
year, which is what this proposed system of CLOD ultimately needs to be effective.681 
So if live kidney donation was established at a somewhat fixed price (more on this below) 
for a refundable tax credit, then even those without a taxable income or tax liability can take 
advantage of this incentive, meaning more overall donations. This is similar to the first-time 
home buyer credit established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 where 
first-time home buyers, subject to certain criteria, were eligible for a fully refundable $8,000 tax 
credit, so there is precedent for these types of special tax credits and assorted benefits.682 Of 
course, in some cases it makes more financial sense to take the deduction route over the credit 
route, especially in the higher incomes around the bracket cut-offs, so having both options 
available provides incentives for the entire spectrum of income earners from poor to rich. 
But at what price should this refundable tax credit be set at? As stated in chapter four, in 
an attempt to find a minimum threshold amount that would constitute a fair payment to 
significantly incentivize live organ donation in the United States, noted economists Gary S. 
Becker and Julio Jorge Elias concluded in a 2007 economics study that payments of roughly 
$15,200 would increase kidney transplants by 44% and payments of $37,600 would increase 
liver transplants by 67%, though larger payments could ultimately attract more donors, while 
also curbing the demand.683 Of course this study was also completed a decade ago, so the 
minimum threshold for a fair payment is going to be higher today due to inflation. According to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI Inflation Calculator, $15,200 in 2007 has the same buying 
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power as $17,802.24 in 2017, and $37,600 in 2007 has the same buying power as $44,037.13 in 
2017.684 So to make things even and at a set, recognizable number, rounding these price 
projections up to $20,000 and $45,000, respectively, would not only constitute fair payments for 
these particular organ donations, but it would also potentially raise the projected organ donation 
rate increases that Becker and Elias predicted, since these proposed prices are comparatively 
higher than their proposed price in 2007. Further, these prices would not only be considered fair 
to the donor, but also not unreasonably high enough to be considered too “irresistible to resist” 
and undue inducement. This is especially true when compared to the rates seen in the Iranian 
kidney model, which Sigrid Fry-Revere equates to roughly $45,000 in American currency (liver 
transplants involve more overall risk and recovery time, which justifies the price of live 
transplants matching that of Iran’s kidney transplants).685 
But as K. Gandhi notes, inflation and cost-of-living increases occur regularly, so a set, 
static price isn’t necessarily ideal either. It’s also not ideal because the cost-of-living is so vastly 
different across the nation.686 For example, $20,000 will go a lot farther for an individual in rural 
Nebraska than Southern California. So to make this system of CLOD as efficient and as 
attractive as possible, there should be price variances and adjustments based upon both yearly 
inflation and cost-of-living rates in the region. Another potential issue in pricing that will lead to 
price variance is the quality of the organ. As with any other commodity, a higher quality organ 
should mean more compensation for the donor than a lower quality organ. For example, a young, 
healthy individual with a perfect kidney should certainly be compensated more for her organ 
than an older, unhealthy obese individual with a kidney of lesser quality. Perhaps these prices 
could be determined by a standardized list of criteria with variable values attached to each, such 
as being a non-smoker, not overweight, physically fit, etc., along with a tiered system of tax 
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credits that would correspond to both the quality of the organ and the living region (cost-of-
living). I won’t speculate on these potential price variances for inflation, cost-of-living, and 
quality, but the important thing is to note the existence of these price variances that will 
necessarily have to be analyzed and discussed. So there will certainly be a range of factors that 
the regional OPOs will have to analyze and evaluate to decide upon agreeable price 
determinations, but for the rest of the dissertation we will assume the standard, base price 
refundable tax credit of $20,000 for a kidney donation and $45,000 for a liver donation. 
Now some might argue that this is just semantic manipulation, and tax benefits constitute 
an indirect organ payment.687 But analogously this would mean that tax deductions for monetary 
donations would be a payment for the actual cash or check involved in the charitable donation 
itself, which doesn’t necessarily make sense. Yes, by definition this is still a case of 
commodification of the human body. But as argued earlier, the State has no right to legislate 
prohibition on these matters anyways, and the goal is to minimize the appearance of 
commodification as much as possible, not necessarily totally eradicate bodily commodification 
altogether, which would be virtually impossible in CLOD. The overall goal is to make this 
process of bodily commodification ethically palatable and socially acceptable, just like the 
numerous other examples of bodily commodification that were mentioned in chapter five, not to 
erase the appearance of bodily commodification that the State has no right to govern anyways. 
What’s more, the best thing about this proposal is the significant legal precedent already 
established for such a system. For example, as mentioned above the first-time home buyer credit, 
established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, allowed first-time home 
buyers, subject to certain criteria, to be eligible to claim a fully refundable $8,000 tax credit, so 
there is already precedent for these types of special tax credits and assorted benefits for specific 
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aims and purposes.688 Even better, in 2016 19 states already had laws allowing tax deductions or 
tax credits, generally valued at $10,000, for living donors as compensation, or more technically 
reimbursement, for travel, lodging, and lost wages related to the living organ donation process.689 
But the only reason that these tax benefits for living organ donation are available is because there 
are numerous states that don’t have laws to protect or reimburse living organ donors, which 
forces them to pay out of pocket to make the charitable act of organ donation, including costs 
associated with travel, lodging, and lost wages during testing and recovery times.690 So not only 
are we not currently properly encouraging and providing incentives for live organ donation, 
we’re also practically discouraging it by forcing significant costs upon the donors themselves. 
 This type of compensation system also provides further advantages beyond avoiding the 
extreme commodification of the Iranian system. For instance, one recent study suggests that 
CLOD can actually save the healthcare system money with double-digit increases in the 
percentages of viable kidneys available for transplantation, which would significantly cut federal 
dialysis costs.691 And as detailed in chapter four, this same logic fueled another study that found 
that CLOD could ultimately save the United States healthcare system over $90,000 per transplant 
patient over a period of 20 years, which we’ll discuss again below when it comes to funding.692 
What’s more, this model based on tax benefits compensation can even lessen the concerns with 
the voluntariness of the decision to donate one’s organs, because the incentives, i.e. tax savings 
and cash refunds, wouldn’t be immediate, which means this wouldn’t be an impulsive decision 
based on short-term goals and desires. This would also allow ample time to conduct interviews 
with potential donors to further gauge voluntariness and the potential donor’s psyche, stability, 
and appropriateness for candidacy. Thus, this system based on tax benefits for CLOD would 
allow incentivized kidney donations that minimize commodification of the body and provide 
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several other practical benefits, both to the overall system and to the autonomy and welfare of 
potential donors and recipients. 
6.1.2)  Funding and Other Proposals 
Of course, one issue that we have yet to discuss is the funding of this proposal. Due to the 
United States’ particular political context and its heavy reliance on a private healthcare system, 
it’s not as simple as just having the federal government take the hit with these losses in tax 
revenue, and even the shelling out of more tax refunds, because the US federal government is not 
as involved in the healthcare system as other federal governments are in more socialized forms 
of healthcare, such as single-payer systems. However, there are several ways around this.  
First, as referenced several times throughout the dissertation already, there’s significant 
positive evidence that instituting a regulated system of CLOD in the United States would 
ultimately pay for itself, if not even further save the healthcare system money, due to the federal 
government already extending Medicare coverage to greater than 90% of Americans with kidney 
failure that need dialysis to survive via the End-Stage Renal Disease Program of the Medicare 
Act of 1972.693 These expenditures account for $34 billion per year for dialysis care, which is a 
significant portion of Medicare’s overall spending.694 And studies have estimated that over a 20 
year period at least $90,000 could be saved per transplant patient in a regulated system of CLOD, 
and one could even consider up to an upper range of $270,000 saved per transplant patient if 
society would value the additional 3.5 QALYs gained by transplant patients with the same rate of 
value that is designated per QALY on dialysis.695 What’s more, this study was completed over a 
decade ago, so it very well could be that the savings are even more significant in 2017. 
Thus, even compensating donors at the price of $25,000 per kidney, the overall 
healthcare system stands to gain at least $65,000 per transplant patient in such a system, which 
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means this system would essentially fund itself and even save money. Of course, this monetary 
gain won’t necessarily be true in every single transplant patient. Since the transplant recipient’s 
health insurance company is generally financially responsible for the donor’s testing, surgical, 
and post-operative care costs, at least some of those transplants will have recipients that are 
covered by either Medicare or Medicaid, meaning the federal government and/or the state, which 
would be reimbursed by the federal government, would be covering the cost of the transplant. 
That would significantly cut into the bottom line of the savings. But the savings accumulated 
from privately insured recipients should still more than cover these types of situations with 
recipients on Medicare and/or Medicaid, along with the much smaller number of liver transplants 
annually. At worst, this should make the system break even, which is still a major overall 
success. Clearly, then, this self-funding option is the most practical and politically expedient 
funding option for such a proposal of CLOD. 
Second, it’s also not unprecedented to reallocate funds in the federal budget or even 
create new taxes and/or initiatives to fund these types of new programs. For example, the most 
recent military budget has the United States spending a whopping $596 billion in defense 
spending, which is nearly $30 billion more than the next seven countries combined, so it could 
very well be argued that this is a non-controversial, very beneficial potential source of 
reallocated funding for this new program, especially due to the program’s modest financial needs 
for compensation.696 In other examples, states have used new taxes and/or initiatives to fund new 
social programs like this in the past, including the state of Illinois in the 1990s utilizing the “Live 
and Learn” initiative to fund a successful media campaign aimed at increasing organ and tissue 
donation rates in the state.697 
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 Third, the federal government could also work in conjunction with private insurance 
companies and require them, either the recipient’s insurance company or the actual donor’s 
insurance company, to reimburse the federal government for lost tax revenue and/or the amount 
of the refund for that individual. Depending on which insurance party would ultimately be 
responsible for reimbursing the federal government, this might also be an ideal option due to 
over a quarter of the United States population already receiving Medicaid benefits as it is.698 That 
is, this might make quite a bit of sense if most of the donors are already utilizing entitlement 
healthcare, which would keep the same party, i.e. the federal government, at both ends of the 
transaction and eliminate the need for a third-party reimbursement. This kind of involvement and 
cooperation of private insurance companies has also been posited elsewhere in markets for 
organs from cadaveric, rather than live, organ donation.699 
Finally, a fourth way this could work is to have this broken down on the state level with 
state taxes with each individual state regulating and administrating its own market. States could 
raise the money via the addition of a specific tax or by other initiatives, similar to the Illinois 
approach under George Ryan in the 1990’s, and that could offset the cost of lost tax revenue and 
refunds.700 In many ways, this method could offer several advantages over federal oversight, 
such as increased efficiency with a smaller pool of Americans and the prospect of helping one’s 
local neighbors. However, this also might not be feasible in all states with higher or unhealthier 
populations and lower budgets, and it could still lead to substantial waiting lists in certain states.  
This also brings up another possibility – making this a private sector program instead of a 
purely federal or state program in the public sector. Proponents of this idea argue that making it a 
private enterprise would lead to more overall efficiency and less corruption. And in fact, there 
might already be some precedent for this due to the fact that the OPTN (the United States’ sole 
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organ procurement and transplantation network that coordinates the entire organ donation, 
procurement, and transplantation process) is administrated and ran under government contract by 
the private, non-profit organization UNOS.701 And ultimately, this is most likely how any system 
of CLOD would be organized anyways. Either UNOS would greatly expand to take upon the role 
of overseeing and regulating the process of CLOD, or another private, non-profit organization 
would be contracted by the federal government to oversee and regulate the process of CLOD. 
And most likely the 58 regional OPOs would also be expanded with new departments 
aimed solely at administrating the process of CLOD, and they’d ultimately function like the 
Anjomans from the Iranian model. As for the allocation process, it would largely mimic the 
allocation philosophy utilized by UNOS now for cadaveric organ donors, only presumably with 
significantly more viable organs to work with, along with having a much greater chance of 
always finding a near-perfect histocompatible match for recipients, which makes the transplant 
much more likely to be a long-term success. And just as with cadaveric organ donation, all 
CLOD transactions will be required to go through the regional OPO, which ensures a fair and 
safe process for both the donor and the recipient. This would also guard against possible abuse 
and exploitation from organ brokers and those attempting transplant tourism. And, of course, 
CLOD transactions would necessarily need to be limited to American citizens, and permanent 
legal residents that pay taxes, which is another way to prevent potential abuse and exploitation. 
So while a completely private program of CLOD could probably never happen, especially given 
the fact that compensation involves federal income tax benefits, there’s a good mixture of public 
and private components to keep corruption at bay and efficiency at its peak, while also having 
the consistency of a single national compensated organ donation policy that is strictly enforced 
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and mandated on the overseeing non-profit organization and the individual OPOs, which helps 
with the inconsistency problems that plague the Iranian model in its various provinces. 
And finally, though this proposal relies on tax benefits compensation for live donors, 
there are other potential proposals that might also work in combination with this particular 
proposal. For example, college tuition, or even something as simple as in-state tuition rates, 
represents a powerful financial incentive for many individuals, and even long-term health 
insurance vouchers provide significant incentives for certain people. This type of variety of 
compensation options is something that Dr. Arthur Matas, an outspoken proponent of CLOD, has 
proposed elsewhere, and utilizing a similar sort of centralized regulating agency, he proposes 
that giving donors a variety of options for compensation is a way to diversify the donor pool and 
maximize organ donation rates to attract as many types of people to the pool of donors as 
possible.702 Another proposal by attorney Sarah Krieger Kahan also puts control of the trade in a 
centralized agency, but she proposes that this agency would actually purchase organs from 
donors individually and allocate these organs similar to how we allocate cadaveric organs 
now.703  
So beyond this particular proposal relying on tax benefits compensation, there are several 
other substantial proposals that hold promise as efficient models for regulating CLOD in the 
United States, and though they differ substantially in their methods, they all share the same 
underlying assumption that a centralized, federal agency should solely and strictly regulate the 
process to avoid the corruption and unethical situations that are commonplace in open, 
unregulated markets for organs. Thus, this proposal offers a unique, practical, and ethical avenue 
of incentivizing live organ donation via a tax framework that is already largely present and does 
not fall into the ethical conundrum of extreme bodily commodification like the Iranian model. 
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6.2)  Mandated Choice, Opt-Out Cadaveric Organ Donation  
 Beyond the establishment of a regulated system of CLOD in the United States, a 
revamped system of organ donation must also address cadaveric organ donation. As stated last 
chapter, there are clearly significant practical and moral reasons to adopt a consent system of 
mandated choice over the more traditional systems of opt-in, explicit consent and opt-out, 
presumed consent that still dominate many nations’ consent policies today. However, by adding 
a further “nudge” to the mix, mandated choice systems can be made even more efficient. 
6.2.1)  Libertarian Paternalism and “Nudges” 
Due to the advancements of disciplines such as psychology and behavioral economics, it 
is now known that we humans are not nearly as rational as we once thought we were, and we are 
subject to irrational influences and cognitive biases that substantially affect our decision-making 
abilities. For example, default settings and the way that information or options are presented to 
an individual, i.e. choice-framing effects, can significantly affect the decision that an individual 
will make depending upon how these default settings and choice-framing effects are set up and 
presented.704 Manipulating these irrational influences and biases can then be considered part of a 
good “choice architecture,” or the deliberate design of the presentation of various differing 
choices aimed at favoring one choice over others, and libertarian paternalism, or a “nudge,” can 
be defined as “any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as 
a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. 
Putting the fruits at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.”705  
 In actual policy, libertarian paternalism is then used in a couple differing ways. First, 
there are certain default settings that necessarily require one preference over another, such as 
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when the default is bifurcated into one of two options. As Sunstein puts it, “default rules and 
starting points often matter, institutions can't avoid nudging people -- and hence can't avoid a 
kind of paternalism, or at least a nudge.”706 Thus, the argument is that since a preference must 
necessarily be set in the default setting, as long as there’s an option to opt-out of the default, then 
it might as well be one that promotes the best outcomes.  
A second and more controversial use of policies that many consider to be nudges is the 
method of providing incentives or disincentives for particular actions, states, or purchases. For 
example, “sin taxes” are measured hikes in taxes for certain purchases considered “sins,” 
“vices,” or undesirable habits, i.e. habits or pleasures that lead to immediate gratification but also 
future health costs and consequences, such as potato chips, as determined by the State.707 These 
taxes are “levied to both discourage and profit from an act purported to be harmful to society.” 
Generally, these are aimed at perceived vices, such as gambling, tobacco, and alcohol, to 
discourage their consumption. However, they’ve recently been employed in public health 
strategies aimed at curbing obesity, too, such as the UK’s decision to return to sin taxing sugary 
drinks based on the amount of sugar that they contain.708 Similarly, disincentives might also be 
used by eliminating options altogether, such as Mayor Bloomberg’s New York City large soda 
size ban.709 
The problem with these types of actions and policies is that they’re not consistent with 
the conditions of libertarian paternalism. The use of disincentives, such as “sin taxing” or 
directly eliminating options, is hardly any different from direct paternalism, because they force 
individual change by eliminating options or creating penalties for not changing. The reason 
nudges are compatible with liberalism in many default settings is because they allow the 
individual to easily opt-out without being unduly forced and coerced to participate in the 
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behavior. In eliminating options or sin taxing, though, there is no ability to opt-out, and you are 
either forcing individuals to change their conception of the good by taking away options or 
forcing them to modify their behavior, or otherwise suffer the consequences, which are higher 
taxes paid on items. Remember, this type of action is expressly prohibited in the definition of a 
nudge itself when it is stated, “To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruits at eye level counts as a nudge. 
Banning junk food does not.”710 These policies then deny individuals the freedom to choose their 
own conception of the good freely and without penalty; thus, this use of disincentives, sin taxes, 
and the elimination of options is direct paternalism and not consistent with liberalism and Mill’s 
harm principle, i.e. the threshold standard for government intervention into individuals’ lives, 
thus it isn’t libertarian paternalism, even though some vehemently argue for this status.711 
Interestingly enough, though many assume that positive incentives, especially smaller 
financial incentives, are excellent practical examples of nudges in actions, by definition they’re 
technically not nudges either. This is due to two interrelated reasons. First, there is a theoretical 
dilemma between the two different thinking systems of the human brain that are responsible for 
nudges versus incentives. Nudges are supposed to work upon the more instinctive, unconscious 
components of human thinking, i.e. what Thaler and Sunstein call the “Automatic System” of 
human thinking. This is the system of human thinking responsible for making you duck when a 
ball is unexpectedly thrown at you or making you smile when you see a cute puppy.712 However, 
incentives don’t work via this “Automatic System” of human thinking but rather the “Reflective 
System” of human thinking. This system is more rational and self-conscious than instinctive and 
unconscious, and incentives work on this system by giving the agent an actual reason to change 
their behavior, i.e. incentives engage this system by changing the cost-benefit analysis.713 Thus, 
 259 
 
financial incentives rely upon rational processes rather than cognitive biases to change behaviors, 
which, by definition, makes them incompatible to be considered nudges.714 
The second reason involves the very definition of a nudge itself. Remember, the first part 
of the definition of a nudge states that it is “any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives.”715 However, any effective incentive, especially financial, will necessarily 
change the economic incentives of the agent, so, again, by definition incentives cannot be 
considered nudges. But this isn’t to say that incentives - again, especially financial incentives - 
aren’t behavioral economic interventions or part of a good choice architecture either, because 
they clearly are.716 Similarly, this also isn’t to say that incentives aren’t effective either, because 
many empirical studies have shown the effectiveness of using cash incentives or even lottery-
based incentives to further promote public health aims.717 However, though incentives are 
effective components of a good choice architecture with the aims of behavioral economic 
intervention, conceptually they are not nudges, because they require rational reasoning and 
significantly changing the agent’s economic incentives for effectiveness. 
6.2.2)  “Nudges,” Mandated Choice, and Organ Donation 
One area where nudges have been extensively used is the area of organ donation. This is 
because the default donor status is extremely preference-laden. Currently, in the United States 
the default setting for cadaveric organ donation is negative, i.e. it is not assumed that you will 
donate your organs after death and individuals must explicitly consent and opt-in to become 
cadaveric organ donor, and attempts at changing this default status to a positive, presumed 
consent status have largely been met with skepticism, especially by the American Medical 
Association.718 However, though ultimately opting for a system of mandated-choice, Thaler and 
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Sunstein argue that a nudge and change in the default setting from negative, non-donor to 
positive, donor, i.e. an opt-out system of presumed consent, would significantly increase 
cadaveric organ donation rates.719 There is recent evidence to back up Thaler’s and Sunstein’s 
claim, too. In a recent systematic review, though it was found that other factors are also 
necessarily involved in organ donation rates, there was strong evidence that opt-out, presumed 
consent systems have increased organ donation rates over opt-in, explicit consent systems.720 
Similar findings were also reported in another recent study that found that though the number of 
living donors was higher in opt-in countries than opt-out countries, deceased donor rates and the 
total number of kidneys and livers transplanted were higher in opt-out countries than opt-in 
countries.721 
Similarly, others have argued for “faux” nudging in the sense of organ donation 
prioritization incentives where those that sign up to be cadaveric organ donors would ultimately 
receive priority over non-donors in issues of organ allocation.722 Some opponents have 
considered this method to be a disguised form of payment for organs, which is a highly 
questionable argument at best, or practically ineffective at increasing organ donation sign up 
rates.723 However, these types of incentives are very similar to what Israel has instituted, and the 
introduction of these incentives in Israel has greatly increased both the number of deceased organ 
donors and the number of newly signed donor cards.724 Of course, as was just argued above, 
incentives of this type are not technically nudges, though they still are an effective method of 
choice architecture. 
Nudges and other incentives are then an effective way to increase cadaveric organ 
donation rates; however, as argued in the previous chapter, with opt-out, presumed consent 
systems it’s very difficult in our liberal, individualized society to justify any argument that 
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automatically presumes donation without actual explicit consent. This is why both of the 
aforementioned nudges and incentives, i.e. the opt-out default setting and prioritization, should 
be combined with a mandated choice strategy on the national or federal level. By combining 
these three strategies, you provide two differing nudges or incentives, i.e. the default/status quo 
bias and prioritization, to each individual making a decision about becoming an organ donor.725 
The process would go something like this. First, via completion of driver’s license 
applications, state identification cards, tax returns, or some combination of these options, you 
mandate each individual to designate their organ donation preference. During this process, you 
provide them with the necessary educational information to make an informed choice, either 
personally or with detailed instructions for where to find more information regarding organ 
donation, such as a website, and along with this information will be information regarding both 
the prioritization incentive and the positive default status for organ donation, which gives you a 
far-reaching response rate for explicit consent.726 (It is explained below how a positive default 
status is consistent with a mandated choice approach.) Since there will already be information 
regarding the CLOD tax deduction and credit on the income tax return and the ACA has already 
established precedent for conducting this type of business on income tax returns, i.e. inquiring 
about one’s health insurance status, it seems that the mandated choice question for cadaveric 
organ donation should necessarily be on income tax returns, perhaps in addition to other state-
issued forms to ensure widespread coverage.727 
 This type of system has two main advantages. First, this system increases the percentages 
of explicit consent from the actual donor, rather than a presumed consent or consent from the 
family, because you mandate the choice to be made by individuals themselves. This is ideal, 
because it is uncertain how many families truly understand the preferences for organ donation of 
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the potential donor, which could lead to wasted organs and violated preferences or, even worse, 
organ donation from someone opposed to donation. From 2010 to 2016, the NHSBT estimated 
that 1,200 people missed out on life-saving organ transplants due to English families vetoing 
approximately 547 potential organ donation cases.728 The question is this - how many of those 
547 patients truly did have a positive preference for organ donation that was missed out upon due 
to the family misjudging their preferences? With this system, though, that won’t be a worry for 
most cases, because the health team will have either explicit consent for or against donation, 
which will ultimately keep the family from having to make yet another tough decision.729 The 
explicit choice of the individual should also be honored in both brain-death organ donation cases 
and donation after cardiac death cases, where possible. 
The second major advantage of this system is its ability to lessen the ethical concerns 
with default settings of presumed consent, which is ultimately how a positive default status is 
consistent with a mandated choice approach. As stated in the previous chapters, the main ethical 
issue with presumed consent legislation is that it seems to go against some deeply-rooted 
ideations about individuals’ sovereignty over their own bodies, and it is argued that it does not 
respect individual autonomy and individual sovereignty over one’s own body to presume a 
preference for organ donation across a population.730 However, in this system actual donation 
based on presumed consent would be at an absolute minimum, because most of the given 
population would be mandated to give an explicit preference to donation. Though since no 
system is perfect and reaching every single member of a population isn’t really feasible, we 
would have to rely on the family of the patient to decide upon organ donation, under a 
substituted judgment standard, i.e. the subjective preferences of the patient, in cases of no 
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mandated preference on file, which is essentially a soft opt-out format (with a mandated choice 
explicit consent primary component).731  
Still, though, there might be exceedingly rare cases where a patient meets the criteria for 
organ donation, a mandated preference is not on file, and no family can be located. This would 
be the only time that presumed consent would be used on a patient, and there’s actually quite a 
bit of precedence for this type of thing, too. The Anatomy Act in several Indian states allows 
unclaimed bodies to be given to medical and teaching institutions for anatomical examinations 
and teaching purposes.732 Many states in the US even have similar policies, including West 
Virginia, whose Department of Social Services has a detailed policy regarding offering 
unclaimed bodies to the Anatomical Board of Gift Registry after a search for an advanced 
directive, next of kin, and authorized representative has come up empty and the individual is to 
be buried at the public expense.733 So given these realities, a fairly persuasive argument can be 
made that those brain-dead patients, and perhaps even patients in persistent vegetative states that 
are having life-sustaining treatment withdrawn and can have organs procured via donation after 
cardiac death, whom cannot be claimed by family become the responsibility of the State, and 
consent can be presumed on the basis of the best interests of the state as a whole, which can be 
justified due to public funds having to be used in the process.  
Thus, this is essentially the justification for having a positive default status combined 
with a mandated choice approach. Ideally, the State tries to elicit explicit preferences from 
patients themselves regarding donation, and if that fails, then family members become the 
primary decision-makers regarding donation. If no family is present, then consent is presumed 
based on the responsibility and interests of the State, as there is precedent for in other contexts. 
Utilizing this positive default status as a nudge would then entail presenting this default setting to 
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the individual as the “status quo” when they are making their decision. For example, the question 
could say something like: “Though we first try to elicit and rely on (1) you or (2) your family’s 
preferences for organ donation, the default option when these preferences are unknown is a 
willingness to donate your organs upon your death. Would you like to change this donation 
status now, or would you like to continue your willingness to organ donation?”  
This would essentially be a modified version of a soft opt-out donation format that would 
proactively try to elicit and mandate donation preferences from individuals. When the individual 
has not given their preferences, then the default setting would also be of use to organ 
procurement specialists in their attempt to persuade the family to agree to organ donation. By 
informing the family of its default status, you take advantage of the status quo bias and greatly 
increase the likelihood of an affirmative decision for donation. Therefore, by adjoining the 
mandated choice philosophy with the nudges of the default/status quo bias and prioritization, 
which would be a separate component that would be inherent within the UNOS allocation 
philosophy, though thoroughly promoted, cadaveric organ donation can be effectively 
incentivized, and we can enhance and protect individual autonomy by ensuring that individuals’ 
preferences are being met by garnering explicit consent for or against organ donation in much 
larger numbers and percentages.734 
Though the above recommended changes in both CLOD and mandated choice, opt-out 
cadaveric organ donation should more than suffice to significantly reduce and minimize the 
organ waiting lists within the US, there’s also the possibility of using tax benefit incentives for 
cadaveric organ donation. Just as with CLOD, you could use a tax deduction and/or credit to 
further incentivize signing up to be an organ donor, though the deduction amount would need to 
be much, much smaller due to the much greater numbers and the ability to use it every year. A 
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bill in 2001 actually proposed a $2,500 tax credit to those who were registered as organ donors 
and had provided legal consent, though it never passed into law.735 But something like the ability 
to utilize a $500 to $1,000 tax deduction or credit for every year that you’re a registered organ 
donor should suffice for this goal. But rather than relying on another type of financial incentive 
like this, as a society we should view and promote cadaveric organ donation as a moral and 
patriotic duty of a good, morally sound citizen. This type of rhetoric with organ donation lines up 
well with many religious traditions, especially Christianity and Judaism, along with our liberal, 
secular morality. Though it’s not a strong enough duty that it should be codified by law, it is a 
strong enough duty that American society should promote it as a moral and patriotic obligation 
of the good American, of course unless there are other considerations that might make 
registering to be a donor impossible, such as certain cultural, religious, or health reasons.736  
Ultimately, this type of revamped system of organ donation and transplantation in the 
United States would look much different than the system we have today. Not only would there 
be a thriving regulated market for live organ donors with both financial and prioritization 
incentives, there would also be a significantly more engaged cadaveric organ donation system 
that actively aimed to elicit organ donation preferences rather than merely relying on word of 
mouth or a controversial notion of presumed consent to attain organs. Further, in addition to 
OPOs promoting organ donation as a patriotic and moral duty of good Americans, organ 
procurement specialists would be singing the same tune to grieving families in need of guidance 
on deciding about their loved one’s organs, along with seeking out and promoting IDOD in 
competent LSW Donors. The ultimate result of this revamp would be a much more efficient and 
robust process of both live and cadaveric organ donation, and not only would this system be 
much more practically efficient, it would also respect individual autonomy, promote beneficent 
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acts, prevent and remove harm, and ensure just and equitable treatment for the rich and 
poor/healthy and unhealthy alike. With the OPTN/UNOS ethics committee finally taking the 
consideration of financial incentives for organ donation seriously, it is now time to act to repeal 
this archaic and paternalistic prohibition of CLOD that in the West does nothing but harm others 
and encroach upon individual autonomy and conscience. It is time for all Americans to reclaim 
the classical liberal roots of our forefathers, take a stand for the hundreds of thousands of 
Americans on organ waiting lists, and proclaim to our overreaching federal government: “Do not 
tread on me.”
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
Though this revamped American model of organ donation is specifically tailored to the 
cultural, political, and moral contexts of the United States, this model’s same basic framework 
could also be a potentially good fit for numerous other nations around the world, and this is 
especially true in more developed nations and Western nations with similar cultural, political, 
and moral contexts, specifically those with commitments to liberal, democratic, and pluralistic 
values. The applicability of this model to other national contexts is due to several distinct 
reasons. First, rather than having a singular, global model of CLOD, regulated systems of CLOD 
are best suited for the national context, because national systems are easier to control, 
administrate, and regulate. It is very difficult to control, regulate, and administrate these types of 
activities across national borders, which is especially dangerous in organ donation due to the 
potential problems of donor exploitation and organ trafficking. Thus, keeping the model aimed at 
the national rather than global context is a way of both increasing efficiency and allowing tighter 
and more effective regulation and oversight over the entire compensated donation process. 
Second, the vast majority of more developed nations already include the type of tax framework 
and individual mechanisms needed to make this work. In fact, a global study covering the 6 
populated continents and 43 countries found that nearly 90 percent of those countries have some 
sort of tax benefits available for charitable donations, which means the necessary framework for 
this model is currently present in many nations around the world already.737  
Finally, the vast majority of other nations around the globe have more socialized forms of 
healthcare, meaning the government, or more accurately the taxpayer, is already financially 
responsible for the majority of its own citizens’ healthcare expenditures. This is beneficial for 
this model of CLOD for two reasons. First, as stated last chapter this type of national socialized 
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healthcare functions much easier with this model of CLOD, because there’s no ideological or 
practical issue with enabling a nation’s government to be the main purchaser/compensator of 
organs/organ donors. If the government is already largely responsible for the financial 
component of healthcare, then there’s no substantive issue with them also playing this role in this 
model of CLOD, especially when the health and financial benefits of implementing such a 
system are considered. Of course, the financial benefits for these types of healthcare systems will 
likely be significantly smaller than the financial benefits for the United States’ healthcare system, 
since other nations’ governments will almost always be paying for the entirety of the transplant 
operation costs, where the same isn’t necessarily true in the United States due to a large 
percentage of private health insurers. Second, one of the consequences of socialized healthcare is 
increased income taxes, which is required in order to have the government revenue needed to 
fund such a socialized system of healthcare. Thus, tax benefits compensation would be a very 
welcomed method of donor compensation in countries where citizens are already paying a 
significant amount of income taxes, and this would provide a very attractive financial incentive 
to potential donors. 
What’s more, even while being a developing country with a poor corruption index and 
reputation, the related and similar Iranian model of CLOD has remained remarkably effective, 
efficient, and corruption-free throughout its existence, and it has effectively deterred organ 
trafficking, organ brokers, and transplant tourism within Iran ever since its establishment. 
Transparency International is a global organization with the purpose and aims of locating, 
broadcasting, and destroying corruption in governmental agencies throughout the world. This 
organization puts out an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that ranks each country 
according to its corruption prevalence, perception, and control. Iran rates low in every factor of 
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corruption, scoring a mere 29 points out of a total of 100 points and ranking 131 out of the 176 
nations that this organization surveyed. They also rank in the 20th percentile when it comes to 
controlling corruption.738  
Thus, the fact that this model has avoided corruption in a very corrupt national 
government, while simultaneously meeting its goal of alleviating the kidney waiting list and 
halting organ trafficking and the black market, is a great testament to this model’s effectiveness, 
and the changes made to the proposed American model should only serve to bolster this 
resistance to corruption by eliminating the direct quid pro quo cash for organ exchange 
arrangement and providing a more thorough consistency in the application and enforcement of 
transplant laws and directives throughout the nation, states, and regional OPOs. Clearly, then, 
when one combines its national orientation, utilization of a common tax framework, consistency 
with socialized forms of healthcare, and ability to be effectively implemented and evade 
corruption, it becomes readily apparent that this is a promising model for nations struggling with 
long organ waiting lists worldwide. 
To conclude, our current system of organ donation is broken, and as a society we have a 
strong moral obligation to do what we can to aid these ailing individuals until our medical and 
scientific capabilities make this a problem of the past. Offering financial incentives via 
compensation for live organ donation is the only current avenue capable of adequately 
addressing this problem, and this dissertation has given a substantial and compelling moral 
justification for the establishment of a regulated system of CLOD in the United States based on 
the ethical concept of principlism and the moral and political principles of classical liberalism 
that form the foundation of our American political philosophy. This argument for the moral 
justification of CLOD was systematically presented, discussed, and defended in a step-by-step 
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process throughout the differing chapters of the dissertation, which ultimately culminated in the 
final chapter that presented the proposed revamped model of organ donation and transplantation 
for the United States.  
After giving an abbreviated version of this moral justification argument in chapter one, 
chapter two set the stage for the basis of CLOD by looking at past systems of organ donation, 
analyzing future potential avenues of organ transplantation, and elaborating on the medical, 
political, and moral contexts involved with the establishment of a regulated system of CLOD in 
the United States. This chapter then established a strong moral obligation to aid these individuals 
who are dying on organ waiting lists due to a lack of viable organs for transplantation. Since 
altruistic systems have consistently failed to meet organ needs and are very inefficient compared 
to systems utilizing financial incentives for organ donation, chapter two concluded that we have 
a strong moral obligation to not legally prohibit any morally justifiable regulated system of 
CLOD in the United States, since this would essentially be damning certain individuals with 
preventable organ failure to death due to a condition that they didn’t choose or bring about 
themselves, which is prejudiced and discriminatory. 
Chapters three and four then thoroughly investigated the possibility of morally justifying 
a regulated system of CLOD in the United States. After analyzing the concept of principlism 
containing the moral principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence, it was 
concluded that we have strong moral obligations from the principles of autonomy, justice, and 
non-maleficence to not prohibit a regulated system of CLOD in the United States. And though 
the principle of beneficence does not necessarily morally obligate us to not prohibit CLOD, the 
principle of beneficence is clearly consistent with and in favor of regulation, rather than 
prohibition, of CLOD, because CLOD ultimately engenders many beneficent acts when utilized 
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appropriately. Common substantial objections to CLOD were also analyzed and evaluated, 
including objections from exploitation, commodification, stigmatization of donors, and the 
suppression of altruistic organ donation. Though some of these moral and practical objections 
have garnered much interest and support in the professional literature, it was argued and 
concluded that none of these objections ultimately represent a sufficient and compelling case for 
the justification of the legal prohibition of CLOD in the United States. 
  Chapter five then examined the ethicality of some popular cadaveric organ donation 
consent policies and other differing organ donation proposals to further revamp the American 
system of organ donation and transplantation. After analyzing the three major cadaveric organ 
donation consent policies, it was concluded that mandated choice policies are the most practical, 
effective, and ethically sound. Other recent organ donation proposals were also evaluated and 
analyzed, including proposals of IDOD, organ donation euthanasia, and donation after physician-
assisted suicide, where allowed by law. It was concluded that IDOD in competent, capacitated 
patients and donation after physician-assisted suicide are the only two options that are ethically 
sound, and both of these options should be promoted by organ procurement specialists in their 
attempts to garner consent for organ donation and procurement. 
Finally, chapter six put all of the aforementioned conclusions and findings together and 
delineated the proposed model that is the culmination of the entire dissertation. This proposed 
model ultimately utilizes tax benefits compensation to financially incentivize live organ donation 
and increase organ donation rates. As for cadaveric organ donation, this model combines a 
mandated choice consent system with an opt-out, presumed consent system to utilize “nudges” 
and effectively incentivize and increase cadaveric organ donation rates over the rates observed in 
regular mandated choice consent systems. Thus, this dissertation has made a strong case for the 
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moral justification of CLOD and the immoral and unjustifiable nature of legally prohibiting 
individuals from freely partaking in such transactions in the United States. By following these 
steps and implementing this new proposed model to revamp the current organ donation system, 
not only can we put an end to this archaic and paternalistic prohibition of CLOD that in the West 
does nothing but impede progress and encroach upon individual autonomy and conscience, but 
we can most importantly stop standing by and watching our loved ones suffer on dialysis and 
ultimately perish prematurely due to unjustified moral paternalism based on faulty assumptions 
and abstract philosophical objections that simply do not translate to the real world.
737 “Donations in Other Countries: Are They Tax-Deductible?” Global Impact, accessed March 10, 2017, 
http://charity.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/page%20photos/GI-
KPMG_Donations%20from%20Other%20Countries.pdf.   
738 “Iran,” Transparency International, accessed March 10, 2017, http://www.transparency.org/country/IRN#.  
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